The Second World War changed the fate of Arab countries. Among them was Lebanon, a small country with a predominantly Christian population. France, having received a mandate from the League of Nations to govern Lebanon, agreed in 1926 to grant it a special constitution, a national parliament and the post of president. However, this was only the beginning of Lebanon's 20-year struggle for real independence. The factors of this struggle were the rivalry of Britain and France with the Axis powers in the Middle East, the Anglo-French contradictions during the Second World War, the position of the progressive forces of the anti-fascist coalition, and the unification of numerous political, social and religious factions within Lebanese society.

Key words: mandate, National Pact of 1943, Maronites, Sunnis, Shiites, Druze, confessionalism.

The coming to power of the Popular Front government in France in the summer of 1936 led to the conclusion in November of the same year of a treaty between Paris and Beirut, according to which, after three years, France was to give up the League of Nations mandate to govern Lebanon, from control over its customs, finances and communications system. In fact, this was the consent of the mother country to the independence of the colony, but with important restrictions: Lebanon had to coordinate its foreign policy with France, keep its troops on its territory, and most importantly, recognize its right to protect ethnic and religious minorities in Lebanon. And since the number of such minorities in the country at that time reached 20 (the most influential were Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims) and there were serious contradictions and mutual claims between them, France thus had the opportunity to constantly interfere in the affairs of Lebanon, playing the role of "supreme arbiter" (Istoriya Vostoka, 2006, p. 152)..

In January 1939, the French Parliament refused to ratify the 1936 treaty renouncing the League of Nations ' mandate to govern Lebanon, and even to recognize in principle the sovereignty of this country, although in 1926 Paris "granted" it a constitution granting it the right to have a republican regime, its own government and a bicameral parliament. But this constitution was repealed in 1932 and replaced in 1934 with a new one, which transferred all power to the President, who was appointed High Commissioner of France, and deprived the Parliament of legislative initiative. All this took place against the backdrop of an escalating confrontation in France itself between left-wing forces and extreme right-wing organizations, which in 1938 put forward the idea of creating a "Front of the Mediterranean Countries", which would unite France and its possessions with fascist Italy and Francoist Spain. The right even planned to use "Muslim commandos" to provoke a pro-Fascist revolt in France, similar to that raised by General Franco in Spain [Gallissot and Badia, 1976, p. 409; Julien, 1972,

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p. 122]. The right was closely linked to Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, both of which were active military, intelligence, and propaganda expansions in the Mediterranean in the 1930s. In Lebanon, they were openly targeted by the National Social Syrian Party (NSSP), which received their help, headed by Antun Saade, formed in 1932 and soon numbered 30 thousand members [Istoriya Vostoka, 2006, p. 151-152; Sovremennaya Istoriya..., 1980, p.33-34].

At the beginning of World War II, the new French High Commissioner to Syria and Lebanon, General Maximilian Weygand, abolished the constitutions of these countries and dissolved their parliaments. The Communist Party and the League of Struggle against Fascism and Nazism, which is common to both countries, were banned. Weygang began construction of roads, airfields and other strategically important facilities. Although France was at war with Germany, the French High Commissioner, being a pathological anti-communist, planned an attack on the USSR, in particular an airstrike on the Baku oil fields. In the spring of 1940, he became commander-in-chief of the entire French army and "became famous" as one of the perpetrators of its capitulation in June 1940.

General Henri Fernand Denz, who succeeded Weygand in the Middle East, strictly followed all the instructions of the puppet "Vichy regime" established in France, led by Marshal Henri Philippe Petain. Britain tried to prevent it by declaring an economic blockade on Lebanon and Syria and cutting off the Kirkuk-Tripoli oil pipeline, which connected Lebanon with the oil-bearing regions of Iraq. But Denz, working with the German-Italian armistice commission that arrived in Lebanon in September 1940, helped it export raw materials and food to Germany and Italy, thereby creating economic difficulties for Syria and Lebanon. In February 1941. he suppressed hunger riots in a number of cities, but soon began to attract Arab patriots of Lebanon to his side, fearing the influence of the Free France movement, founded on June 18, 1940 by General Charles de Gaulle.

Turning Syria and Lebanon into a base of confrontation between Great Britain and its then possessions-Iraq and Palestine - was part of the German plans to use Arab nationalists against London, which, as is known, were implemented in 1940-1941 by the former Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husseini, the prominent ideologue of pan-Arabism, the Druze Emir Shakib Arslan, and the Prime Minister of Iraq in 1940-1941 Mr. Rashid Ali al-Ghailani. The territory of Syria and Lebanon, their airfields, bases and road network played an important role in these plans [Istoriya Vostoka, 2006, p. 153; Mirsky, 1961, p. 140-160; Lévi-Provençal, 1947, p.10-19].

On June 8, 1941, British troops (primarily the Australian Division and the Indian Brigade), along with units of the Free French Army, entered Syria and Lebanon. On July 14, Denz surrendered. On the same day, General Georges Catroux, on behalf of Free France, issued a declaration of intention to abandon the mandate to govern Lebanon and Syria and recognize their independence, provided that "France signs a treaty with each of the two republics at the end of the world conflict" [Les Arabes du Message à l'histoire, 1995, p. 504]. The British government supported this initiative, actually promising to do the same [Abu Shakra, 1988, p.14; History of the East, 2006, p. 154].

"It soon became clear that this would not satisfy the British," de Gaulle later recalled. - Their actions... They were carried out on the spot by a group of people who were not scrupulous, but who had a lot of money, and were approved by the Foreign Office, which sometimes complained about this, but never expressed its negative attitude. They were supported by the Prime Minister (W. Churchill-R. L.), whose ambiguous promises and feigned emotions were misleading about his intentions. All of this was intended to ensure that Britain's leadership position was maintained throughout the East." The long-standing rivalry between the two Powers in the colonies then sharply escalated. "In carrying out its policy," de Gaulle emphasized, " England intended to take the place of France by means of veiled or crude methods

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in Damascus and Beirut" [De Gaulle, 1957, p. 211]. Sometimes it came to threats. For example, the commander of the British brigade that occupied the Jebel Druse region threatened the representative of de Gaulle: "Well, if we need to fight, we will fight!" [ibid., p. 227].

On August 7, 1941, the Allies tried to reach an agreement: de Gaulle and the British resident in the Middle East, O. Littleton, concluded an agreement on mutual recognition of Britain's primacy in military matters and France's" special interests " in the Levant countries. But that didn't put an end to the controversy. "In Beirut, "de Gaulle noted," Spears settled "(a British general who became an envoy to the governments of Lebanon and Syria - R. L.). Unofficially, he was supposed to "encourage the French to fulfill their promises," as the New Zealander William Harris writes without a trace of humor [Harris, 1999, p. 136].

"In his hands," de Gaulle wrote, " were magnificent trump cards: the presence of an English army; the diverse activities of English intelligence; control over the economic relations of the two countries, which could exist only if there was trade; support for his activities in all capitals from the world's first diplomacy; huge funds for propaganda; official support for neighboring countries the Arab states, Iraq and Transjordan, where kings from the house of Hussein reigned, as well as Palestine, whose British High Commissioner systematically expressed hypocritical fears about the reaction of the Arab population of the territories entrusted to him in connection with the "harassment" that their Syrian and Lebanese brothers were allegedly subjected to" [De Gaulle, 1957, p.234].

September 9, 1941 Winston Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons, said that " there can be no question that France will continue to maintain the same situation in Syria as before the war." Although General Katrou declared the "independence and sovereignty" of Syria on September 27, and Lebanon on November 26, British pressure continued. "The British," de Gaulle later recalled, "although they did not dispute our rights in words, in reality they did not take us into account in any way," constantly interfering in the relations of "Free France" with the governments of Lebanon and Syria, forming cavalry from Druze, trying to control the purchase and distribution of grain, threatening to expel those they did not like French representatives, etc. [ibid., pp. 260-262].

Syria and Lebanon were included in the sterling block. The foreign trade of these countries, the supply of food to the population, and the means of communication and communication were controlled by the British military command, which had a much more numerous and better equipped armed forces in the Levant countries than de Gaulle's supporters. Nevertheless, the desire of both Britain and" Free France " to attract Lebanese and Syrians to their side, to stop the machinations of Nazi agents and pro-fascist organizations previously encouraged by Denz, and the lifting of the ban on the democratic press helped to activate patriotic and progressive elements in Lebanon and Syria. The League of Struggle against Fascism and Nazism, which published the progressive magazine At-Tariq (The Way), which was popular in many Arab countries, was restored, the Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR was created, and all political organizations were allowed, with the exception of the NSSP headed by A. Saade, due to its pro-fascist orientation.

Although the final formalization of the independence of the Levant countries was postponed until the end of the war, the very fact of its recognition by French officials was of great importance and greatly influenced subsequent events. The new generation of intellectuals, young students, especially students, became more and more imbued with the ideas of national liberation, as was convincingly evidenced, in particular, by the inter-communal congress in the Maronite spiritual center of Bkerki, which opened on December 25, 1941 [Abu Shakra, 1988, p. 14; History of the East, 2006, p. 154-156; Modern History..., 1980, pp. 36-37].

But in 1941-1942, when the outcome of the battles for Stalingrad, the Caucasus and North Africa had not yet been decided and the danger of a German-Italian invasion had not yet disappeared, there were no conditions for the realization of independence. In August 1943, de Gaulle declared in Beirut: "The independence of the State of Syria and the State of Lebanon is a fait accompli. "

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It was the goal of France, as set out in the mandate received from the League of Nations, and can only be proclaimed on the basis of this mandate. That is, France and only it can grant this independence." The general went on to talk about the "hardships of war" that prevented "the use of democratic institutions" and expressed the hope that "the day is not far off when Syrians and Lebanese will be able to express their opinions in dignity and calm" [Les Arabes du Message à l'histoire, 1995, p. 504].

It was difficult for De Gaulle to simultaneously gain the support of England and argue with it. In addition, England was supported by the United States, which was cool about de Gaulle and his movement. Maintaining diplomatic and other ties with the Vichy regime, Washington, according to the general, "was ready to negotiate with anyone who would open the gates to North Africa to American troops." At the same time, he was outraged by the hypocrisy of London, which "insisted on the rights of the Arabs to independence, when the British put Gandhi and Nehru behind bars in India, severely punished supporters of Rashid Ali in Iraq, and dictated to Farouk, the king of Egypt, the composition of his government" [De Gaulle, 1960, p.34]. De Gaulle formed 12 battalions of Lebanese and Syrians totaling 25,000 men, but they were opposed by the 700,000-strong British army, which largely consisted of Indians, Australians, New Zealanders, and South Africans and controlled Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Sudan, and Transjordan along with Lebanon and Syria. With its help, England "held in its hands the entire foreign trade of the Arab countries, that is, in fact, the entire life of the population, determined the opinion of prominent figures and the position of governments" [ibid., pp. 36-37].

Combining financial and diplomatic pressure with propaganda and intelligence, the British intervened in the Lebanese presidential and parliamentary elections in July-October 1943, and then actively influenced President Bishar al-Khoury and Prime Minister Riad al-Solha, pushing them to make anti-French declarations: about "the immediate realization of independence" and "the immediate realization of independence". on "affirming our national interest to the exclusion of any other" [De Gaulle, 1946, p. 215; Johnson, 1986, p. 7, 26; Les Arabes du Message à l'histoire, 1995, p. 504-505]. At the same time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the then newly formed Lebanese government, Camille Chamoun, attacked France, and the newly elected parliament amended the text of the Lebanese constitution, "removing from it just what was relevant to the mandate, as if it had been eliminated" [De Gaulle, 1960, pp. 229-231].

In response, the French representative (delegate) in the Levant vetoed the revised version of the constitution on November 12, 1943, dissolved the rebellious parliament, and arrested the president, Prime Minister, and a number of ministers of the new government. Emile Edde, who had previously held this post (1936-1939), was appointed interim President instead of the elected al-Khoury. But the French Committee of National Liberation (CPLC), formed in the summer of 1943, headed by de Gaulle, considered that the French delegate "went beyond the limits of actions permissible in this situation, although he recognized the measures taken by him and, most importantly, the feelings that dictated them." The best orientalist in the FKNO, J. Catrou (a native of Algeria), was sent to Beirut, who released B. al-Khoury, R. al-Solha and other prisoners (all of them returned to Beirut on November 22), and in December 1943 agreed to the exclusion of articles on the French mandate from the constitutions of Lebanon and Syria and promised withdraw the French troops.

However, the British did not stop "noisy protests against France"after that. De Gaulle was ironic:

"In Cairo, the demands came from Nahhas Pasha, whom the English ambassador imposed on King Farouk as chairman of the Council of Ministers, in Baghdad from Nuri Said, who returned to power only through the influence of British troops, in Amman from the Emir Abdullah, whose budget was drawn up in London and whose army was commanded by General Peake and Colonel Glabb, who were called "Pic Pasha" and "Glabb Pasha" "[De Gaulle, 1960, p. 232-234; Les Arabes du Message à l'histoire, 1995, p. 506-507].

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The year 1943 turned out to be significant in the history of Lebanon: the so - called National Pact was finalized - a serious and long-term document that represented a compromise between the country's leading communities-Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims. President Al-Khoury signed the agreement on behalf of the former, and Prime Minister Al - Solh signed it on behalf of the latter. According to some sources, the previously mentioned General E. Spears played a certain role in developing the document and facilitating a compromise between its participants [Harris, 1999, p. 136-137]. The Pact stipulated that Lebanon was a part of the Arab world with a special character and relations with the West. Christians pledged not to impose "foreign", i.e. Western, influence on Lebanon, and Muslims - to unite it with any Arab state (meaning Syria, to which Sunnis have always gravitated).

It was specifically stipulated that the president of the country should be a Maronite, the prime minister-a Sunni, the chairman of the parliament-a Shiite, its vice-chairman-an Orthodox. Each community had to be represented in all state institutions, including elected ones. According to the 1932 census, among the Lebanese there were 30% Maronites, 22% Sunnis, 18% Shiites, 10% Orthodox, 6% Druze, 6% Uniates (Greek Catholics) and 8% of the rest (Gregorian Armenians and Armenian Catholics, Nestorian Assyrians and Chaldeans, i.e. Assyrians and Chaldeans).Catholics, Protestant Christians, and Jews). In Parliament, there should have been 6 Christians for every 5 Muslims [Istoriya Vostoka, 2006, p. 155-156; Harris, 1999, p. 136-137; Vallaud, 1976, p.49].

The principle of confessionalism thus consolidated the superiority of Christians. But gradually, as the religious composition of the population changed, it turned from a factor of temporary stabilization of the situation into a factor of destabilization and a source of conflicts that hindered the development of Lebanon. Therefore, according to the French historian E. Picard, "it would be more accurate to speak of a 'communal' pact than a 'national ' one" (Picard, 1988, p. 119). In addition, in real life, it was impossible to isolate yourself from outside influences. Due to the geostrategic and geopolitical situation of Lebanon, the struggle for it only intensified after the adoption of the National Pact. Britain and France were replaced by the United States with its diverse interests in the Middle East, and Syria-Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

"France remains true to its promises, its obligations and its duty," Georges Catroux declared on Lebanon Radio on November 23, 1943 [Catroux, 1949, p.427]. But it was more of a good wish. Since the end of 1943, the so-called Constitutional Bloc began to actively manifest itself, uniting deputies, ministers, large landowners, merchants and financiers-representatives of different faiths-around B. al - Khuri and R. al-Solkh. Blok argued for the recognition of the concept of Kiyan lubnaniyah (Lebanese genesis), "so that each community receives its rights fairly and according to the importance of its position" [Abu Shakra, 1988, p.12-13].

The Constitutional bloc was opposed by the National Bloc, which expressed extremist views of the Maronite elite (up to the denial of the Arab character of Lebanon). The remaining parties remained in the shadows until the end of the war, with the exception of the Communist Party (by the beginning of 1944 it was divided into independent parties in Syria and Lebanon) and the NSSP, whose activities were allowed in May 1944 by the British military authorities and which supported the plan of "Greater Syria" (annexation to Syria) put forward by the Emir of Transjordan (and in fact London). Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan) and the "Holy Crescent" plan of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Said, according to which Iraq was to be added to the" Greater Syria". Both plans provided for the extension of the power of the openly pro-British Hashemite dynasty, which then ruled in Iraq and Transjordan, to the new states. But both Syrians and Lebanese rejected these plans, which deprived them of independence and imposed a monarchy instead of a republic [Istoriya Vostoka, 2006, p. 155].

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In 1945, Lebanon participated in the creation of the League of Arab States, proving that it did not intend to isolate itself from the Arab world (as some Maronites called for) and from its problems [Les Arabes du Message à l'histoire, 1995, p. 507]. In August of the same year, diplomatic relations between Lebanon and the Soviet Union were established through the mediation of the USSR Ambassador to Egypt N. V. Novikov. On this occasion, the Lebanese Government stated: "Unconditional recognition by the Soviet Union will strengthen our independence and make it unshakable." At that time, during the years of the Red Army's victories over Hitler's troops, the authority of the USSR was higher than ever. The Lebanese press in this regard stated with satisfaction: "Russia recognized the independence of our country quite sincerely", so that "our small people would enjoy all their rights, their freedoms and their absolute sovereignty" [Novikov, 1976, p. 4]. 9, 27, 150, 182, 189].

On international issues, Lebanon tried to act together with Syria, which was dictated primarily by economic problems. In February 1945, these states declared war on Germany and Japan, in a purely symbolic act, and agreed to maintain a unified body that controlled foreign companies and concessions, as well as the general customs administration and the tobacco monopoly. The entire economic life of the Levant countries and their economic stability depended on these institutions. At the same time, Lebanon and Syria sought to establish their position as equal partners of other states, signing in April 1945. The UN Declaration of which they became members. A month earlier, they joined the founding members of the League of Arab States (LAS), signing in Cairo a pact on cooperation between Arab countries, providing for "the protection of their interests and sovereignty, and the common consideration of affairs."

The decisive stage of the struggle to transform independence from formal to actual occurred in May 1945. The end of World War II deprived both France and Britain of a reason to keep their troops in the Levant. The de Gaulle government agreed to withdraw military units, but only after concluding agreements that were beneficial for Paris in the areas of finance, military cooperation, culture and diplomacy. London also did not abandon plans to gain a foothold in the countries of the region. And the United States also had a project to establish control over the territory of Syria and Lebanon, through which they intended to lay oil pipelines from the oil-producing principalities of the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. Realizing this, Beirut and Damascus have repeatedly raised the issue of withdrawing British and French troops, but without any conditions or concessions [Recent History..., 1980, pp. 38-39].

May 6, 1945]. a new contingent of French troops was landed in Beirut (under the pretext of replacing the previous one, which had not yet been withdrawn). This happened without prior notice and, of course, with the consent of the Lebanese Government, which provoked anti - colonial protests in the country, and in some places armed clashes with the French. The same thing, but with great bloodshed, happened in Syria, where since May 8, attacks on French soldiers have become more frequent, whose response to this was the shooting of demonstrators in Damascus on May 19, reprisals directed against the residents of Aleppo (Aleppo), the shelling of the cities of Homs and Hama on May 27, and, finally, unprecedented in cruelty and violence. Degrees of destruction artillery and aerial bombardment of Damascus on May 29.

In Lebanon, the French were more cautious than in Syria, as they did not want to lose the sympathy of local Christians, especially the Maronites. But there were also "local battles"in Lebanon. Until May 17, the French sent military reinforcements here, but, apparently, they were more counting on the demonstration effect of their actions in Syria and a compromise with the Lebanese elite, known for its pro-French sentiments and generally orientation towards the West [Istoriya Vostoka, 2006, pp. 156-157].

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France's aggression against the Levant states provoked protests in Arab countries, and on May 21-in the Arab League. On May 28, the United States expressed its dissatisfaction, not for the first time demonstrating ostentatious anti-colonialism in order to oust imperialist competitors from a particular region. This time, the United States decided to use the opportunity to gain economic (through the construction of oil pipelines), political (by winning the sympathy of not only Lebanese, but also other Arabs) and socio-cultural (by expanding its influence through Protestant religious missions, carried out since the XIX century, and the activities of the American University in Beirut). advantages.

England also decided to strengthen its influence in the region and oust the French from there. At the same time, it relied on long-standing ties with Sunnis, Druze and some Lebanese Protestant denominations, but mainly on its military superiority.: Until May 6, 1945, there were 60,000 British and only 5,000 French troops in Syria and Lebanon. On May 31, 1945, British Prime Minister W. Churchill sent a blatantly threatening message to the head of the Provisional Government of France, de Gaulle, demanding that the French military return to their barracks "in order to avoid clashes between British and French troops." Finally, on June 1, 1945, the USSR demanded the cessation of military operations in the Levant countries, which could not remain aloof from the Middle East conflict, having by that time become a permanent member of the UN Security Council [Istoriya Vostoka, 2006, p.156-157; Sovremennaya Istoriya..., 1980, p. 39].

The de Gaulle government found itself in a very difficult situation, since in addition to Lebanon and Syria, during May 1945 it was simultaneously engaged in suppressing the anti-colonial uprising in Algeria, during which 88 Europeans were killed and 150 wounded (Algerians, according to various sources, died from 20 to 45 thousand people) [Julien, 1972, pp. 304-306 Du Manifest.., 1948, p. 68; Réalités algériennes, 1953, p. 105; The Middle East Journal, 1948, p. 195-196]. This excited the whole country, especially since in the government itself, de Gaulle could only count on the unconditional support of Catholics from the Republican People's Movement; socialists and communists were critical of the general's "imperial" views.

In this situation, France was forced to stop military operations in the Levant and begin withdrawing troops (first from Syria to a calmer and more loyal Lebanon). French garrisons in some areas were being replaced by British ones, and some British soldiers were urgently turned into "civilians" and tried by hook or crook to stay in Syria and Lebanon, trying to get into local public and private institutions. All this was accompanied by discussions at the UN, the Arab League's demands for an early and complete withdrawal of foreign troops from the Levant, and disputes between diplomats and politicians.

Gradually, the British had to abandon their plans. They did not want to accept the participation of the USSR and a number of Arab states in the settlement of the conflict proposed by de Gaulle. But to do this, it was necessary to reach an agreement with France, especially since it became a permanent member of the Council of Europe, taking the same position in the UN as Great Britain. The French insisted on comparing the situation in Syria and Lebanon with the situation in Iraq and Transjordan, but the British wanted to avoid this, and this also had to be agreed with Paris. On July 8, 1945, France officially handed over to the Syrian and Lebanese authorities control over the Syro-Lebanese military special formations, numbering 20-25 thousand fighters trained by French officers. This move strengthened the sovereignty of Syria and Lebanon and somewhat raised the prestige of France in the eyes of the Levantines [Istoriya Vostoka, 2006, p. 157].

The contradictions between the great Powers helped Lebanon and Syria eventually gain real independence. Keeping a close eye on each other, and

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Also, following the evolution of public opinion in the Arab countries, by the end of 1945, Britain and France agreed on the mutual withdrawal of troops from the Levant countries "in principle", although they did not specify the timing of this withdrawal. But they also had to abandon this trick.

"In February 1946," writes the Arab historian Sana Abu Shakra, " the UN Security Council began discussing the withdrawal of troops at the request of Syria and Lebanon, but was unable to make a decision due to maneuvers by Britain, France and the United States. However, before the determination of Syria and Lebanon, the firm position of the Soviet Union and the change in the balance of power in favor of the liberation of both countries, the colonialists retreated. In March, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Anglo-French troops from Lebanon until December 31, 1946" [Abu Shakra, 1988, p. 15].

But this was preceded by a heated discussion in the UN Security Council, where the USSR, Poland, Egypt and Mexico supported the Levant states, and the United States proposed a draft resolution that practically froze the solution of the problem. Then, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, the Soviet Union vetoed an American project that did not meet the national interests of the peoples of Lebanon and Syria, which, naturally, met with a positive reaction from the Arab world [Recent History..., 1980, pp. 39-40]. The international community condemned the maneuvers and tricks of the colonialists, who tried to hold their positions at all costs.

Despite the lack of a clear UN decision, it was clear that the withdrawal of troops could not be avoided, and its further delay would only worsen relations between the Levant states and the European powers, who until recently, in 1941-1942, claimed to be the "liberators" of Lebanon and Syria. Therefore, on April 17, 1946, the Anglo-French troops left the territory of Syria, and on December 31 of the same year - Lebanon. Since then, these dates have been celebrated in both countries as national holidays and "yawm al-jala" (Evacuation Day) [Istoriya Vostoka, 2006, p. 158; Les Arabes du Message à l'histoire, 1995, p. 507].

Thus, the events of World War II and the resulting escalation of contradictions between the great Powers allowed Lebanon and Syria to turn their formal independence into a real one. This was facilitated by large-scale geopolitical shifts on the world stage, the collapse of the Axis powers, which tried to undermine the prestige of traditional metropolises and to some extent weakened their positions, and the promotion to the global forefront of the policy of the USSR, which played a decisive role in the defeat of fascism. The war was a powerful stimulus for the liberation movement, because it showed the Lebanese, as well as other Arabs, the vulnerability of the colonial authorities, the possibility of overthrowing and expelling the colonial masters and new contenders in their place.

So, the Lebanese observed the inability of the French colonialists to resist both the German-Italians and the British competitors, and those, in turn, to the newly appeared American rivals. Thanks to this, the level of national and civic consciousness of the Lebanese people has significantly increased. They rallied on an anti-colonial basis, gradually overcoming traditional differences between different ethnic and religious groups. The effectiveness of the actions of the masses of the people increased, and their influence on the feudal-bourgeois elite, which previously always retained the ability to maneuver socially and politically and the ability to use the mood of the masses in their own interests, increased.

Given all this, it can be stated that the Second World War marked the beginning of many important social processes in Lebanon, first of all, the gradual elimination of relations of colonial dependence and their consequences, liberation from the most archaic features of traditionalism, and a certain modernization of the economic, cultural, social and political life of Lebanese society.

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list of literature

Abu Shakra S. Formation of the anti-French coalition of political forces in Lebanon and the Struggle for independence in 1939-1946, Moscow, 1988.

De Gaulle Sh. Military memoirs. A call. 1940-1942. Moscow, 1957.
De Gaulle Sh. Military memoirs. Unity. 1942-1944 years. Moscow, 1960.

Istoriya Vostoka: v 6 t. T. V. Vostok v sovremennoe vremya (1914-1945 gg.) [History of the East: in 6 vols. Vol. V. The East in modern times (1914-1945)].

Mirsky G. I. Iraq in the Time of Troubles (1930-1941). Moscow, 1961.

The newest history of the Arab countries of Asia, Moscow, 1980.
Novikov N. V. Puti i pereputya diplomata (zapiski o 1943-1944 gg.) [Ways and crossroads of a diplomat (notes on 1943-1944)]. Moscow, 1976.

Catroux G. Dans la bataille de la Méditerranée. Egypte, Levant, Afrique du Nord. 1940-1944. Témoignages et commentaires. P., 1949.

De Gaulle Ch. Discours et messages. T. II. P., 1946.

Du Manifeste à la République Algèrienne. Alger, 1948.

Gallissot R., Badia G. Marxisme et l'Algérie. P., 1976.

Harris W. Faces of Lebanon: Sects. Wars and Global Extensions. Princeton, 1999.

Johnson M. Class and Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State 1840-1985. L.: Ithaca Press, 1986.

Julien Ch. -A. L'Afrique du Nord en marche. P., 1972.

Les Arabes du Message à l'histoire / Sous la direction de Dominique Chévalier et André Miquel. P., 1995.

Lévi-Provençal E. L'émir Shakib Arslan (1869 - 1946) // Cahiers de l'Orient conlemporain. P., 1947, fascicules IX-X.

Picard E. Liban, état de discorde. Mesnil-sur-l 'Estrée. P., 1988.

Réalilés algériennes. Alger, 1953.

The Middle East Journal (Washington), 1948, N 2.

Vallaud P. Le Liban au bout du fusil. Evreux, 1976.

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