Demographic processes in Iran after the Islamic Revolution are of particular interest. On the one hand, in the first decade after the revolution, this country experienced very high population growth rates (about 3% per year). On the other hand, in the 1990s there was a rapid drop in the birth rate, which was unexpected for many analysts. Currently, Iran is undergoing processes that, contrary to existing stereotypes (one of which is the perception of Iran as a young state with a high birth rate), in the future may lead to a reduction in the population and its rapid aging.

The author analyzes the demographic situation in Iran since 1979, including the forecast until 2100, which will help to better understand current trends in demographic development.

Key words: Iran, population, birth rate, mortality, demographic explosion, family planning.

In Iran, as in many developing countries, the demographic transition began in the first half of the 20th century. A significant reduction in mortality, while maintaining a high birth rate, has led to a very rapid population growth. If the first general census of 1956 counted 18.95 million people, the next census of 1966 counted 25.8 million \Natayej-e kolli-ye sarshomari-ye, 2009]. Following the publication of the results of the 1966 census, the Iranian Government expressed concern about the very rapid population growth. In 1967, a Family Planning Council was established within the Ministry of Health and an official family planning program was launched. The goal of the program was to help improve the physical, psychological and socio-economic well-being of the family, as well as reduce population growth. The goal was to reduce the population growth rate from 3.1% (the level of 1956-1966) to 1% per year. By the early 1970s, 1,500 state-run clinics had been established to provide contraceptives [Amani, 2010, pp. 86-93].

Since the adoption of the family planning program, Iran's population growth rate has slowed slightly. The 1976 census showed an annual growth rate of 2.7%, and the total population was 33.7 million [Natayej-e kolli-ye sarshomari-ye, 2009].

By the end of the 1970s, the share of the urban population (from 34% to 50% in 1960-1980) and the literacy rate of the population over the age of 15 increased markedly, although the latter remained very low, especially among women: in 1976, 48.2% of men and only 24.4% of women over the age of 15 were literate [World Bank, 2013]. All these processes contributed to the decline in the birth rate.

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the new government, seeking to completely break with the previous regime, which it accused of bowing to the West, also abolished the previous demographic policy. The activities of the Family Planning Council were curtailed. An exceptionally difficult foreign policy situation (the war with Russia).

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Iran's de facto isolation in the international arena) led to the fact that a large population began to be perceived as a necessary condition for the country's survival, so rapid population growth and a high birth rate were strongly encouraged. Despite the formal authorization of family planning, the socio-psychological atmosphere in the first decade after the revolution favored a high birth rate. The ration system, in which basic necessities, as well as some expensive imported goods, were distributed according to the number of family members, also contributed to an increase in the birth rate [Abbasi-Shawazi, 2002]. As a result, the birth rate increased slightly in the early 1980s. However, this promotion did not last long. According to the UN five-year data, the total birth rate in Iran increased slightly in 1980-1984 compared to 1975-1979 (from 6.27 to 6.54 children per woman), but then decreased to 5.62 in 1985-1989 [UN Population Division 2013].

It is important to note that the Iranian economy in the 1980s, as a result of a sharp drop in oil exports (the main source of income) and isolation from the world market, was in a deep crisis, and per capita income significantly decreased [Ulchenko and Mammadova, 2006, p. 146]. The decline in the standard of living of families in the mid-1980s, which led to an increase in the cost of raising and educating children, also had an impact on the decline in the birth rate. Many young people were forced to postpone marriage until they found a job in order to be able to provide for their families, and in marriage - to limit the number of children for whom they sought to provide a decent level of well-being and a good education [Voronov, 2006].

Another feature of Iran's demographic dynamics after 1979 was a significant reduction in mortality. Despite success in reducing the death rate in pre-revolutionary Iran, there were still problems in the country that the Shah's government did not pay enough attention to. For example, sanitation in rural areas was incomparably worse than in urban areas: while 90% of households in cities had access to clean drinking water and 98% of households had electricity, in rural areas it was only 20% and 28%, respectively. With an average national infant mortality rate of 105% o, according to the survey of 1975-1976, it was 60%o in urban areas and 124%o, i.e. 2 times higher in rural areas. The average life expectancy in the village was 10 years less than in the city - 51.2 years versus 61.5 years, respectively [Aghajanian et al., 2007].

Immediately after the revolution, the Islamic Government declared its main task to fully support the disadvantaged segments of society and adopted a new Constitution, which guaranteed the provision of food, basic health care and access to primary education to the entire population (Vahidnia, 2007). The Government, which was forced to spend huge amounts of money on the war with Iraq, had very limited funds that could be allocated to social needs. Nevertheless, in the late 1980s, almost half of the budget was allocated for social expenditures-46.9% [Ulchenko and Mamedova, 2006, p. 147]. Special attention was paid to the development of backward regions. Since 1981, the creation of a holistic health system covering the entire country has begun [Abbasi-Shavazi, McDonald, Hosseini-Chavoshi, 2009].

All these measures, despite the military actions and the economic crisis of the 1980s, led to a significant reduction in mortality, especially in infants, who are most sensitive to the socio-economic situation. According to the UN, infant mortality in Iran decreased from 92% o in 1975-1980 to 55%o in 1985-1990 [UN Population Division, 2013].

A slight increase in the birth rate and a significant decrease in mortality in the first half of the 1980s led to a sharp increase in the population growth rate. According to the next census of 1986, the population of Iran reached 49.4 million people, and the growth rate of the population of the Islamic Republic of Iran is growing rapidly.

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Despite significant losses from military operations and destruction, the growth rate was a record 3.9% [Natayej-e kolli-ye sarshomari-ye, 2009]. The natural growth rate was somewhat lower (more than 3.2%) due to mass migration to Iran from Afghanistan and Iraq [Abbasi et al., 2002], but it is also much higher than in the 1970s, which indicates the scale of the post-revolutionary demographic explosion.

After the publication of the census results, the country's authorities were concerned about such rapid population growth and its possible consequences for the Iranian economy. Even then, Iran could not cope with the growing number of young people who needed to be provided with jobs.

In December 1989, after much discussion, the Iranian Government adopted a new family planning program. Its main goals were: to increase the interval between births to 3-4 years, to reduce the birth rate for women under 18 and over 35 years, and to limit the number of children in the family (preferably no more than 3 children). One of the goals of this program was to reduce the natural population growth rate to 2.2% by 2009 and the total birth rate to 3.5 children per woman by the same year (Aghajanian, 1998). At the same time, many demographers, including Iranian ones, doubted the possibility of achieving these results.

The Ministry of Health and Medical Education has been given the authority and resources necessary to provide all married couples with free family planning services. The goals of further reducing child mortality, improving women's education, and expanding social insurance and pension coverage were set to eliminate one of the most important incentives for spouses to maximize the number of children in the family [Abbasi et al., 2002]. Family planning services were quickly made available to all comers, even in remote areas of the country, by expanding the coverage of the modern health system through which these services were distributed.

The program unexpectedly quickly yielded successful results. The planned goals were practically achieved 16 years earlier than planned-in 1993, just 4 years after the program was launched. At that time, the total birth rate dropped to 3.6%, while the population growth rate dropped to 2.3%. Given the great role of religion in Iranian society, the success of the program is attributed to its support from the Iranian clergy. A significant role was played by the educational campaign to train the population in family planning methods in order to reduce poverty and improve the living conditions of children. It was held in print, on radio, television, and in mosques. Young couples planning to register their marriage have started to receive mandatory counseling on how to use family planning tools [Vahidnia, 2007].

The 1996 census confirmed the rapid decline in the birth rate in Iran. Thus, the population was 60.1 million [Natayej-ye kolli-ye sarshomari-ye, 2009], which is significantly less than the UN forecast for 1996 - 76 million people. The average annual population growth rate was 1.96%, the lowest since the mid - 20th century. The share of the population under 15 years of age has fallen to 39.5% (compared to 45.5% in 1986), and the share of the elderly population has risen to 4.4% (3% in 1986). The total birth rate in 1996 was 3 children per woman and fell by 2 times compared to the level of the mid-1980s Mehryar and Ahmad-Nia (2004).

The unprecedented decline in the birth rate recorded by the census was confirmed by a large-scale demographic survey in 2000. According to it, the total birth rate decreased to 2.17. The percentage of married women aged 15-49 using contraception was very high (72%) compared to 49% in 1989 [Abbasi-Shavazi, McDonald, Hosseini-Chavoshi, 2009].

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The last census in Iran was conducted in 2011. Its results confirmed the trend towards a decline in population growth and an increase in urbanization: these figures were 1.29 and 71.4%, and the population reached 75.15 million people. The percentage of urban residents in Iran is much higher than the global average (about 50%) and is close to the indicators of developed countries (70-80%). Huge changes have occurred in the age structure. The share of children under 15 years of age has fallen sharply - to 23.4%, the elderly (over 65 years) The share of the working-age population increased to 5.7%, and the share of the working-age population increased to 70.9% [Statistical Center of Iran, 2012].

Among the reasons that contributed to such a rapid decline in the birth rate, it is necessary to point out the state policy of encouraging family planning. After the Islamic Revolution, modernization continued, affecting the reduction of the birth rate. For example, infant mortality declined rapidly, reaching 20.3%o in 2005-2010, the literacy rate of women and girls over the age of 6 reached 80% in 2010, and the literacy rate of women aged 15-24 in most provinces was close to 100% [Gozares-e pohost-e didebani-ye, 2012]. Infrastructure and sanitation have improved significantly, especially in rural areas. By 2000, infant mortality in rural areas was almost the same as in urban areas (30% and 28%, respectively) [Aghajanian et al., 2007]. In 2004, all urban residents and 98.3% of rural residents had access to electricity, while 99.1% of urban residents and 89% of rural residents were provided with clean drinking water. 97.5% of urban residents and 89.1% of rural residents have televisions (compared to 22.6% and 3.2% in 1977), and 98.5% and 92.4% have refrigerators (compared to 36.5% and 7.6%, respectively, in 1977) [Salehi - Esfahani, 2006]. All these factors made it easier for the population to accept ideas about birth control, especially in rural areas.

However, the planned parenthood program has contributed to such a dramatic decline in the birth rate that it fell below simple reproduction more than 10 years ago and continues to decline steadily. In 2011, the birth rate was only 1.6 children per woman. This level is significantly lower than simple generational replacement. Many countries with similar birth rates (for example, Bulgaria, Russia, and Croatia) are experiencing population decline [World Bank, 2013]. However, in Iran, the population continues to grow, increasing by about a million people each year. The reason is due to the peculiarities of the age structure of Iran, which is dominated by young people compared to developed countries due to the very high birth rate in the recent past. European countries have had a low birth rate for many decades, and the proportion of older people in their age structure is higher. For example, the share of women aged 20-35 years (who account for the vast majority of all births), according to the UN, in 2010 in Iran was 16.8%, and the share of the elderly (over 65 years), who account for a significant proportion of deaths, was only 5.2%. For comparison, in Bulgaria, Russia, and Croatia, the proportion of women aged 20-35 was 10, 12.3, and 9.7%, respectively, while the proportion of older people was 18.3, 13.1, and 17.5% [UN Population Division, 2013]. The predominance of young people in the age structure allows Iran to have a significantly higher overall fertility rate and a low overall mortality rate (for example, in 2011 it was 2.7 times lower than in Bulgaria, although life expectancy in these countries is almost the same-73-74 years) [World Bank, 2013].

Although Iran's population is currently growing, in a few decades, according to UN forecasts, this growth will stop. Many experts consider it very likely that the birth rate in Iran will continue to fall significantly below simple reproduction, especially since in some provinces the total birth rate is already 1.2-1.4 [Abbasi-Shavazi, McDonald, Hosseini-Chavoshi 2009]. According to this scenario of an accelerated decline in the birth rate (to 1.3 from the 2020s to the end of the 21st century), the peak of the population of Iran will fall on

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2043, when it will reach 88 million people, and then begin to decline. The rate of decline will increase over time, and by 2100, the population of Iran will be only 55 million people (at the level of 1991), that is, it will be reduced by more than 30 million people. By 2100, 42% of the population will be 65 years of age or older [UN Population Division, 2013]. Thus, if the birth rate remains even slightly below the level of simple reproduction, Iran will still face a decline in the population and difficulties associated with its rapid aging in a few decades.

To date, about 50% of humanity has experienced a drop in the birth rate below the level of simple reproduction, and in 20 countries there is already a steady decline in the population [Antonov, 2011]. However, such countries often do not take measures to overcome the demographic crisis, and the birth rate in them continues to decline. In contrast, the Iranian leadership in 2012, drawing attention to the serious drop in the birth rate, canceled the family planning program and took a number of measures to stimulate the birth rate [Iran abolished its birth control program, 2012]. These measures include: increasing maternity leave for working women, providing preferential loans to parents for the third and fourth children, providing free food to families with children under two years of age, and providing material remuneration for the birth of a child, which increases depending on the order of birth [Jafarov, 2012].

Among these measures, support for large families (3 or more children) plays an important role. After all, in order to stop the population decline, families with 3 or more children must make up more than half of all families (Borisov, 2005). Support for large families, despite the high costs, is economically profitable in the medium term, contributing to the growth of the labor force and stimulating the domestic market (Korotaev and Khalturina, 2011). Therefore, the program of increasing the birth rate in Iran can produce certain results, although its implementation is complicated by the economic difficulties that the country is currently facing [Sazhin, 2013].

Thus, in a very short period of time, the demographic history of Iran has shifted from rapid population growth to a very low birth rate and the threat of population decline. It is very important that Iran quickly realized the danger of depopulation and took thoughtful measures to increase the birth rate. The future will show how effective they will be.

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