The article is fieldwork-based and is devoted to the study of social cohesion in the context of co-existence of various Muslim communities in a Dagestani village. The article explores social aspects of religious confrontations emerged around an episode of forced dismissal of a village imam who was accused of belonging to the Wahhabi network. The author analyses narratives around the imam, who is the central figure of the conflict, the main line of respective religious divide, and the flexibility of the boundaries between various groups/communities. As a conclusion, the article identifies preconditions of intensification of religious solidarity, its particular normative, cultural, and political dimensions.

Keywords: Dagestan, informal institutions, Muslim communities, religious confrontations, religious solidarity, social constructionism.

The study was carried out as part of the ARC project "Globalisation et militantisme en monde musulman" with the support of the Free University of Brussels (ULB).

The study is conducted under the framework of the project ARC "Globalisation and militantism in the Muslim World" and is supported by the Universite Libre de Bruxelles (ULB).

Zaitseva A. Mobile solidarity of religious groups in the context of conflict in Dagestan: a case study of confrontations around the figure of a rural Imam.Gosudarstvo, religiya, tserkva v Rossii i za rubezhom [State, Religion, Church in Russia and Abroad]. 2016. N2. pp. 281-309.

Zaytseva, Anna (2016) "Cohesion of Religious Communities in Situation of Conflict: A Case Study of Confrontations around Imam in a Dagestani Village", Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom 34(2): 281-309.

page 281
A significant part of political science research on the influence of the religious factor on modern political processes in the Republic of Dagestan focuses on the study of the origins, manifestations and possibilities of countering armed jihad1. At the same time, in our opinion, the topic of interaction of various religious trends among themselves also contains a significant research potential for understanding the specifics of the mutual influence of religious and social processes in post-Soviet Dagestan. In the most Islamized republic of Russia, where the Sunni version of Shafi'i Islam2 dominates, many Islamic movements are recorded. Their diversity is not limited to the most prominent groups - Sufi brotherhoods (tariqats)3, Salafis 4 and supporters of armed confrontation,

1. We are talking primarily about English-language literature: Campana, A., Ducol, B. (2014) "Voices of the "Caucasus Emirate": Mapping and Analyzing North Caucasus Insurgency Websites", Terrorism and Political Violence: 1-22; Campana, A., Ratelle, J. -F. (2014) "A Political Sociology Approach to the Diffusion of Conflict from Chechnya to Dagestan and Ingushetia", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism: 37(2): 115-134; Hahn, G.M. (2008) "The Jihadi Insurgency and the Russian Counterinsurgency in the North Caucasus", Post-Soviet Affairs: 24(1): 1-39; Ratelle, J. (2013) "The Insurgency in the North Caucasus: Putting Religious Claims into Context", Russian Analytical Digest 131: 5-8; Shterin, M., Yarlykapov, A. (2011) "Reconsidering Radicalisation and Terrorism: the New Muslims Movement in Kabardino-Balkaria and its Path to Violence", Religion State and Society State & Society 2:303-325; Souleimanov, E. (2012) "Islam, Nationalisme et Vendetta: Г Insurrection au Caucase du Nord", Politique etrangere 2: 375-386; Ware, R., Kisriev, E., Patzelt, W., Roericht, U. (2002) "Dagestani Perspectives on Russia and Chechnya", Post-Soviet Affairs 18(4): 306-331; Yemelianova, G. (2015) "Islam, Nationalism and State in the Muslim Caucasus", Caucasus Survey 1(2): 3-23; Ware, R., Kisriev, E. (2010) Dagestan: Russian Hegemony and Islamic resistance in the North Caucasus. Armonk, New York, London: M. E. Sharpe; and also about some Russian-language political science studies of the North Caucasus: Dobaev I. Modern terrorism: Regional change. Rostov-on-Don: SKNC VS, SFU, 2009; Makarov D. V. Radicalization of Islam in Dagestan: opportunities and limits of jahidism. 2004. N6. pp. 147-161.

2. A small number of Shiites live in the southern part of Dagestan (about 4% of believers), and the Nogais of Northern Dagestan are followers of the Hanafi religious and legal school (Bobrovnikov V. "Islamic Revival" in Dagestan: 20 years later / / Central Asia and the Caucasus. 2007. N2(50). pp. 161-172).

3. There are three Sufi tariqas in Dagestan-naqshbandiyah, qadiriyah, and shaziliyah. The Republican muftiate is dominated by followers of Sheikh Sada-Afandi Chirkeyi, Mufti of Dagestan and chairman of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Dagestan (DUMD), who was killed on August 28, 2012. The clannishness of the DUMD, as well as their loyalty to the official structures of power, are among the main complaints of their religious opponents against them.

4. Salafis (from the expression "as-Salaf al-Salih" - righteous ancestors) are adherents of the Sunni direction of Islam, according to which it is necessary to-

page 282
While appealing to religious motives, it represents a much more mosaic picture both in the ideological and religious plane and in terms of the degree of institutionalization of their relations with the state.5 With this in mind, it seems extremely important to understand how, in the context of the coexistence of various Muslim movements, the perception of belonging to a particular religious community affects the formation of religious and non-religious types of collective solidarity at the local level. What is the degree of cohesion of religious communities at the local level in the context of a conflict that is labeled as "religious" in public discourse? What features of the organization of religious and socio-political life can increase the importance of religious identification?

As a relevant empirical case, we chose the situation in the multinational plain village of Stalskoye, where disagreements over the figure of local Imam Omarshab Alibekov were accompanied by manifestations of social tension in the public space. The demand for Alibekov's resignation from the post of imam of the central mosque and the response of the villagers led to several incidents, accompanied by collective mobilization within the village and the positioning of this conflict as a "religious split" in the republican and federal press6. It was noted that in Stalsky live ve-

This is a return to the way of life of the early Muslim community, following the sacred texts and "purifying Islam" from many religious customs that they interpret as heretical innovations. Salafism is a heterogeneous movement, including in terms of legitimizing the use of armed jihad. In recent years, the term "Salafism "has gained a little more popularity among the population, but the trend is still often identified with" Wahhabism", despite their fundamental doctrinal differences and the disagreement of Salafists themselves with this.

5. In addition to various schools and trends within Sufi fraternities and Salafi groups, other trends are also represented in Dagestan (Hizb ut-Tahrir, Fethullah Gulen's Nurjular movement, etc.). For more information, see: Ware, R., Kisriev, E. Dagestan: Russian Hegemony and Islamic resistance in the North Caucasus; Bobrovnikov V. "Islamic Revival" in Dagestan: 20 years later; Kisriev E. F. Islam and Power in Dagestan. Moscow: OGI, 2004; Makarov D. V. Radicalization of Islam in Dagestan: Opportunities and limits of jahidism; Yarlykapov A. Modern Dagestan: actual ethnopolitical and ethno-confessional problems / / NB: Problems of politics and society. 2012. N3. pp. 130-153 [http://e-notabene.ru/pr/article_257-html, accessed from 1.03.2016].

6. In 2007, an attempt was made in Stalskoye to force the resignation of Omarshab Alibekov, who by that time held the post of imam of Central Asia.

page 283
followers of the Sufi movement, as well as adherents of other branches of Islam, identified as "Salafis" or "Wahhabis"depending on the source of publication7. After the high-profile murder of Imam Alibekov on 16 May 2014, 8 and other murders that occurred in the village in 2014, 9 the situation in Stalskoye was described as the result of extreme polarization along religious lines.10
mosques for about seven years (field materials of the author - PMA), as a result of complaints about him as a "Wahhabi". According to some sources, " the basis for the appeal was the actions of representatives of the Duma, who wanted to replace the current imam of the mosque Omarshab Alibekov with their protege "(A. Magomedov). Residents of the village of Stalskoye in Dagestan demand to leave the former imam. 13.05.2008 [http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/136333/, доступ от 30.10.2015]). In May 2008, Alibekov's opponents sent a written appeal to the leadership of the republic and district, the muftiate of Dagestan, demanding "to punish Alibekov". Supporters of the imam reacted to this by sending an open letter in support of Alibekov to the authorities - the President of the republic, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Dagestan, the head of the municipal formation of the district. Intra-communal tension could not be relieved. So, in August 2013, on Eid al-Fitr (an Islamic holiday marking the end of the obligatory fast [Eid] in the month of Ramadan), a large-scale brawl occurred at the central mosque, which led to the intervention of law enforcement agencies. A group of armed men tried to attack Imam Alibekov right in the mosque, but the parishioners managed to repel him.

7. To the " Wahhabis "(or "Wahhabists") in the republic, as a rule, adherents of various religious Muslim schools are classified, declaring their isolation from Sufism and not recognizing the hierarchical subordination of the SAMD, which does not correspond to either the religious studies interpretation of this term or the self-determination of believers. The term is often used in public discourse in a negative connotation to refer to adherents of religiously motivated violent acts.

8. On May 15, 2014, the imam went by car to Kizilyurt. A car with Alibekov's body on fire was found on the territory of the Buinaksky district a day after he stopped communicating.

9.In 2014, several cases of violent deaths were recorded in Stalskoye. Some of them have received a special response. Less than a month before the murder of Imam Alibekov, on April 26, 2014, the former chairman of the Stalsky state farm (SEC "Ulubia Buinakskogo")was killed Haji Hasanguseynov. In July 2014, another resident of Stalskoye, village deputy Azizov, was killed. In addition, in January 2014, the village was blocked by law enforcement agencies in connection with the conduct of "special measures" to search for members of illegal armed groups.

10. Mention of the "Wahhabi mosque" in Stalskoye first appears in the press after the murder of the former chairman of the state farm Gasanguseynov Haji. In general, the press gave various interpretations of the religious positioning of the imam and his supporters. But after May 2014, references to the relationship between Alibekov and the leader of the Caucasus Emirate militants Aliaskhab Kebekov became more frequent.

On July 3, 2015, two militants, suspected members of illegal armed formations, were killed in a counter-terrorist operation in the Kizilyurt district.-

page 284
Thus, the Stalsky case allows us to analyze the degree of cohesion of communities designated as religious groups-opponents (supporters and opponents of Alibekov). This is possible by deconstructing concepts based on" groupism " - "the tendency to view discrete, limited groups as basic components of social life, as the main actors in social life, and as the main units of social analysis" 11.

Let us clarify that we do not set out to identify the causes and mechanisms of the escalation of the conflict that led to the death of Imam Alibekov, or to resolve conflicting views regarding the religious positioning of the imam. As part of the study of the mutual influence of social and religious processes, we are interested in the following: did the events in Stalsky, characterized as manifestations of a situation of religious schism, lead to the crystallization of religious communities among the villagers (the so-called "group", in the sense of Brubaker)? What features of religious and collective life explained the manifestations of religious solidarity in the village? The study of these issues seems promising both from the point of view of the sociology of Islam, and in the framework of studying the dynamic nature of identification processes, consolidation and disintegration of communities.

The article offers an attempt to clarify these issues through the prism of social constructionism12. For this purpose, the narratives of Alibekov's supporters and opponents are identified, as well as organizational aspects of religious demarcation (I). Further, stating the mobility of the borders of religious communities, we analyze the structural and situational prerequisites (in the normative-religious and socio-political plo-

myrovaniya. According to the National Anti-terrorist Committee, they were involved in the murder of Omarshab Alibekov and a madrasa teacher from the nearby village of Nechayevka in 2014.

11. Brubaker, R. (2002). Ethnicity without Groups. Harvard University Press.

12. The purpose of this approach is to clarify the collective meanings and processes that influence the formation of collective ideas. Among his main postulates are the understanding of knowledge as a social construct, the assertion of the key role of interaction between individuals on the processes of forming their perception of social reality, and the identification of variability as one of the significant properties of social reality. See: Berger, P. L., Luckmann, T. (1966) The Social Construction of Reality. Penguin Books; Denzin, N.K., Lincoln, Y.S. (2005) The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research: Sage Publications, Third Ed.; Hay, С (2016) "Social Constructivism", in M. Bevir, R.A.W. Rhodes (eds) Routledge Handbook of Interpretive Political Science, pp. 99-113. Routledge.

page 285
promoting active and diverse manifestations of religious solidarity in the public space (II).

Empirical framework: situational analysis of a flat Dagestan village

The importance of empirical analysis at the micro level is explained by the need to take into account the causes and development of conflict, as well as the features of the social structure of the case under study. In addition, due to the organizational specifics of Islam (the lack of a clear hierarchy among the Muslim clergy and an institutionally fixed structure of belonging to a community among believers), territorial affiliation often becomes a structuring element for organizing the life of a religious community in Dagestan. That is why studying the social aspects of religious life in the context of a particular village allows us to consider the interaction of Muslims within a religious community - a rural jamaat14. Such an analysis is much more problematic in the urban environment.15
13. The diversity of Dagestan's social and political heritage is explained not only by the ethnic diversity of this most multiethnic region of Russia, but also by a number of other features rooted in the various historical trajectories of development of a dozen independent communities that have existed on the territory of Dagestan since the late Middle Ages and differed in their governance system and political structure ("free communities", khanates, etc.). feudal formations); specialization in various types of economic activity in conditions of various geographical and climatic conditions (Karpov Yu., Kapustina E. Highlanders after mountains. Migration processes in Dagestan in the XX-early XXI centuries: their social, ethno-cultural consequences and prospects. St. Petersburg, 2011), variations in the rate of modernization and urbanization of its individual districts, etc.

14. In this case, the jama'at refers to the community of believers in the village. This concept has multiple interpretations and often also refers to a community of believers who attend the same mosque.

15. On the non-relevance of methods of the sociology of religion focused on the study of religious life as a sociology of organizations for the study of institutionally "unorganized" Muslim communities, see: Jeldtoft, N., Nielsen, J. S. (2011) "Introduction: methods in the study of" non-organized "Muslim minorities", Ethnic and Racial Studies 34(7): 1113-1119; Jeldtoft, N. (2011) "Lived Islam: religious identity with" non-organized "Muslim minorities", Ethnic and Racial Studies 34 (7): 1134-1151; Kuhle, L. (2011) " Excuse me, which radical organization are you a member of? Reflections on methods to study highly religious but non-organized Muslims", Ethnic and Racial Studies: 34(7): 1186-1200.

page 286
To understand the specific features of the context under study, we will provide brief information about the village of Stalskoye, as well as outline the empirical base that formed the basis for the subsequent analytical parts of the article.

Brief description of the village of Stalskoye and research methodology

The studied village of Stalskoye is located in the Kizilyurt district, 45 km from Makhachkala and belongs to the type of lowland settlements that were formed by immigrants from various regions of the republic. The first settlement appeared here in the 20s of the XX century after the construction of the October Revolution Canal and was named Samurkent, in 1937 the village was renamed Stalsky. The population of the village was formed from several waves of immigrants. The first to arrive were Lezgins, Kumyks, and settled Germans, 16 and in 1957 Avars from the Andalal region, whose historical homeland is the village of Ratlub in the Shamil region, came here from Chechnya. Avars from the Kvareli region of Georgia (the historical homeland is the village of Gunzib in the Tsunta region) came here in two stages - in 1968 and in the early 1990s. In Stalsky, there are also people from other places of the republic - the villages of Gimry, Irganay, Arakani in the Tsunta district, as well as from the village of Keleb in the Shamil district, which formed a separate microdistrict. Thus, the population of the village has been replenished over the past decades and today it is a rather motley mosaic. The largest groups listed by local residents are Tsuntins, Ratlubs, Celebs, Kumyks. Informants often repeated that "everyone here is an outsider", emphasized the multinational composition of Stalsky: "Dagestan is in miniature, they call our village"17.

By Dagestani standards, Stalskoye is a large village consisting of several auls. Otkhodnichesky strategies prevail.-

16. In 1941, all residents of German origin were expelled from Dagestan.

17. PMA. PMA - the author's field materials collected during expedition trips to the village of Stalskoye and Makhachkala in April, May and September 2015.

18. Data on the population of the village varies greatly: from 5729 people, according to the 2010 All-Russian Census, to 9785 people, according to the website of the village administration [http://selo-stalskoe.ru/nashe-poselenie/istorija-sela-stalskoe.html, accessed from 1.03.2016]. Estimates of local residents and journalists significantly exceeded the official figures.

page 287
work: men go to work in Makhachkala and Kizilyurt, work on construction sites or on cargo transportation (across Russia). Women grow berries for sale (strawberries, cherries) and sell them on the federal highway "Caucasus", along which the village is located. Collective farm gardens were gradually cut down for land distribution, and today the farm raises cattle, which provides work for a small number of people. The village has four schools, two medical centers and six mosques (one cathedral or juma mosque, several blocks).

The field data set consists of interviews with residents of Stalskoye; publications in the mass media (local and federal press news sites, thematic Internet portals about Islam); videos with Imam Omarashab Alibekov, posted in the public domain; interviews with Dagestani journalists and Muslim activists; and field observations during trips to the village. The study used the method of theoretical sampling in the framework of Grounded Theory.

Semi-structured interviews 19 were conducted in order to clarify the interpretation of religious differentiation among rural residents by the example of correlating the imam's affiliation with a particular trend 20. We tried to find out from infor-

19. Semi-structured interviews with thirteen local residents were conducted in the format of individual meetings or in the presence of a researcher and two informants. Several meetings were held with some informants. Most of the interviews were arranged directly by the author, addressing informants at their place of professional activity; acquaintance with several informants was indirect. Quite interesting material was gleaned from informal interactions with local residents during trips to the village (in late April-early May and in September 2015) - walking around the village and short-term accommodation with local residents. The conversation with the informants went beyond discussing issues related to the figure of the murdered imam. This is partly due to the fact that the results described in the article are part of a dissertation project on the study of social features of the organization of religious life in modern Dagestan. Four expert interviews with non-locals were conducted in Makhachkala in the spring of 2015. All interviews were conducted in Russian.

20. One of the limitations of the sample was the difficulty of identifying and accessing informants who were not just supporters of the late Imam, but were from his inner circle. In addition to the relatively short period of information collection, this difficulty is associated with the specifics of accessing the research field less than a year after high-profile murders. Another methodological limitation of the study is the impossibility of integrated observation in mosques: women attending the mosque and Friday prayers

page 288
Mantov, how did Alibekov identify those who supported the demands for his resignation and those who considered them unfounded; what did the informants base their opinion on the imam's religious identification? It was important for us to get the opinion of the widest possible range of people, so interviews were conducted with various actors in religious and public life - representatives of the clergy, administration officials, employees of the budget sector, and law enforcement agencies at the local level. These data were compared with the evidence of various sources - thematic publications on Islamic topics, religious studies and local lore literature.

"Mobile" identification of religious Affiliation: Duality of Narratives and Religious Practices

Has Omarashab Alibekov become a figure dividing the village jamaat into two communities? Did the locals consider him a follower of "Wahhabism", as it was presented in some press reports starting in 2014?

By the time the conflict broke out, Omarashab Alibekov, a native of Teletl village in Shamil district, had been an imam in Stalskoye for about seven or eight years. The assessment of the numerical ratio of his supporters and opponents turned out to be quite contradictory-both in the responses of informants and according to information from external sources. The most likely version seems to be that the group opposed to him was initially relatively small (30-50 people). Closer to 2014, the number of dissatisfied people increased. Some of them did not attend the juma mosque and left on Friday for Juma namaz 21 in nearby villages (Nechayevka and others). At the same time, the "more radicalized part of the Salafists"22 went to a neighboring village for Friday prayers

not accepted. This circumstance, as well as ignorance of local languages, predetermined the collection of field material using semi-structured interviews. In the future, the author hopes to develop his observations and conclusions on a broader empirical material about the daily life of rural believers.

21. Friday prayer (juma namaz) is often called "ruzman" (from Avar, "ruzman" - Friday).

22. PMA.

page 289
Komsomolskoe 23. In fact, the village jamaat, as a set of believers of a separate territorial unit, was organizationally divided. Did this mean that there were irreconcilable ideological and doctrinal differences and concomitant practices among the believers of the village?

To answer these questions, we will analyze narratives that assess the central figure of the conflict, trying to identify the ideological positioning of the imam and his supporters.

Ambivalence of narratives about the figure of Alibekov

Based on our material, it is highly likely that Omarashab Alibekov did not fit into the system of hierarchical subordination of the Duma, but did not consider himself either Sufi or Salafi. Here it is important to keep in mind the diversity of religious movements among Muslims in Dagestan: not all Sufis are subject to the DUMA, and the Salafi environment is heterogeneous (today there are three or four groups that differ from each other, including in the interpretation of the issue of the use of violence 24). Alibekov could have his own critical point of view on a number of issues, 25 but not present his religious views in an antagonistic form. This is also evident in the ambivalence of narratives that characterize its perception by rural residents.

Thus, informants who criticized Alibekov accused him of wrong attitude to the mufti:

[Alibekov] did not get up at the mufti's entrance when he arrived in the village. He said that "in the house of Allah, only before the Most High stand".

23. According to some sources, this took place both during Alibekov's lifetime and after his death (under the new imam appointed by the Duma).

24. Emic term from the PMA.

25.Alibekov is known to have openly criticized cases of torture and the situation in the republic as a whole, but after being warned, he stopped raising these issues publicly (PMA).

page 290
Some informants also expressed confidence that "lesnye" people visited Dibir26.27 As a rule, the ambivalent nature of the information was emphasized:

People went to see him [Alibekov]. They say he preached a moral lesson about police officers - to kill them. I asked him a question in person, and he told me that this was not the case.

If none of the informants claimed about Alibekov that he followed what they considered to be incorrect religious canons, some were concerned about the religious practices not of the imam himself, but of a group of believers who visited the central mosque.:

The students know what he [Alibekov] said to them. The disciples preached openly. "Bidah "[innovation] they talk about praising the Prophet. Sadaqa [charity] cannot be distributed. You don't have to give money for the dead. [...] Either the teacher was bad, or he was duplicitous, so it turns out?

Why couldn't Omarashab be removed? He showed a very good side at first. And to the end. He just said one thing and did another.

It is difficult to say how much of the villagers ' ideas were based on real experience of interaction and/or observation. A fairly common opinion was that "they [a group of criticized believers] do not say such things openly, only in their own circle." As the informants admitted, their judgments were often based on other people's opinions, and the reason for their confirmation could be, for example, the situation when Alibekov was seen standing next to a "Wahhabi" in Kizilyurt, and the person who saw this scene began to spread relevant judgments about the imam.29 Many informants were critical of the accuracy of such information: "Someone said something. One said, the other said. They listen with their ears, but not with their eyes.-

26. Dibir-imam of the central mosque.

27. "Forest" refers to members of the armed underground.

28. Emic terms applied to this group of believers vary depending on the religious loyalty of the informants: from "Wahhabis" (among supporters of the Duma) to "Jamaats" (among supporters of Alibekov).

29. PMA.

page 291
shaking". This illustrates the spread of stereotypical attitudes that are not based on real direct observation, but are formed under the influence of collective ideas.

It is characteristic that among the informants who did not consider Alibekov a "Wahhabi", there were not only believers, but also atheists. At the same time, among the believers who supported Alibekov, many did not identify themselves with any particular group or direction, but emphasized that they had learned Muslim practices from their parents. Both sides emphasized in every possible way the "staged" nature of the rumors spread about the imam.

Some informants were also aware that the imam received training in Syria, but was sent to Stalskoye by the Spiritual Administration: "As a teenager [Alibekov] was sent to Syria. Between two currents, he was found there, he knows two directions." This ambivalent positioning alarmed those believers who considered subordination to the DUMA to be a necessary norm of religious life.

In total, we did not find a direct allegation of Alibekov's own involvement in adherents of religiously motivated violence. According to one informant, the late imam said that if someone called him a "Wahhabi" in his presence and demanded that he leave, he was ready to do so, "but no one dared to take such a sin on their soul".30 It is also noteworthy that before Alibekov's arrival, in the early 2000s, the imam of the central mosque in Stalskoye (a certain Muhamad) was "deposed" because of his "Wahhabi views" precisely because of the consolidated position of the "council of elders", who called for his "resignation" 31. However, even those dissatisfied with Alibekov they did not allow themselves to speak so categorically about the imam. And after Alibekov's death, informants who criticized his ideological position spoke positively about him, recognized his charisma and popularity among the villagers. Thus, according to the informant, "when he [Alibekov] was killed, local men were crying." 32
30. PMA.

31. PMA. Unfortunately, we were not able to get enough detailed information about this episode.

32. This remark belonged to one of the representatives of the law enforcement agencies, who believed that the so-called "lesnye" people visited Alibekov.

page 292
In general, the narratives about Alibekov's figure indicate not so much the presence of irreconcilable normative attitudes, but that there were many "doubters"in the village. Indeed, many informants, regardless of the degree of support for Alibekov, emphasized that a significant number of believers in the village did not have their own expressed opinion about the ongoing conflict. For example, supporters of the Duma, who consider criticism of Alibekov justified, described the clash on Eid al-Fitr in August 2013 as follows::

The mass is ordinary people. They see the leaders fighting. They have no idea, they were just following him, he was in front. Now they are also following the new imam. There are many indifferent ones. But they forget about their children.

Indeed, the relations between the believers of the village and novy Dibir, who was sent to Stalskoye from the Duma in May 2014, were mostly smooth, but there were also those who now changed their attitude towards Alibekov in a positive direction.33
Contested practices

The fact that Alibekov and his followers were hardly identified with "Wahhabis" is also indicated by some rituals practiced by the imam.

The source of the first disagreements in Stalsky was funeral rites - a well-known subject of disagreement between adherents of Sufi and Salafi trends. Not all residents of the village agreed with Alibekov's criticism of certain traditions. So, according to an informant who identified himself as a supporter of Omarashab, his negative opinion about the loud women's dhikr, which is done for the dead, as well as about visiting the cemetery on Friday 34, caused dissatisfaction. Nevertheless, all the relatives and friends of the deceased were present at the funeral in the village, regardless of the ideological differences about the rites. Burials at the Stalsky cemetery were also not marked

33. PMA.

34. According to the informant, the imam stressed that the ceremony should not be ostentatious.

page 293
divisions based on religious traditions, as is the case in villages with a pronounced religious confrontation.

In addition, the videos show Alibekov's participation in practices that are criticized in the Salafi community. Thus, a video recording from 2011 shows Alibekov participating in the mawlid in Kaspiysk on February 18, 201135. As you know, this practice is condemned in the Salafi community as a bidah innovation. 36 Moreover, judging by the external attributes of those present at the mawlid (green skullcaps), it can be said that many supporters of the Sufi religious leader, Said-Afandi Chirkeyi, were present in the mosque next to Alibekov.

Alibekov's soft, non-confrontational nature and lack of a principled position on a number of religious issues were repeatedly emphasized by many informants. It was noted that for this, in particular, he was criticized by some more "tough" Salafists. According to one of the informants, who identified himself with Salafist circles and was well aware of what was happening in the village, the population of Stalsky was not so religious that ideological debates would have led to a real polarization.37
In general, the situation in Stalsky is characterized by the very "mobility of religious boundaries" described by V. O. Bobrovnikov: "With the exception of some intolerant leaders who preach the "purification of Islam" from Wahhabis or Sufis, most of the jamaat situationally changes their religious orientation, joining one or another faction. " 38
We see that the expression of discontent with Imam Alibekov was expressed in the fragmentation of Stalsky's religious life and the division of residents during the Juma namaz. But the statement of this circumstance alone does not allow us to conclude that the collective identity of believers and chet is crystallized-

35. Video of Mawlid in 2011. Mawlid-TIELEK in Kaspiysk (7.02.2011) [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a40BE5wM_zE, accessed from 30.10.2015). Mawlid's video, edited in 2013 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CUphhTCXU08, accessed from 30.10.2015].

36. The permissibility of holding mawlids that are not timed to coincide with the expected date of birth of the Prophet Muhammad does not cause discrepancies among Islamic trends.

37. PMA.

38. Bobrovnikov V. Islam, vlast i obshchestvo v byvshem kolkhoze: dagestanskii sluch [Islam, power and society in the former collective farm: the Dagestani case]. Ocherki politicheskoi antropologii Kavkaza [Essays on the Political Anthropology of the Caucasus]. 2012. pp. 9-31.

page 294
comments on the design of two different religious groups with irreconcilable ideological and dogmatic attitudes. A significant part of the population was characterized by an uncertain position regarding the imam, in contrast to the external presentation (framing) of the situation as a religious schism.

Normative-religious and situational-political prerequisites for religious solidarity in the public sphere

Next, we will analyze the features of the organization of religious and collective life, in which the perception of religious affiliation of dibir could become a factor in activating the processes of religious identification at the village level.

The question of the effectiveness of religious rites

First of all, the significance of the figure of the imam of the central mosque is connected with the religious rites in which he participated. We remember that the status of imam was repeatedly challenged by a certain part of the jamaat through refusal to participate in the collective Friday prayer held by Alibekov. It is important that, unlike the afternoon prayer, the Friday (midday) prayer should be performed collectively - by the entire community-in the cathedral mosque of the locality. An exception is allowed only if it is overflowing. This is also related to the criteria for the validity of juma namaz: it is considered such in the presence of a certain quorum of participants in the mosque - according to various estimates of scientists, from three believers to forty people who know mahraj (the ability to correctly pronounce sounds and recite prayer). In Ogalsky, after an unsuccessful attempt to remove Alibekov, some believers also held Friday prayers in the new mosque:

The mufti refused to explain the reasons for his actions, and his supporters later opened their own mosque in the village, where they also hold Friday prayers, which is considered a gross violation of Islamic canons.39
39. The administration of a district in Dagestan is trying to remove intra-religious tension in the village of Stalskoye. 30.05.2008 [http://www.m.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/137154/?full_page=true, accessed from 30.10.2015].

page 295
Thus, both for the part of believers who supported Alibekov and for those who supported his "resignation", the collective performance of Friday prayers under the leadership of the imam they supported became an important factor in self-identification and confirmation of their own religious cohesion in the public space.

In addition to the Friday prayer, criticism of the imam's religious affiliation was directly related to the perception of the effectiveness of important collective life-cycle rituals performed by him (weddings, funerals, etc.).40.According to some sources, it was the Mufti of Dagestan who described all of Alibekov's religious activities as illegal. 41 Consequently, for those who believed that the imam was following the wrong religious canons, the rites performed by him were not valid.42 This weakened the integrating and regulatory functions of rituals and rites at the level of rural society, which, in turn, could re-activate the need for establishing religious identification at the rural level.

Sources of legitimation of the imam: jamaat or DUM?

The conflict was also caused by the existence of different interpretations of the issue of appointing an imam. Competing concepts in Dagestan focus on different attitudes to the administrative primacy of the DUMD institute over other Muslim organizations.

According to the first concept, the situation is recognized as legitimate if the imam is appointed by the Duma:

40. It should be noted that the rituals of the life cycle in Dagestan have a pronounced mass character - as a rule, hundreds of people come to a wedding, to "condolences" in one family.

41. Magomedov A. Residents of the village of Stalskoye in Dagestan demand to leave the former imam. However, the mufti himself denied that he had forbidden people to pray for Alibekov. See: The administration of a district in Dagestan is trying to ease intra-religious tensions in the village of Stalskoye / / Caucasian Knot. 30.05.2008. [http://www.m.kavkaz-uzel.m/articles/137154/?full_page=true, accessed from 30.10.2015].

42.From the point of view of experts in Islam, even if certain religious discrepancies are established, it is impossible to prove the "illegality" of the rites performed without serious theological analysis. But from the layman's point of view, differences in religious practices are often perceived much more acutely (PMA).

page 296
The procedure for appointing an imam takes place with the consent of the higher authority, which is the Duma. It is led by Mufti Ahmad-haji Abdulayev, who was chosen by all alims and imams of the Republic of Dagestan. It is to him, both according to Sharia and universal principles, that one should obey. The DUMD and mufti either appoint an imam themselves, or recommend an applicant and then approve it. But if a jamaat has a candidate, they have the right to apply and ask for her approval. [ ... ] The clergy can also offer their candidacy, but in no case impose it on the will of the Jamaat. Everything happens with the consent and mutual decision...43.

Such an interpretation does not find unanimous approval among those who perceive the decisions of the Duma as a manifestation of the "policy of appointing ""official" clergy, who thus seek to strengthen the position of the followers of Sheikh Said Cherkeyevsky. 44 Thus, at the beginning of the conflict in Stalsky, a fairly large part of the villagers supported leaving Alibekov:

[ ... ] The local population, dissatisfied with the fact that the imam of a rural mosque is changing without their consent, expressed their protest. An appeal was prepared to the authorities of the republic and about 700 signatures were collected in support of Alibekov, and Mufti Abdulayev was even interviewed by a certain influential person in the Republic of Dagestan (the head of one of the district administrations) ... 45

The importance of the collective decision of the villagers as the main source determining the legitimacy of a cleric in the post of dibir was emphasized.:

Outraged parishioners said that they themselves invited an imam to work, who suits them perfectly, and, if necessary, remove it.

43. From an interview with Imam of the central Juma mosque of Makhachkala Mukhammadrasul-haji Saaduev. Magomedov M. " Work on... imams" / / Draft. N23. 6.06.2008 [http://chernovik.net/content/novosti/rabota-nad-imamami, accessed from 30.10.2015].

44. See: Magomedov A. Residents of the village of Stalskoye in Dagestan demand to leave the former imam. 13.05.2008 [http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/136333/, accessed from 30.10.2015]; Magomedov M. " Work on... imams" / / Draft. N23. 6.06.2008, [http://chernovik.net/content/novosti/rabota-nad-imamami, accessed from 30.10.2015]

45. Magomedov M. " Work on... imams."

page 297
If the mufti is removed from office, then a decision will be made without outside interference, and the mufti was invited to express his complaints in public.46
The dominating role of the DUMA in the religious life of the republic today is not really supported by the institutionally fixed mechanisms and practices of appointing an imam. For example, the expediency of Alibekov's departure was argued by the Duma as follows::

Gadzhiev 47 also explained that the mufti of Dagestan, Akhmadkhadji Abdullayev, in a personal conversation noted that he had never made statements about Alibekov's removal from office: "I prayed for him then, how can I say after that that it is impossible to pray for him? Under Alibekov, the villagers were divided into two parts, so he was asked to leave the post, since he could not unite everyone. " 48
It is still important for the imam to enlist the support of the community and/or its most important representatives. It can be assumed that the opposite is also true: in order to "remove" the imam from office, it is necessary to have leverage over the Jamaat and / or individual important players in society. In the 2000s, such discrepancies led to conflicts not only in Stalsky, but also in localities of different size, ethnic composition, and social organization in Dagestan (for example, in the city of Derbent, the mountain village of Sogratle, and the plain village of Komsomolsky, up to the conflict in Makhachkala in November 2015).

So, the conflict that manifested itself in Stalsky was, among other things, due to the existence of different concepts about the participation of believers in the formation of the institute of the imam of the central mosque and the role of the DUMA as an institution claiming the highest religious authority. The length of the conflict is associated with the lack of consensus and an effective mechanism for resolving such a situation.

46. The district administration in Dagestan is trying to resolve intra-religious tensions in the village of Stalskoye.

47. Magomed Gadzhiev - head of the administration of the Kizilyurt district in 2007.

48. The district administration in Dagestan is trying to resolve intra-religious tensions in the village of Stalskoye.

page 298
The role of the imam in the social life of the local society

Finally, disagreements about the figure of dibir can trigger collective mobilization due to his involvement in various processes of distribution and maintenance of social statuses within the village. What social, religious, and cultural practices are associated with this?

As a rule, important matters of rural society are discussed on Friday after the collective prayer. In the presence of the jamaat, any question can be raised, including who is better to vote for in the elections. As for the choice of the topic of discussion or the Friday sermon (khutbah) itself, if the imam is appointed from the Duma, the agenda can be partially formed on his recommendations.49 But regardless of the imam's religious loyalty and positioning towards the DUMD, the imam often focuses the choice of the khutbah topic on discussing certain socially significant events that occurred in the village.50 The degree of politicization of the topics, the power of the imam's influence on the Jamaat and his interference in secular affairs varies considerably depending on the context and factors that determine the authority of the imam (his age, degree of dedication to the problems of the village and methods of solving them). At the time of the controversy, Omarashab Alibekov had been a village imam in Stalskoye for about seven years, but his age (less than 40 years old) and background (he was not a native of Stalskoye) did not add to his authority. Nevertheless, according to one informant, he was extremely charismatic, could afford to make critical statements, although in general he was known for his non-confrontational nature.

Another point that emphasizes the importance of the imam's figure is his involvement in the informal institutions of managing the social life of the village. In the case of Stalsky, the imam was invited to-

49. PMA.

50. PMA.

51. Kapustina E. Vybory v sel'skom Dagestane: politicheskoe evitiya kak element sotsial'noi zhizni [Elections in rural Dagestan: a political event as an element of social life]. Essays on the Political anthropology of the Caucasus. Saint-Petersburg: Peterburgskoe vostokovedenie, 2012. pp. 32-60; Karpov Yu., Kapustina E. Gortsy posle gor [Mountaineers after mountains]. Migration processes in Dagestan in the XX-early XXI centuries: their social, ethno-cultural consequences and prospects.

page 299
They come to formal and informal collective meetings in which residents participate. For example, there are three or four village council meetings per quarter, which are attended by the majority of the jamaat members. Important announcements are made at village councils, and misdemeanors committed by villagers can be discussed. The imam is also invited to meetings of village deputies, as well as to the council of elders.52 It follows that the imam of the central mosque plays an important role not only in the religious field, but also in the life of the village as a whole.

How powerful is the imam's authority and how does it compare with other local authorities? Ultimately, the imam's influence on social processes depends on a complex configuration of factors, on the distribution of social roles among influential players at the local level. It happens that when religious differences arise in the community, the imam may decide to withdraw from his duties in order to avoid an escalation of the conflict and a split in the village.53 But if authoritative people in village 54 support the imam, then he can stay even if there are still disagreements. This is not so much about the quantitative ratio of supporters and opponents of the imam, but about the authority of certain players who are for or against him.

In Alibekov's case, the imam still enjoyed the support of the "elders", although, according to some accounts, their relationship became somewhat strained over time. As noted above, the previous Dibir Muhamad was " deposed "because of his" Wahhabi views "precisely because of the consolidated position of the"council of elders" 55. But in later years, the elders were listened to less, and those who have achieved material success now have more authority.

52. The council of elders of Stalsky consisted of about five people from different tukhums: "adults who know everything, who worked - labor figures." At the time of collecting the field material (May - September 2015), the council consisted of three members (the other two had recently died), and its replenishment was expected after the local elections in September 2015.

53. PMA. According to press reports, Alibekov offered to leave the post on his own initiative, if the believers could find a satisfactory, compromise figure.

54. These informants included people who were respected in the village, either because of their age and knowledge, or because of the availability of economic and / or administrative resources.

55. The situation most likely dates back to the early 2000s (PMA).

page 300
It is known from the PMA and press publications that some " situational authorities "(influential people) in Stalsky were opposed to the imam, but, according to one of the informants, in 2013 the elders supported Alibekov and did not believe in the replicated rumors: "We know our Imam" 56. Nevertheless, her other characteristic about elders is also important for understanding the balance of power: "they don't decide much, but they know a lot."57 In general, the opinion was expressed that people with administrative resources have disproportionately large levers of influence on difficult situations, such as the one that developed in Stalsky. It is obvious that the role of the traditional institution of elders has weakened in comparison with the 1990s.

It is also important to understand the features of the social structure of Stalsky as a multinational lowland village: the lower authority of informal traditional institutions and/or the more complex balancing of interests of different groups are explained here by the lower cohesion of the community compared to mountain villages and villages with a more homogeneous composition of the population.58 The informant's comment about the neighboring village of Kizilyurt district, Kirovaul, is indicative: "For some reason, there is no mess there: all Tsumandin residents, all single-district residents. Here is a multi-ethnic village." It is significant that a competitor in the framework of group solidarity can be considered not so much a representative of another nation as a native of another district. For the residents of Stalsky, the districts from which they moved are no less important for the differentiation of the village than ethnic origin.

So, dibir is an important participant in the informal regulation of social processes, which, in turn, increases the importance of identifying a consensus figure for this post. However, today in many lowland villages, there are many levels of loyalty, and ways to resolve the conflict-

56. PMA.

57. PMA.

58. Regarding this situation, our hypothesis is as follows. Traditional institutions are losing their strength more quickly in lowland migrant villages, where it is all the more difficult to maintain the influence of elders because villages are characterized by a mosaic composition (and a large number of tukhums - family-related groups), but at the same time they are located in relative proximity to cities, which somewhat increases the tendency to individualize life strategies and the possibility of forming other types of authorities.

page 301
issues through traditional representative bodies (the council of elders) they are also undergoing changes.

As we will see later, in Stalsky, the public manifestation of religious solidarity was possible, among other things, because of specific conflict situations.

Situational and political context

First, the general process of securitization of 59 religious issues is an important conflict-causing factor. This means making religious affiliation a security issue in the context of the long - term struggle of the Russian authorities against the armed underground, and more recently, the transition of their adherents to the side of the so-called "Islamic State" (IS), an organization recognized as a terrorist organization by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. In recent years, the Kizilyurt district has repeatedly introduced a counter-terrorist operation (CTO) regime, and the "Kizilyurt bandit group" was considered one of the most active formations of the extremist underground.60 Around Stalsky and in the village itself, measures were repeatedly taken to neutralize the militants.

Along with the ongoing CTO in the Republic, the increased monitoring of Salafist adherents is accompanied by numerous human rights violations.61 It is against the background of these processes that belonging to a religious community that does not declare loyalty to the DUMA becomes particularly problematic for a certain circle of believers. The reason for this is the practice of the Russian authorities of an "excessively broad approach", when Salafists are suspected of religious extremism. The public discourse against religious "oppositionists" and their de facto equation with Wahhabis and militants in some cases simplifies the division into "friends" and "strangers", strengthening the exclusive religious division. On the other hand, many villagers are suspicious of the situation.

59. The concept of" securitization " was developed by the Copenhagen School of International security. For more information, see: Buzan, V., Waever Ole, de Wilde Jaap (1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

60. Rybina Yu. The militants were hiding in a dugout / / Kommersant. 05.07.2015 [http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2762261, accessed from 30.10.2015].

61. Human Rights Watch, 2015.

page 302
to official interpretations of what is happening (for example, to the official version of Alibekov's murder-by militants, members of the"Kizilyurt gang"). In any case, the scale, form and duration of the struggle against the armed underground set the tone of public life, which promotes a more active manifestation of religious solidarity in the public space.

Secondly, the authority of the imam could become capital in the struggle for the resources of influence. It is known that some influential residents of the village were among the critics of Omarshab Alibekov. Most likely, it was the active position of the initially small group of Alibekov 62 opponents, supported by influential players at the local level and religious authorities outside the village, loyal to the DOOM line, that led to the emergence or aggravation of religious contradictions in the village. A similar position was expressed in an article about Stalsky published in the socio-political weekly "Youth of Dagestan" on December 6, 2013:

There is practically no ground for interethnic or intra-religious conflicts [in Stalsky], but sometimes minor tensions arise artificially created (by the ambition or thirst for power of those who want to take a chair).

According to some sources, "active agitation work to remove the imam of the local mosque O. Alibekov" 63 was carried out with the support of people who once had access to the administrative resource of the village. According to information published in the republican newspaper Chernovik, the inability to reach an agreement with the jamaat and imam contradicted the political ambitions of some authoritative figures at the local level (who, in turn, denied such interpretations).64. For our analysis, it is important to note that some of the villagers were convinced not only that Alibekov had powerful opponents, but also that they were actively acting on his behalf.-

62. According to some data, this group was dominated by ratlubtsy (PMA).

63. Moscow Helsinki Group. Human rights in the regions of the Russian Federation. 2008. Collection of regional reports. Volume 2. 2009.

64. For more information, see: Akhmedov M. Uraza po-stalski / / Chernovik. 16.08.2013 [http://chernovik.net/content/novosti/uraza-po-stalski, доступ от 30.10.2015].

page 303
65. Such actions were regarded by them as provocations, which only increased the division between supporters and opponents of the imam.

Finally, we should talk about the land issue - one of the most important conflict-causing factors in modern Dagestan 66. The distribution of land plots has become an important issue in recent years in Stalsky: "in the past [2014] year, more than 2000 plans were distributed - the population grew"67. We do not have detailed data on this process, Alibekov's position on the land issue and his participation (or non - participation) in solving land problems-this issue deserves a separate study that goes beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it seems important to point out this potentially conflicting node of interests, where the authority of the imam and, accordingly, belonging to a particular religious community could also be perceived as one of the additional social resources for declaring one's interests. Judging by the publications in the press and the collected field material, as in many large Dagestani villages on the plain, the solution of land issues was quite difficult here, including due to the divergence of interests of individual players.68
Conclusion

The analysis of the situation in Stalskoye made it possible to identify some features of the organization of religious life in the conditions of coexistence of various Muslim religious movements and to trace their connection with local conflicts.

65. Akhmedov M. Uraza po-stalski.

66. See: Adiev A. Z. Land issue and ethnopolitical conflicts in Dagestan. Rostov-on-Don, 2010. p. 153; Kazenin K. A., Moscow, p. 4. Elements of the Caucasus. Land, power, and ideology in the North Caucasian republics. Moscow: Regnum, 2012; Kazenin K. Regulirovanie zemel'nykh otnosheniy v Dagestan: sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie korni "traditionalizatsii" [Regulation of Land relations in Dagestan: Socio-economic roots of "traditionalization"]. 2015. N10(3). Pp. 113-133; Starodubrovskaya I., Zubarevich N., Sokolov D., Intigrinova T., Mironova N., Magomedov Kh. North Caucasus: Modernization Challenge. Moscow: RANKHGS Publ., 2011, pp. 87-88.

67. PMA.

68. In this connection, it is necessary to mention the murder on 27 June 2014 of Deputy Stalsky, who was a member of the land commission and was engaged in the distribution of land plots in the administration (On [b] the murder of a deputy in the Dagestani village of Stalskoye // Kavkazpress.ru. 03.07.2014 [http://kavkazpress.ru/archives/54204, accessed from 30.10.2015]).

page 304
The first paradoxical conclusion concerns clarifying the nature of religious schism in the context of conflict in the religious field (at the micro level) and against the background of securitization of religious affiliation (at the macro level). A study of the narratives of rural residents about the late Imam Alibekov has shown that conflict does not necessarily lead to the crystallization of religious identity in an antagonistic way. Religious divisions may be of an institutional nature, in particular, they may reflect attitudes towards the Duma, but they may not be associated with clearly defined ideological attitudes and/or religious practices that are mutually exclusive. Active parties to the conflict may be relatively insignificant groups in terms of numbers, while a much larger segment of the population may not have a pronounced opinion and take one or another position situationally.

Framing the situation in Stalskoye as a religious split and confrontation between "Wahhabis" / "Salafis" and supporters of the Duma does not reflect the complexity of the processes of religious separation. This indicates both the importance of deconstructing religious markers when choosing categories of social analysis for a more accurate definition of actors in religious life, taking into account the sociological features of Islam (lack of" church " organization, flexibility of religious and ritual practices), and for understanding the real relationship between religious and social moods and more accurate identification of active actors in socio-political processes.

Secondly, the identification of the situational nature of religious identification and the identification of mechanisms for integrating religious authorities (in our case, the imam of the central mosque) into the distribution of symbolic and material resources indicate not only the possibility of instrumentalization of religion in favor of the interests of certain players. In the context of modern Dagestan, belonging (individual or collective) to a particular religious trend of Islam is instrumentalized (which is facilitated by the established official discourse and practices that consolidate the dichotomy between "traditional" Islam and "Wahhabism"). Categorization of the religious field has social and social significance. For "religious entrepreneurs", this creates an incentive to invent "religious boundaries" (and control

page 305
above them) - borders that contrast collective identities associated with religion.

In the future, it seems promising to expand our understanding of the mechanisms of religious socialization at the local level, as well as to identify different modes of involvement of believers in certain types of loyalty (for example, the distribution of social roles in the village relative to the division into tukhums, clientelist networks, etc.). on the formation of religious identification; on the configurations of informal authorities that determine competing and complementary types of group solidarity at the local level; on the form and stages of consolidation of Muslim communities.

Bibliography / References

Adiev A. Z. Land issue and ethnopolitical conflicts in Dagestan. Rostov-on-Don, 2010, p. 153.

The administration of a district in Dagestan is trying to remove intra-religious tension in the village of Stalskoye. 30.05.2008. [http://www.m.kavkaz-uzel.m/articles/1374/?full_page=true, accessed from 30.10.2015]

Akhmedov M. Uraza po-stalski / / Chernovik. 16.08.2013 [http://chernovik.net/content/novosti/uraza-po-stalski, доступ от 30.10.2015].

Bobrovnikov V. "Islamic revival" in Dagestan: 20 years later // Central Asia and the Caucasus, 2007. N2 (50). pp. 161-172.

Bobrovnikov V. Islam, vlast i obshchestvo v byvshem kolkhoze: dagestanskii sluch [Islam, power and society in the former collective farm: the Dagestani case]. Essays on the Political Anthropology of the Caucasus / Edited by Yu. Karpov. 2012. pp. 9-31.

Video of Mawlid in 2011. Mawlid-TIELEK in Kaspiysk (7.02.2011) [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a40BE5wM_zE, accessed from 30.10.2015). Mawlid's video, edited in 2013 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CUphhTCXU08, accessed from 30.10.2015].

Kazenin K. Regulation of land relations in Dagestan: socio-economic roots of "traditionalization" // Economic policy. 2015. N10(3). pp. 113-133.

Kazenin K. Elements of the Caucasus. Land, power, and ideology in the North Caucasian republics. Moscow: Regnum Publ., 2012.

Kapustina E. [Elections in rural Dagestan: a political event as an element of social life]. Obshchestvo kak obekt i subjekt vlasti [Society as an object and subject of power]. Essays on the Political anthropology of the Caucasus. Saint Petersburg: Peterburgskoe vostokovedenie, 2012, pp. 32-60.

Karpov Yu., Kapustina E. Highlanders after mountains. Migration processes in Dagestan in the XX-early XXI centuries: their social, ethno-cultural consequences and prospects. St. Petersburg, 2011.

Kisriev E. F. Islam and power in Dagestan. Moscow: OGI Publ., 2004.

page 306
Magomedov M. " Work on... imams" / / Draft. N23. 6.06.2008, [http://chernovik.net/content/novosti/rabota-nad-imamami, accessed from 30.10.2015].

Magomedov A. Residents of the village of Stalskoye in Dagestan demand to leave the former imam. 13.05.2008 [http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/136333/, доступ от 30.10.2015].

Makarov D. V. [Radicalization of Islam in Dagestan: opportunities and limits of Jahidism]. 2004. N6. pp. 147-161.

The Moscow Helsinki Group. Human rights in the regions of the Russian Federation. 2008. Collection of regional reports. Volume 2. 2009.

About the murder of a deputy in the Dagestani village of Stalskoye // Kavkazpress.ru, 03.07.2014 [http://kavkazpress.ru/archives/54204, accessed from 30.10.2015].

Rybina Yu. The militants were hiding in a dugout //Kommersant. 05.07.2015 [http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2762261, accessed from 30.10.2015].

Starodubrovskaya I., Zubarevich N., Sokolov D., Intigrinova T., Mironova N., Magomedov Kh. North Caucasus: Modernization Challenge. Moscow: RANKHGS Publ., 2011.

Yarlykapov A. Modern Dagestan: actual ethnopolitical and ethno-confessional problems / / NB: Problems of politics and society. 2012. N3. pp. 130-153 [http://e-notabene.ru/pr/article_257-html, accessed from 1.03.2016].

Adiev, А. (2010) Zemel'nyi vopros i etnopoliticheskie konfikty v Dagestane [Land issue and ethno-politic conflicts in Dagestan]. Rostov-na-Donu.

"Administratsiia raiona v Dagestane pytaetsia sniat' vnutrireligioznuiu napriazhennost' v selenii Stal'skoe" [The district administration in Dagestan tries to remove intra-religious tensions in the village of Stalskoe] (2008), Kavkazskii Uzel, 30.05.2008. [http://www.rn.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/l37l54/?full_page=true, accessed on: 30.10.2015].

Akhmedov, M. (2013) "Uraza po-stalski" [Uraza a la Stalskoe], "Chernovik". 16.08.2013 [http://chernovik.net/content/novosti/uraza-po-stalski, accessed on: 30.10.2015].

Berger, P.L., Luckmann, T. (1966) The Social Construction of Reality. Penguin Books.

Brubaker, R. (2002). Ethnicity without Groups. Harvard University Press.

Bobrovnikov, V. (2007) "Islamskoe vozrozhdeniie" v Dagestane: 20 let spustia" [The Islamic Resurgence in Dagestan: 20 years later], Tsentral'naia Aziia i Kavkaz 2(50): 161-172.

Bobrovnikov, V. (2012) "Islam, vlast' i obshchestvo v byvshem kolkhoze: dagestanskii sluchai" [Islam, Power and Society in the ex-kolkhoz: the case of Dagestan], in Iu. Karpov Obshchestvo kak ob"ekt i sub"ekt vlasti. Ocherki politicheskoi antropologii Kavkaza, pp. 9-31. Saint-Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo peterburgskoe vostokovedenie.

Buzan, B., Waever Ole, de Wilde Jaap (1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Campana, A., Ducol, B. (2014) "Voices of the "Caucasus Emirate": Mapping and Analyzing North Caucasus Insurgency Websites", Terrorism and Political Violence: 1-22.

Campana, A., Ratelle, J. -F. (2014) "A Political Sociology Approach to the Diffusion of Conflict from Chechnya to Dagestan and Ingushetia", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism: 37(2): 115-134.

Denzin, N.K., Lincoln, Y.S. (2005) The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research: Sage Publications, Third Ed.

page 307
Hahn, G.M. (2008) "The Jihadi Insurgency and the Russian Counterinsurgency in the North Caucasus", Post-Soviet Affairs: 24(1): 1-39.

Hay, C. (2016) "Social Constructivism", in M. Bevir, R.A.W. Rhodes (eds) Routledge Handbook of Interpretive Political Science, pp. 99-113. Routledge.

Iarlykapov, A. (2012) "Sovremennyi Dagestan: aktual'nye etnopoliticheskie i etnokonfessional'nye problemy" [The Contemporary Dagestan: actual ethnopolitic and ethnoconfessional problems], NB Problemy politiki i obshchestva 3: 130-153.

Jeldtoft, N. (2011) "Lived Islam: religious identity with "non-organized" Muslim minorities", Ethnic and Racial Studies 34(7): 1134-1151.

Jeldtoft, N., Nielsen, J.S. (2011) "Introduction: methods in the study of "non-organized" Muslim minorities", Ethnic and Racial Studies 34(7): 1113-1119.

Kazenin, K. (2012) Elementy Kavkaza. Zemlia, vlast', ideologiia v severokavkazskikh respublikakh [Elements of the Caucasus. Land, Power, Ideology in the North Caucasus Republics]. Moskva: Regnum.

Kazenin, K. (2015) "Regulirovanie zemel'nykh otnoshenii v Dagestane: sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie korni "traditsionalizatsii" [Regulation of land relations in Dagestan: socioeconomic roots of "traditionalisation"], Ekonomicheskaia politika 10(3): 113-133.

Karpov, Iu., Kapustina, E. (2011) Gortsy posle gor. Migratsionnye protsessy v Dagestane v XX - nachale XXI v.: ikh sotsial'noe, etnokul'turnye posledstviia i perspektivy [The Highlander after the Mountains. Migration Processes in Dagestan in XX-beginning of the XXth century: their social, ethnocultural consequences and perspectives]. Sankt-Peterburg: Peterburgskoe Vostokovedenie.

Kapustina, E. (2012) "Vybory v sel'skom Dagestane: politicheskoe sobytie как element sotsial'noi zhizni" [Elections in the rural Dagestan: a political event as an element of social life], in Iu. Karpov Obshchestvo как ob"ekt i sub"ekt vlasti. Ocherki politicheskoi antropologii Kavkaza, pp. 32-60. Saint-Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo peterburgskoe vostokovedenie.

Kisriev, E. (2004) Islam i vlast'v Dagestane. [Islam and Power in Dagestan]. M.: OGI, 2004.

Kuhle, L. (2011) "Excuse me, which radical organization are you a member of? Reflections on methods to study highly religious but non-organized Muslims", Ethnic and Racial Studies: 34(7): 1186-1200.

Makarov, D. (2004) "Radikalizatsiia islama v Dagestane: vozmozhnosti i predely dzhakhidizma" [Radicalisation of Islam in Dagestan: potential and threatshold of jihadism], Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost' 6: 147-161.

Ratelle, J. (2013) "The Insurgency in the North Caucasus : Putting Religious Claims into Context", Russian Analytical Digest 131: 5-8.

Shterin, M., Yarlykapov, A. (2011) "Reconsidering Radicalisation and Terrorism: the New Muslims Movement in Kabardino-Balkaria and its Path to Violence", Religion State and Society State & Society 2:303-325.

Souleimanov, E. (2012) "Islam, nationalisme et vendetta : l' insurrection au Caucase du Nord", Politique etrangere 2: 375-386.

Starodubrovskaia, I., Zubarevich, N., Sokolov, D., Intigrinova, T., Mironova, N., Magomedov, X. (2011) Severnii Kavkaz: modernizatsionni vyzov. [North Caucasus: A Challenge of Modernisation]. Moskva: RANKhGS.

Yemelianova, G. (2015) "Islam, nationalism and state in the Muslim Caucasus", Caucasus Survey 1(2): 3-23.

page 308
Magomedov, M (2008) "Rabota nad... imamami" [Work on ...imams], "Chernovik" 23. 06.06.2008 [http://chernovik.net/content/novosti/rabota-nad-imamami, accessed on 30.10.2015].

Magomedov, A. (2008) "Jiteli selenia Stalskoe v Dagestane trebuiut ostavit prejnego imama" [The inhabitants of the Dagestani village Stalskoe claim to keep their imam"], Kavkazski Uzel. 13.05.2008 [http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/136333/, accessed on 30.10.2015].

Moscow Helsinki Group. Prava cheloveka v Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Sbornik regionalnikh dokladov. Tom 2. [Human Rights in the Russian Federation. Regional Reports Series. Volume 2] (2009).

"O[b] ubiistve deputata v dagestanskom sele Stal'skoe" [On the killing of the deputee in Stalskoe] (2014), Kavkazpress.ru. 03.07.2014. [http://kavkazpress.ru/archives/54204, accessed on 30.10.2015].

Rybina, Iu. (2015) "Boeviki ukryvalis' v blindazhe" [The militats were hiding in blindages], Kommersant. 05.07.2015 [http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2762261, accessed on: 30.10.2015].

Video mavlida v 2011 godu [Video of mavlid in 2011] "Mavlid-TIELEK" g. Kaspiiske (7.02.2011 g.) [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a40BE5wM_zE, accessed on 30.10.2015]. Video mavlida, smontirovannogo v 2013 godu [Video of mavlid edited in 2013] [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CUphhTCXU08, accessed on 30.10.2015].

Ware, R., Kisriev, E., Patzelt, W., Roericht, U. (2002) "Dagestani Perspectives on Russia and Chechnya", Post-Soviet Affairs 18(4): 306-331.

Ware, R., Kisriev, E. (2010) Dagestan: Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance in the North Caucasus. Armonk, New York, London: M.E. Sharpe.

page 309

Permanent link to this publication: