V. GELBRAS

Doctor of Historical Sciences

In China, at the beginning of the XXI century, migration movements developed, the likes of which the modern history of the world has not yet known. Their full extent and consequences are still difficult to assess. The relatively small-scale migration of peasants in the 1980s and 1990s reached an unprecedented level in 2001-2004. The process has actually just got off to a peculiar start.

The country has not yet conducted adequate research for this ^process1 . The employed population in rural areas in 2003 was almost 488 million people, or 65.6% of the total employed population of ^the country2 . According to estimates of the Ministry of Agriculture of the People's Republic of China, the actual labor needs of the industry do not exceed 170 million people. Approximately 135 million people found work in rural "enterprises of volosts and settlements" (see Table 1). It turns out that at least 150 million peasants are considered surplus rural labor in China, or more than 30% of the total number of workers. The figures are impressive: the population of China that is unnecessary for agricultural production exceeds the entire population of today's Russia... Meanwhile, every year 6 million surplus workers are added to the villages ^.3 In China, it is estimated that by 2020, the number of workers not required for agriculture will reach 250 million people!⁴ Every year, the country is experiencing an increasing migration of peasants seeking to use their forces outside their native villages. In 1990, the number of peasants who found work outside their parish was 15 million, and in 2003 it was already 98 million, that is, more than 6 times more than ⁵ . During the 1990s, more than 80 million peasants were employed in urban areas ^.6 In 2003 alone, another 90 to 110 million farmers were looking for work. At the same time, the population of 660 cities increased by more than 27% in ^the 1990s7 . In addition, between 60 and 110 million farmers do not find a permanent source of income in the villages, but they have not yet become migrants. Consequently, migration flows can be expected to expand and multiply in the coming years. Their scale and significance cannot be overestimated.

The question arises: what is known about this new phenomenon in the social and political life of the PRC?

However, first of all, we will briefly focus on the main stages of administrative and political regulation of social mobility in Chinese society. Such an overview will help to recreate the real picture of the latest phenomena in general terms, and therefore, to understand their significance and imagine their consequences ^.8

TWO UNEQUAL SOCIAL PARTS OF CHINESE SOCIETY

The population registration system began to be established in the PRC in the 1950s. In 1951, the "Provisional Rules for Urban Population Management" were published, and in 1955, the State Council of the PRC issued an "Instruction on the creation of a system for registering permanent residents". During this period, cooperation in the countryside had complex social consequences and was accompanied by a deterioration in the financial situation of a part of the peasantry. As a result, there was a massive influx of peasants to the cities. In 1956 and 1957, the Government issued three orders to prevent the spontaneous influx of rural residents into the cities.

In the following years, the government's policy changed several times. With the beginning of the Great Leap Forward in 1958, 20 million peasants were mobilized to work in the cities. In October of the same year, the Government issued the "Population Registration Regulation of the People's Republic of China", placing strict restrictions on the arrival of peasants in cities. In the 1960s, 20 million peasants mobilized to work in the cities were sent back to the countryside.

In 1964, the State Council of the People's Republic of China approved the decision of the Ministry of Public Security to control the movement of the population, emphasizing two "strict restrictions". The first of them provided for a de facto ban on urban registration of the rural population. The second - stopped the movement of the population between the cities of the country.

During the "cultural revolution" (1966-1978), more than 20 million people from among the literate urban youth and bosses were sent to the village,

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objectionable to the organizers of the cultural revolution." In 1975, the Constitution of the People's Republic of China removed the provision on the right of citizens to freedom of movement and choice of place of residence.

In essence, the set of measures taken meant the introduction of the norms of class society: from the moment of birth, a person acquired the rights and obligations of an urban or rural resident for the rest of his life. Chinese society was divided into two unequal parts. The rural population was restricted in their economic, social and cultural rights.

With the end of the "cultural revolution" in 1976-1978 and the transition from 1979 to the "policy of reform and openness", the situation in the country began to gradually change. At first, more than 20 million previously expelled citizens returned to the cities. At the same time, restrictions on the right to city registration were tightened. Moreover, when a family with a mixed rural and urban registration was formed, its members were required to work in the village, and children received only a rural registration. Later, in 1984, the CPC Central Committee ordered that peasants be allowed to settle in county towns and cities, provided that they provide for their own food. They were not given ration cards due to the citizens.

The policies of the governing bodies were again volatile. In 1989-1991, peasants who worked in cities but had "agricultural registration" were returned to the countryside.

A new turn in politics took place after the proclamation in 1992 of the policy of creating a "socialist market economy". Farmers were called upon to develop the market by taking part in the expansion of non-agricultural production on the basis of the principle of "leaving the land while staying in the countryside". This policy had important economic consequences. It contributed to the growth of the number of "enterprises of volosts and settlements" and the volume of their production. Enterprises provided an increase in the employment of the peasantry and their income.

The development of this sphere did not change, however, the main thing: society remained divided into two unequal parts. The most important flaw of the system, as Lin Guoguan wrote back in 1994, was that the rights and interests of the peasantry were sacrificed to the industrialization of cities and the development of urban civilization. "This system of registration solidified and strengthened along with the planned system, and it was to be eliminated with the establishment of the market system." ⁹ His opinion was shared by other experts, but the changes took years.

Analyzing the current situation, Chinese experts note numerous shortcomings of the virtually lifelong registration of one part of the people as an urban population, and the other as an agricultural one ^.10 Well-known economist and sociologist Lu Xueyi, an expert at the Center for Development Problems under the State Council of the People's Republic of China, pointed out the lack of equal pay for equal work of a peasant worker and a worker with a city registration. For peasant workers, different standards of working time were established, and a different length of time for performing the same types of work was established, than for urban workers ^.11

Only in 2000-2004 did the highest authorities of the CCP and the state make decisions that opened the way for peasants to freely search for work in cities. During these years, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the State Council of the People's Republic of China adopted a number of regulations that allow, regulate and encourage peasant migration. The Special Resolution of the XVI Congress of the Communist Party of China (2002) on agriculture and the status of the peasantry gave an incentive to the legislative and executive bodies of the state to step up their activities in these areas.

At the end of 2001, the State Planning Committee and the Ministry of Finance published a "Notice on the complete regularization of fees for departing or arriving employees". In this document, it was prescribed to completely eliminate fees for temporary residence, registration of temporary residents, etc. from March 1, 2002. Zhao Shukai, a specialist at the Center for Development Problems, called the elimination of fees and levies "an improvement on the old management system", and the abolition of "various discriminatory restrictions-a revolution in the old system" ¹² .

Table 1

Scale of employment at "enterprises of volosts and settlements" (millions of people)

Source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 2003 (Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 2003) - Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2003, e. 448; Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao, 2004 (Concise Chinese Statistical Handbook), e. 42.

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On January 15, 2003, the State Council of the People's Republic of China issues a "Notice on the establishment of work on the management of employment and services for peasants arriving to work in cities". The document referred to the abolition of administrative permits for the use of peasant workers by enterprises, eliminated professional restrictions for entering the work of peasant workers, and planned the gradual introduction of certificates of temporary residents. In all branches and types of work, it was prescribed to establish the equal status of urban workers and peasant workers. The decisions of 2000-2003 were assessed by Chinese authors as "important political changes", as "the arrival of spring in the employment of migrant peasants" ¹³.

In the Chinese press, it is noted that innovations are implemented inconsistently, some are ignored by local authorities altogether. For example, the Office of Planned Birth Management of Migrants in Chengdu decided to introduce special marriage certificates for migrants. They cost 50 yuan to issue. If a migrant does not have this document, a fine of 50 to 500 yuan is provided ¹⁴ .

New orders are established gradually. By the end of July 2003, in the provinces of Henan and Jiangsu, the city of Chengdu, "agricultural registration" was abolished, and a single "resident registration" (jumin hukou) was introduced for the entire population. About half of the country's provinces and cities have started to reform the registration system. In more than 20 thousand small towns, the reform is being carried out as an experiment. According to the Ministry of Public Security, this work applies to 130 million migrants. 50 million of them are registered in cities as temporary residents ¹⁵ .

WHY ARE BARRIERS TO PEASANT MIGRATION BEING REMOVED?

New solutions followed in 2004, which made it easier for farmers to migrate to the cities. The Government formulated the principles of its policy towards peasant workers: "Workers are self-employed, the market regulates employment, and the government promotes employment" ¹⁶ . In 2004, the State Council of the People's Republic of China banned wage delays for peasant workers and ordered the elimination of wage arrears within three years ^.17 A resolution on labor protection of this category of workers was adopted ¹⁸ . It is of great importance, since in 2003, 136 thousand people died in production, most of them peasant workers. In mining, construction, and hazardous chemical industries, peasant workers accounted for more than 80% of all workers killed and injured ^.19

During 2004, a number of other decisions were also adopted to normalize labor relations and social security for peasant workers. At the same time, Ding Ningning, head of the Social Department of the Center for Development Problems, acknowledged at a press conference on March 9, 2005 that there are many acute problems in these areas. Their quick solution is impossible. Employment, income gaps, and social security will remain among the most acute problems in the 11th five-year plan and throughout the entire period up to 2020.

Questions arise: Why do farmers have to look for sources of income outside of agriculture? What prompted the government to remove barriers to the migration of peasants to the cities in 2000 - 2004? Why are migration restrictions and discriminatory measures against peasant workers being gradually lifted?

It seems that the Government either does not have full information about the real situation in the country, or the situation on the ground is so complex that it takes time to develop adequate measures. Each step in their implementation requires, in turn, overcoming the resistance of various forces that are deprived of additional income at the expense of the peasant workers. Therefore, sometimes government resolutions look inconsistent.

Both parties-the peasantry and the authorities - were interested in the migration of peasants in the 2000s. The interest of farmers is clear: they need to increase their income.

General Statistical Office (GSO) The PRC conducts annual surveys of the budgets of peasant families. According to their results, 56.6% of households in 1995, 32.1% in 2000, 30.2% in 2001, and 48.3% in 2002 had per capita incomes of less than 4.1 yuan per day ($0.5) ^.20 According to international standards, this part of the peasantry lives in utter poverty. The number of employed peasants who had less than 8.2 yuan, or less than US $ ¹, per day reached more than 90% in 1995, almost 75% in 2000, 72.4% in 2001, and 69.8% in 2002,21 The trend is obvious: there is a gradual, though slow, decline in the poorest part of the peasantry. Nevertheless, their numbers remain gigantic.

Liu Jian, head of the special body of the State Council of the People's Republic of China responsible for eliminating rural poverty, noted that the number of poor people in villages who did not solve the "problem of satiety and warmth" did not decrease in 2003 for the first time during the years of reforms, but increased by 800 thousand people ^.22 It should be added that in 2003 only 15.2% of GDP was created in agriculture in the People's Republic of China23 .

The peasants are forced to look for and use every opportunity to improve their situation. Therefore, their desire to find earnings in cities is completely natural. Wang Mengkui, head of the Center for Development Problems at the State Council of the People's Republic of China, emphasizes that non-agricultural income already accounts for 50% of farmers ' incomes, of which one third is formed by income in the form of wages. Wages account for 80% of the increase in farmers ' incomes.

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The authorities realized that the country's economy is interested in increasing the incomes of the peasantry to a certain extent even more than the peasants themselves. The understanding of such a paradoxical fact was caused by the fact that domestic demand for Chinese industrial products, determined by the needs of 20% of the world's population, on the one hand, did not create stable impulses for increasing production, and on the other, it caused social tension. Measures to develop the domestic market have become necessary. Focusing exclusively on the production of goods for export made the country dependent on the situation on the world market. China's accession to the WTO required the government to take measures to improve the competitiveness of the Chinese economy. Migration, while contributing to the involvement of the poorest segments of the population in industrial production, can significantly reduce the cost of producing export products. According to the UN, the average salary in China is 1/48 of that in the United States, 1/30 in Japan, 1/20 in Taiwan, 1/14 in South Korea; it is lower than in Mexico, Turkey, the Philippines, India, Indonesia ²⁴ . Therefore, in recent years, entrepreneurs from different countries have begun to transfer the production of many goods to China.

More than 27% of the rural population works at "enterprises of volosts and settlements". As a result, the country has developed, in the words of Wang Mengkui, a "two-layered urban and rural economy", characterized by the coexistence of backward branches of traditional agriculture and advanced branches of the modern economy.

The" two-layer economy "was, in Wang Menkui's view,"an unavoidable form of transition." In the context of the implementation of the "policy of strict separation of the city from the countryside", it led to specific social consequences and lagged behind urbanization and industrialization. "Volost and Village enterprises" have played an important role in the country's economy. Currently, in his opinion, they are changing, and it is necessary to look for a new name for them, for example, "small enterprises in the village". It is necessary to find ways to ensure that" small enterprises in the countryside " organically join the unified process of industrialization and modernization of the entire country. These enterprises will transform villages into" small towns", forming the" economic center " of urbanization and turning the rural population into a non-agricultural one. In the course of such "Chinese - type" urbanization, the "most important thing" will happen-non-agricultural employment of the rural population will increase.

In this area, however, there are serious problems.

In the 10th five-year plan (2001-2005), it was planned, according to Chen Zhun, a specialist at the Center for Development Problems, to transfer 40 million peasants to work in cities and employ them in the non-agricultural sector. In fact, over the next 5 to 10 years, it is necessary to employ 15 to 20 million peasants annually in cities and in the non - agricultural sector. Over 10 years, 150-200 million people should be attracted to non - agricultural employment ²⁵ . Chen writes that already at the end of the 9th five-year plan, the lag of urbanization from industrialization has become one of the biggest strategic problems. The most radical method of transferring surplus rural labor is urban development. However, in the 10th five-year plan, special emphasis was placed on the construction of small towns, small and medium-sized cities and resolute "suppression of spontaneous expansion of large cities".

Most of those Chinese scientists who openly express their opinion believe that there is no other way to successfully develop the country, other than eliminating all forms of administrative and political division of Chinese society into urban and rural. At the same time, many of them are convinced that this path is thorny, and many problems need to be solved immediately.

"SMALL TOWNS" AND INTRA-PROVINCIAL MIGRATION

"Small towns" should appear where "enterprises of volosts and settlements" are concentrated. Both are located in rural areas and represent a kind of socio-economic magnets that attract the surrounding able-bodied rural population. I had to visit such enterprises in different parts of the country. Everywhere people went to work from afar, sometimes covering up to 10 - 20 km. It is the peasant workers who are potential residents of future "small towns".

Rural residents ' search for work in their native places creates migration flows within the provinces. Approximately half of the workers of "enterprises of volosts and settlements" may not participate in migration movements or participate in them to a minimal extent. They work in family-owned enterprises, which officially constitute the category of "individual enterprises" (they are explained in English in China by the concept of "Self-Employed Individuals"). In 1995 - 2002, their number ranged from 50 to 60 million people ^.26 They do business using home remedies and household help. Only peddlers move between localities . Apart from individual producers, approximately 60-70 million people are currently involved in the rural migration process.

In 2002, almost 133 million people worked in the "enterprises of volosts and settlements", which formed a specific, largely independent sector of the economy, including about 77 million in industry and 39.5 million in the service sector. They accounted for 31.6% of GDP, ²⁷ although it is not entirely clear how these calculations were made. Data on this subject in the Chinese press are different.

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Table 2

Main indicators of population migration in China (2000 census)

Источник: Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 2002; Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2002, e. 102 - 103.

In 2003, it was reported that 160 million peasants were engaged in non-agricultural activities28 . However, this figure did not appear in the official socio-economic results of the year.

"Enterprises of volosts and settlements" received a great development in the first years after the spread of farm work in the villages. In 1981 - 1985, the number of employees of these enterprises increased by almost 40 million people, in 1986 - 1990 - by almost 23 million, in 1991 - 1995 - by about 36 million. But then, in the second half of the 1990s, their development noticeably slowed down. In 2001-2003, the number of employees at such enterprises increased by only 8 million people.

Chen Xiwen, deputy head of the Center for Development Problems, is convinced that "enterprises of municipalities and settlements" cannot serve as a model of non-agricultural activities in the village ^.29 He came to the conclusion that it is expedient to eliminate the political separation of the city from the countryside as soon as possible, and to develop a unified concept of their economic and social development. Han Qiuyan, a specialist at the Center, supported this view. In his opinion, it is necessary to clarify the development strategy of these enterprises, providing for the creation of a single industrial system of the city and village, the formation of a single labor market. The existence of a second industrial system in the countryside" is advisable only within the framework of a clear division of labor. " ³⁰

At the same time, it is important to note that the 10 most economically developed provinces and cities, which play a leading role in the country's foreign trade, account for 54% of all "enterprises of volosts and settlements" in the country, and they employ more than 62% of the total number of employees of these enterprises. They accounted for over ⁷⁶% of value added in 200331 . Therefore, the problem is actually more complex, due to the specifics of the development of the economy of individual provinces of the country.

The fifth Census of the People's Republic of China, held in 2000, revealed some trends in population migration (see Table 2).

About 144 million people lived outside their places of residence. If we exclude 23 million people who live in cities, the number of migrants in the country was 121 million. 90 million people arrived in cities (74.4%), 31 million in villages (25.6%). 65% of the 121 million migrants found work within the province of residence, and 35%, or more than 40 million people, were looking for work in other provinces. The main provinces of the exodus were Sichuan, Anhui, Hunan, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hunan. The main points of inflow were Guangdong (35.5%), Zhejiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Beijing, Fujian, i.e. the most rapidly developing cities and provinces ³² .

The population census revealed that on the eve of the liberalization of the migration process in 2001-2003, more than 29% of the population already lived outside the places of permanent residence. The greatest mobility of the population was typical for city dwellers. Consequently, by 2000, many restrictions on the movement of the population were incompatible with the needs of their daily life.

If we talk about "enterprises of volosts and settlements", then, apparently, they have become a powerful magnet that attracts the population of different registration points. It can be assumed that at the county level, that is, in "purely" rural areas, about 19% of residents were not at the point of registration at the time of the census due to employment in other areas of their native county. The place of work, as a rule, was provided by "enterprises of volosts and settlements". It can be assumed that some citizens were also absent at the time of the census at the place of registration in connection with work at "enterprises of volosts and settlements" located outside the cities.

For a more detailed analysis of migration, we will use the materials of the 2000 census and the 2003 sample survey (see Table 3).

These tables allow us to establish that the absolute majority of the country's residents lived where they were registered. For a period of more than 6 months, a small part of it was absent from the place of registration. Therefore, if we take into account the data of the previous table, the majority of employees employed in enterprises outside the point of their registration, even in rural areas, had to find a place of work in such a way that they could get to work on time every day and have the strength to return home.

Thus, the idea of Wang Menkui about the possibility of forming "small towns" on the basis of" enterprises of volosts and settlements " is not without reason.

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Table 3

Population structure depending on the place of registration and residence (2000, 2003)

Источник: Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 2002, e. 100 - 101; Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 2004, Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2004, e. 102 - 103.

In 2001-2003, intra - provincial migration continued to develop. The information about it, of course, is significantly inferior to the information obtained in the course of the population census. Nevertheless, it deserves attention. It is quite difficult to determine the scale of migration in these years. Migration is a continuously pulsating phenomenon. Some people go on the road, some return to their place of permanent residence, some find a more or less permanent job and live there, while maintaining a rural residence permit. Most of the peasants in these years were looking for and finding a place of work in their province. At the same time, a very significant proportion of them went in search of earnings in distant lands.

To consider the prospects of migration and its social significance, it is important to answer at least three questions. First: isn't migration within neighboring villages, even counties, just a temporary phenomenon generated by the transition period necessary for the creation of"small towns"? Second, how much influence does local conditions have on the migration process and urbanisation of the village? Finally: can the movement of population between villages be considered migration? From the point of view of the inhabitants of most other countries, such mobility is not migration.

Indeed, people in many countries travel a much longer journey to and from their place of work every day, and no one calls such trips migration. Fair. The peculiarity of China, however, is that for many decades its inhabitants were attached by the system of registration to the land, to a certain point of residence. Several generations were forced to live in strict accordance with the established order. They needed the permission of the authorities even for temporary stay in other places. Passing relatively short distances, they fell into a different control zone, a different registration zone. Therefore, even relatively short movements have to be called migration in this country.

It is also equally important that today, when people move between localities and take up non-agricultural jobs, they participate in the formation of new norms of life, new social relations, permeated by many elements of urban and rural life. "Enterprises of volosts and settlements" and emerging "small towns" symbolize the formation of a new quality of life - freedom to choose a place of work and residence, freedom of movement. The fundamental conditions that characterize the quality of life of the population are changing. Therefore, we can talk about migration in this case. This is a spatially limited migration, but still a migration. It is an important process that is transforming China.

MIGRATION BETWEEN PROVINCES

The 2000 Population Census, which recorded migration flows constrained by numerous restrictions, nevertheless revealed some trends that deserve careful analysis. Between 1990 and 2003, the number of migrants who left their home provinces increased from 15 million to 98 million, according to the white paper on employment and employment policy ^.33 6-fold growth. Unprecedented scope! The press is already writing about the problems of the second generation of migrants. People who were born in cities but still have a rural residence permit grew up in cities.

Wang Mengkui writes that currently there are approximately 800 million inhabitants in villages. Their situation remains difficult.

Despite the acute shortage of arable land, cultivated areas are declining. Thus, in 1987-2001, more than 24 million mu (1.6 million ha) were requisitioned. As a result, at least 34 million farmers began to have less than 0.3 mu (0.02 ha) of land per capita, or lost it altogether. There is also an illegal seizure of cultivated land. At least 40-50 million peasants, i.e. 5-6% of the rural population, lost their land. Clearly, the migration potential in the Chinese village is enormous.

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Table 4

Migration flows based on dialect distribution, 2000

Source: Zhongguo tungji nianjian, 2003, e. 112-115.

The 2000 census serves as an important source of analysis, making it possible to establish the connection of population migration with the real problems of the country's socio-economic situation, with the historically developed living conditions of the population. Among the latter, we should mention, for example, the existence of dialects, the differences between which are sometimes so great that they make it almost impossible for everyday communication between representatives of different regions of the country (see Table 4). To overcome this obstacle, almost since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, a campaign has been launched to spread the common language of communication (Putonghua) in the country, and over half a century some results have been achieved. Thanks to them, population migration between many provinces became possible.

It is very difficult to identify the impact of China's dialect diversity on migration exchange between provinces. However, the census data allow us to establish an indisputable fact: the high rates of economic growth in the provinces of the South and Southeast are provided not only by national and foreign direct investment, but also to a large extent by the influx of additional workers, including the introduction of Putonghua, which, in turn, plays a significant role in the formation of a unified Chinese language. There is still a lot to be done in spreading Putonghua, but as they say, the ice has broken.

In regions of economic growth, migration mainly takes place in the sphere of distribution of a particular dialect. For example, in the areas of the Northern dialect, Wu, Jiang-Zhe, as well as Hakka, Yue, and Min, migration flows of local residents are mainly limited to the provinces where the corresponding dialects prevail. In these regions, even major industrial and cultural centers such as Shanghai and Guangdong attract, first of all, workers whose language of communication is the local dialect.

The opposite example. In the zones of the East Shandong dialect, the Yangtze interfluve dialects-Huanghe, Xiang, Gan, there is a predominant outflow of the working-age population. The share of migration exchange between provinces here does not exceed 10%. But even in this region there is such a center of attraction for migrants as the dynamically developing province of Shandong.

The underdeveloped region of the Northwestern Dialect is characterized by minimal migration between provinces. Its flow is directed to the neighboring Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (ARVM). Thus, in the rapidly developing XUAR, the Chinese Army's industrial and construction corps was revived in the 1990s, reaching almost 2.5 million people in 2001.

The reduction and complete removal of barriers to peasant migration in 2001-2003 and the Government's solution of a number of their pressing problems caused not only an increase in migration, but also important changes in the composition of migrants. The quality of the labor force has improved. In 2001, almost 77% of rural migrants were people with incomplete secondary or higher education levels. Employment of migrants in the service sector is rapidly increasing. The impact of migration on the growth of farmers ' incomes is increasing. In 2002, compared to 2001, the net per capita income of farmers increased by 438.2 yuan ($53) due to working outside their farms.

Migration has had a major impact on the rural economy ^.34 The impact of migration on rural life is very diverse. People who return from the cities are enriched with completely new life experience, who have mastered new professions and business skills that allow them to earn additional income in their native village.

(The ending follows)

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-----

¹ Until recently, the problem was not raised in substance, even in the bodies called upon to deal with it. Thus, two reports of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security of the People's Republic of China for 2002 and the 4th quarter of 2003 did not mention anything about peasant workers and rural migration to cities. In the books of the" blue " series on social problems of the Academy of Social Sciences, in the 2002 issue, only a few paragraphs were devoted to this topic (Blue Book of Chinese Society. Shehui lanpishu. 2002: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce (Blue Book on Chinese Society. Analysis and forecast of the social situation in China, 2002). Beijing. Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2002, e. 134). The State Statistical Office of the People's Republic of China (SSO) published the results of processing the 2000 census data containing information on peasant migration only in the yearbooks for 2002 and 2003. It was only after the first political decisions of the State Council of the People's Republic of China in 2001 - 2002 that an analysis of the problems of peasant migration to cities was developed in the country. The palm tree in this work belongs to the staff and experts of the Center for Development Problems under the State Council of the People's Republic of China, as well as several groups of sociologists.

² Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao, 2004 (China Statistical Abstract). - Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2004, e. 42.

³ "Zhongguo qinnian bao", 2004, April 8 - http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/2004/Apr/540716.htm

⁴ Guowuyan fazhan yanjiu zongxin, Zhong gong zhongyan zhengce yanjiu shi deng-in Wo guo nongcun laodongli zhangyi yu zou xiang shiminhua de zhanlue cikao (shang) 2003 - 02 - 26 (Center for Development Problems, Policy Study Office of the CPC Central Committee. Considerations on strategies for moving labor out of the country's villages and gradually becoming urbanites, part 1).- http://drcnet.com.cn/htmldocument/guoyan/gybd/2003-02-026/162003drcnetchentec hdfgdghdaA023. asp

⁵ Si. nungcun laodungli juyue (4) - http://china.com.cn/ch-book/20040426/5.htm; Zhongguode juye zhuangkuang he zhengce (Employment and Politics in China); Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen banggungshi. - Beijing. 2004. si yue - http://china.com.cn/ch-book/20040426/index.htm

⁶ Zhonghua renmin gungheguo guowuyuan xinwen bangungshi. Zhongguo de laodun he shehui baoxian zhuangkuang (Information Center of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. Labor and Social security in China) - http://china.com.en/ch-book/429/2.htm

⁷ http://xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-06/16/content_1529604/htm

⁸ The review below is based on the following publications in the Chinese press and electronic media: Lin Guoguan. Huji zhidu gaige yu chuangxin: nongmin yu shichang de huhuan (Reform of the registration system and the creation of the new: the appeal of the peasantry and the market); "Nongye jingji wenti", N 6, 1994, p. 7; Hao Hong. Weishenme sho liudong cuisheng huji gaige (Why they say that migration encourages registration reform) " Renmin ribao. Huadong xinwen", 2001, August 24 -http://people.com.cn/GB/shenghuo/200/6201/6202/20010824/542982.htm;

Ceng Wenhong. Wo guo xinxing huji zhidu jiujing you naxie biduan? (What vices, after all, are inherent in the existing system of registration in our country?) "Xinwen zhoukan". 2001 August 2. -http://people.com.cn/GB/shenghuo/200/6201/6202/20010824/543139.htm;

Huji honggou he ri cai neng xiaomi? (When will it be possible to completely eliminate the border in registration?). - "Zhongguo jinging bao", 2001, August 24 - http://people.com.cn/GB/shenghuo/200/6201/6202/20010824/543011.html;

Huji zhidu de beihou shi zenyang de liyi chabie? (What differences in interests are hidden behind the registration system?). - "Zhongguo jinging bao", 2001, August 24 - http://people.com.cn/GB/shenghuo/200/6201/6202/20010824/542999.html

^{Lin Guoguan.} 9 Huji zhidu gaige yu chuangxin: nongmin yu shichang de huhuan (Reform of the registration system and the creation of the new: the appeal of the peasantry and the market). - "Nongye jingji wenti", N 6, 1994, e. 7.

^{Li Huilian.} 10 Zhidu fenxi: Zhongguo huji zhidu you na xie quexian? (System analysis: what are the disadvantages of the registration system in China?) "Zhongguo jingji shibao", 2001, August 24 - http://people.com.cn/GB/shenghuo/200/6201/6202/20010824/543457. html

^{Lu Xueyi.} 11 Jiakuai tuijin liang ge zhuanbian (Accelerate the implementation of two coups) - http://www.drcnet.com.cn/New_Product/expert/showdoc.asp?doc_id=198376

^{Zhao Shukai.} 12 Nungmin liudong: yishi jianshe he zhengce fangsi (Peasant Migration: System Creation and Policy Proposal). 2003, March 2 - http://www.drcnet.com.cn/New_Product /expert/showdoc.asp?doc_id=198258

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ "Zhongguo qingnian bao", 2004, June 20 - http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/2004/Jun/590372.htm

¹⁵ Dapo "er yuan zhi" moshi, Zhongguo tuixing xin yi lun huji zhi gaige (The "two-layer system" model is being destroyed. China introduces a single registration system). - "Da zhong xinwen", 2003, June 25 -http://dzwww.com.cn/xinwen/guoneixinwen/200307250744.htm

¹⁶ Er. Jijide juyue zhengce - http://china.com.en/20040426/3.htm; -Zhongguode juye zhuangkuang he zhengce (Занятость и политика в Китае); Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen banggungshi. Beijing, 2004. si yue - http://china.com.cn/ch-book/20040426/index.htm

¹⁷ Ceng Peiyan: chun jie qian duifu 03 nian nongmin gong gongzi (Ceng Peiyan: pay the peasant workers ' wages for 2003 before the Spring Festival). 2004, January 7 - http://china.com.cn/chinese/kuaixun/475983.htm

¹⁸ Laodong he shehui baoxian bu. Guangyu nongmin gong canjia gong shang baoxian yuguaan wenti de tongzhi (Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Notification on issues related to insurance of peasant workers in case of labor injuries). 2004, June 1 - http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/HI-c/589693/htm

^{Dung Wei.} 19 Qui nian woguogong shang si wang 13.6 wan ren nongmin gong zhan 80% yi shang (Last year, the share of peasant workers accounted for more than 80% of the dead out of 136 thousand people who were injured and injured). - "Zhongguo qingnian bao", 2004, June 19 - http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/2004/Jun/590025.htm

²⁰ Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 2003 (Statistical Yearbook of China) - Zhongguo tungji chubanshe, e. 367.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Wo guo jiejue pinkun renkou wenbao xingshi yanjun (In our country, we have to seriously solve the problem of satiety and warmth of the poor population). - "Zhongguo cinnian bao". 2004, July 19 -http://www.china.com.cn/Chinese/2004/Jul/613028.htm

^{Chen Xiwen.} 23 Dangqian Zhongguo de "san nong wenti" yu chulu ("3 agrarian problems" of modern China and their solution). 2002, November 11 - http://drcnet.com.cn/New_Product/expert/showdoc.asp?doc_id=139477

According to the commission of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, agriculture also generated 14.8% of GDP in 2003. - see: Guanyu jinrong zhi nong wenti de diaoyanbaogao (Research Report on Financial Support for Agriculture). 2004, June 25 - http://www/china.com.cn/chinese/2004/Jun/594570.htm

^{Li Lubin.} 24 Zhongguo fazhan zengzhang de shijie yiyi (International Meaning of China's Economic Growth) - http://www.drcnet.com.cn/view_new.asp?mainunid=205311drcnetchentechdfgdghda A023&dn=guoyan_drcindexl&cnt_id=0

^{Chen Zhun.} 25 Yingjin keneng duo di shi nongmin zhuanchulai (Move the peasants as much as possible). 2004, December 24 -http://www.drcnet.com.cn/New_Product/expert/showdoc.asp?doc_id=149935

²⁶ Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 2003, e. 448.

²⁷ Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao, 2003 (Concise Statistical Handbook of China). - Zhongguo tungji chubanshe, e. 16, 124.

²⁸ "Zhongguo qinnian bao". 2004. April 8 - http://www.chma.com.cn/chinese/2004/Apr/540716/htm

^{Chen Xiwen.} 29 Quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui quanjian zai nongcun (To comprehensively create the beginnings of a middle-class society in the village). 2002, December 3 - http://drcnet.com.cn/New_Product/expert/showdoc.asp?doc_id=145245

^{Han Quan.} 30 Jiejue "san nong"wenti de zhongda zhanlue-tongchou cheng xian jingji shehui fazhan (An important strategy for solving the" three problems of agriculture " - coordinating the socio-economic development of the city and village). 2003, Febuary 24 - http://www.drcnet.com.cn/New_Product/expert/showdoc.asp?doc_id=190251

³¹ 2003 nian Zhongguo nongye fazhan baogao (Agricultural Development Report 2003) - http://www.agri.gov/cn/sjzl/2003/275.htm

^{Li Poulin.} 32 Danqian Zhongguo shehui fazhan de wenti yu xin qushi (Problems and new trends in the social development of modern China) - http://china.com.cn/chinese/zhanti/250902.htm

- in Blue book of Chinese society. Shehui lanpishu. 2002-2003: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce (Blue Book about Chinese Society. Analysis and forecast of the social situation in China, 2002-2003). Beijing, Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2003 - http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhanti/250522.htm

³³ Zhongguo de jiuye zhuangkuang he zhengce baipishu (quanwen) (China's employment environment and politics). 2004, April 26 -http://news3.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004 - 04/26/content_ 1440030.htm

³⁴ 2003 / Wai chu wu gong nongmin chogo 9400 wanren cheng 5 da xin tezheng (The number of farmers working elsewhere has exceeded 94 million). 5 new distinctive features revealed) -http://jjckb.xinhuanet.com/Article.asp?TempNum=41602

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