The article is devoted to US-Turkish relations during the presidency of George W. Bush. The main aspects of US policy towards Turkey and key episodes of interaction between the two countries are considered. The main focus is on the issues of strategic partnership between Washington and Ankara in the period from 1999 to 2009. The paper assesses bilateral relations on the eve of Barack Obama's coming to power.

Keywords: strategic partnership, USA, Turkey, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Middle East, Middle East.

In April 2009, during his first visit to Turkey, U.S. President Barack Obama Obama came up with the idea of an" exemplary partnership " between the two countries [Joint Press Availability..., 04/06/2009]. The attention of the new US administration to this country was quite understandable: at the turn of the century, Turkey made people talk about itself as a new "rising force" [Al, 2010, p. 95]. Bordered by volatile parts of the Middle East, Turkey remains the only Muslim country in the North Atlantic Alliance with an army second only in size to the United States. However, according to some experts, the policy of George W. Bush, carried out within the framework of the so-called strategic partnership, led to a deterioration in relations between the United States and its long-standing ally and prompted Turkey to move closer to Russia, Iran, Syria and some other states. The Iraq campaign launched by Washington in 2003, which resulted, in particular, in the emergence of a hotbed of instability on the Turkish-Iraqi border and the freezing of the issue of Turkey's integration into the European Union [Boyer and Katulis, 2008, p.4-5], led to Ankara's distancing from the West as a whole. The US administration's promotion of the concept of "model partnership" indicated its intention to reconsider its approach to relations with a "vital" state for the United States.

To date, the" model partnership " remains a rhetorical framework for US-Turkish cooperation. It is considered to replace the strategic partnership that existed from 1999 to 2009. In the Russian scientific literature, this phase of U.S.-Turkish relations have not been given sufficient attention, although some authors have turned to the analysis of various aspects of cooperation between the two countries during this period (see, for example: [Avakov, Edge, 2012; Hajiyev, 2010; Guriev, 2005; Egorov, 2010; Sakibaev, 2004; Svistunov, 2005; Suleymanov, 2013]). Collections of articles and publications by experts of the Russian Academy of Sciences played an important role in studying certain aspects of the development of the Turkish state [Turkey on the eve of..., 2007; Turkey in the conditions of..., 2010; Turkey during the rule of..., 2012; Turkey: a new role..., 2012]. However, the conceptual framework of the stratum-

page 113
It has not been studied as a strategic partnership. To understand the reasons for the adjustment of policy towards Ankara after the Democrats came to power, it is necessary to analyze the characteristic features and main directions in relations between the United States and Turkey during the presidency of George W. Bush.

With the end of the Cold War, Ankara was able to establish closer political, economic and cultural contacts with the republics of the former Soviet Union than before. At the same time, its anxiety about alienation from the Western world has increased: if during the Cold War years Turkey was the "mainstay of the free world" on its eastern and southern borders, then with the disappearance of the "Soviet threat" the country's strategic value for the West has noticeably decreased. The Turkish authorities were faced with the task of rethinking national foreign policy approaches.

In March 1991, at the initiative of the Turkish President, T. Ozala wrote to his American counterpart, J. R. R. Tolkien. Bush Sr. was offered the concept of strategic cooperation [The President's..., 1991], the main purpose of which was to define a common line of conduct in relation to Iraq. At that time, the idea of Ankara did not find support in the White House. Washington's attitude to the proposal of the Turkish authorities is quite understandable: for many years, Turkey had limited opportunities to influence the balance of power in the Middle East region. However, the difficulties of implementing the concept of a unipolar world set the American political elite the task of achieving leadership based on a combination of military-political and economic power with a differentiated approach to the world's regions and relying on allies [Turkey in the conditions of..., 2010, p. 193]. The United States, which did not have geographical, cultural and historical ties with the former Soviet republics, They began to see Turkey as a conduit for their interests in these regions. Already in February 1992, Washington announced the beginning of an" enhanced partnership " with Ankara in the field of trade, diplomacy, and human rights protection [Remarks at the Department Ceremony..., 11.02.1992].

A distinctive feature of U.S.-Turkish cooperation in the last decade of the twentieth century was the expansion of the range of common interests of a regional and global nature. Turkey's participation in NATO remained a key component of bilateral relations. Both countries have worked together to meet the challenges of the post-bipolar world: during the conflicts in the Persian Gulf (1990-1991), Somalia (1992-1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995), and Kosovo (1998-1999). Turkey's geographical proximity to unstable regions and advantageous position for transporting energy resources from the Caspian Sea basin to Western markets allowed the country to proclaim itself a "bridge" between the West and the East. The main areas of cooperation between Turkey and the West were energy, trade and investment, the settlement of the Cyprus problem and the question of the status of the Aegean Sea, ensuring security and regional stability.

U.S.-Turkish rapprochement peaked between 1998 and 1999. The two countries ' cooperation in the Balkans was successful within the framework of NATO. In 1999, with the assistance of US intelligence agencies, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers ' Party (PKK) A. Ocalan was detained, which Ankara had long sought. An agreement was reached on the construction of two pipelines (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline) [Press Briefing..., 17.11.1999]. There are prerequisites for the start of negotiations between Ankara and Brussels on Turkey's membership in the EU.

It was at this time, in November 1999, that U.S. President W. Bush met with the President of the United States. Clinton put forward the concept of strategic partnership, which stipulated those areas of activity where the two countries had common ground: joint actions in military, political and economic issues with the aim of "... ensuring peace and security from the Balkans to the Caucasus, from Central Asia to the Middle East and Europe" [Remarks... in State Arrival Ceremony, 15.11.1999]. Ideological framing of the American vision of desks-

page 114
The principles of democracy, the protection of human rights, and the pursuit of peace and prosperity served as examples. Another US ally, a united Europe, was to play an important role in promoting this initiative.

In fact, the Clinton administration proposed a three-way partnership - Turkey, the EU, and the United States. Since joining the EU remained one of the top priorities of Ankara's foreign policy, the partnership created opportunities for the Turkish state to assert its place in the Western world. President S. Demirel expressed hope at a meeting with President Clinton that Turkey's membership in the EU will allow "implementing the project of a pluralistic and democratic Europe" [Remarks... in Joint Press Availability, 15.11.1999]. But more important for the country was Washington's promised assistance in resolving disputes with Greece, which for many years have hampered Ankara's dialogue with Brussels [Remarks...in State Arrival Ceremony, 15.11.1999]. The first confirmation of the prospects of the strategic partnership was the granting of EU candidate status to Turkey in December 1999.

However, two factors hindered the implementation of the Democrats ' intentions. First, by the end of the 1990s, it was discovered that Ankara's foreign policy often contradicted the concept of American world leadership. Turkey was gaining more and more freedom of action in the new geopolitical space. An example of this was the agreement reached in 1997 between Ankara and Moscow on the supply of Russian gas to Turkey via the Blue Stream gas pipeline, which contradicted the White House's desire to achieve gas and oil supplies from the Caspian region to world markets bypassing the territory of Russia. Second, the Clinton administration was nearing the end of its term in office: there was no guarantee that the new government would pay due attention to relations with Turkey. In the future, the dialogue between the two partners could lead to a divergence of views, which the Russian researcher D. V. Nakisbayev believes is caused by Washington's lack of perception of Ankara as a regional partner of the United States: Turkey's interests were either misunderstood or ignored [Nakisbayev, 2010, p.40].

The Republicans who came to power in the United States in 2001 continued the course set by the Democrats towards Turkey. Their approach was based on coordinating diplomatic and military efforts to confront US adversaries-Iraq, Iran, and Syria [Hadar]. After September 11, 2001, cooperation between the two countries took on a new dimension. Turkish Foreign Minister I. Cem announced his country's readiness to support the United States in the fight against al-Qaeda [Alinza, 2001]. Turkey's involvement in the fight against international terrorism has convinced Washington of the correctness of its chosen course. At a meeting with Prime Minister B. Ecevit, George W. Bush, calling Turkey "an ally and friend", said that "they (Republicans - AA) will actively consult with this country regarding any decision" [President Bush..., 16.01.2002]. In 2002, negotiations began on coordinating actions in the event of a war in Iraq. However, it soon became apparent that the strategic partnership was beginning to falter.

Not all Turkish politicians were ready to support Washington in a military action directed against Iraq. Memories of the 1991 Gulf War, which caused significant damage to the Turkish economy, were still fresh in the public mind.1 President A. N. Sezer and Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces H. Kyvrykoglu openly spoke about the risks of participating in the Iraqi operation [Limits..., 16.05.2002]. Ankara was concerned that with the start of the anti-Iraqi campaign, there was a threat of undermining the Turkish economy, which was already weakened financially and economically.-

1 Energy supplies to Turkey have declined sharply. In 1990, the country's economic growth rate was 9.4%, in 1991-0.3%; the volume of external debt reached $ 50 billion, domestic - $ 57 trillion [Duman, 2010].

page 115
the economic crisis of 2000-2001 [Ap, 2010, p. 44]. There was another factor: if Turkey had no borders with Afghanistan, then Iraq was a direct neighbor, so military actions would inevitably lead to an increase in the number of refugees, a deterioration in the trade and economic climate in the region and the emergence of a new hotbed of instability in the immediate vicinity of the country. Ankara was concerned about the possible activation of PKK activities in the border areas, since, if launched, a military campaign would revive the hope of the Iraqi Kurds for the formation of their own independent state. The security of the oil regions of northern Iraq and the Kerkuk-Ceyhan pipeline was no less acute. Having access to these resources, as Ankara believed, the Kurds would acquire additional financial resources for the struggle for independence.

On February 25, 2003, the Turkish government submitted to the Parliament a bill agreed with the American side on "Sending Turkish armed forces to foreign countries and the presence of foreign troops on the territory of the Republic of Turkey" [Turk Silahli..., 25.02.2003]. The United States counted on an ally's help in deploying NATO troops on Turkish territory and operating military facilities to invade Iraq from the north. The decision of the Grand National Assembly, which rejected the bill on March 1, came as a surprise to Washington. It had important consequences for the course of the entire operation: the Americans had to abandon a simultaneous attack from the north and from the south (from the territory of Kuwait). Despite the fact that Turkey did not support the US action, the second bill prepared by Ankara on its position during the war in Iraq was approved by the parliament [763 Turk Silahli.., 21.03.2003], as "there was a serious threat to the country's security". Turkish troops have begun moving closer to the border with Iraq to maintain stability in the border areas. Already in August 2003, Turkey allowed NATO member countries to use the Incirlik air base for logistical purposes. However, the March 2003 crisis and the prolonged Iraqi intervention increased Ankara's dissatisfaction with Washington's unilateral actions and disregard for its interests in the region. As a consequence of the crisis of 2003, Turkey, having demonstrated its independence in making foreign policy decisions to the detriment of "partnership" relations with the United States (and Europe), began to resolutely defend its national interests. Obviously, there was a change of priorities in the country: it no longer wanted to serve unconditionally as a conduit for American interests.

Naturally, Americans wondered why the state, which the United States had funded and protected since the 1940s, failed them at such a crucial moment [Safire, 25.03.2003]. In the Congress in 2003-2004, there were speeches about the inability of the Turkish authorities to influence the parliament and about the increased influence of anti-Western sentiments in the country. The American press wrote that Turkish public opinion was negatively affected by populist speeches of politicians and the media, that propaganda against the United States increased in Turkey not without the help of foreign countries and Islamic values were widely spread. R. Pollock's article published in The Wall Street Journal, in which, returning to the well-known metaphor, he characterized Turkey as the "sick man of Europe", became the most harsh in this sense [Pollock, 16.02.2005].

A distinctive feature of bilateral relations during the period of strategic partnership was the strengthening of anti-Americanism, which was based on Ankara's rejection of the idea of US world domination. After March 2003, the mood in Turkish society changed rapidly: the deep-rooted discontent of Turks with the subordinate role of their country in the White House strategy was exposed. Public sentiment was fueled by the increased activity of leftist forces, especially among young people, nationalist ideas, and increasingly popular conspiracy theories about the alleged operations being prepared by Washington and the West to invade Turkey [Turkmen, 2012, p. 244-247].

The criticism coming from overseas also increased the discontent of the Turkish establishment. It is significant that one of those who demanded that the adoption of the law should not be allowed-

page 116
O. Sav, a deputy from the traditionally pro-Western Republican People's Party, became the project's leader. He drew the attention of parliamentarians to the fact that "a country that has not entered into any armed conflict for 81 years", by approving the bill, "will be involved in a terrible and burdensome war ...which will lead to the fact that not only the voters themselves, but the entire people of Turkey will incur troubles "[CHP'li Sav'in..., 01.03.2003]. The Turks themselves regarded the parliament's decision as a democratic and independent choice of the country [Yenidönemde.., 2010, p. 35].

It is noteworthy that in the context of bilateral relations under the Presidency of J. R. R. Tolkien, According to the director of the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research N. Yilmaz and an expert from the University of Galatasaray F. Yilmaz, it is the episode of the March 2003 crisis that has come to the fore for many Turkish researchers. However, the parliament's refusal to support the American initiative marked the" birth of a new foreign policy " in Turkey [Yilmaz, 2010, p. 560; Turkmen, 2012, p. 176]. Such a judgment, in my opinion, is somewhat exaggerated: the deterioration of relations between Washington and Ankara could not serve as the only reason for restructuring the foreign policy of an entire country. Serious changes were associated with a change in ideological priorities in its domestic political life [Nadein-Rayevsky, 2013, p.89]. The crisis of 2003 only served as a catalyst for deep transformation processes, led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which proclaimed itself a moderate conservative force. The AKP's foreign policy strategy was based on the concept of strategic depth developed by Ahmet Davutoglu in 2002. served as the Chief Adviser on International Affairs to the Prime Minister of Turkey.2 His doctrine was based on the idea that Ankara should pursue a more independent foreign policy and use the main levers of influence on the balance of power in the region - an advantageous geopolitical position and centuries-old experience in interacting with neighbors [Davutoglu, 2012].

Since 2002, Turkey has developed a systematic approach to international relations based on new principles (Svistunova, 2010). The most famous of them is "zero problems with neighbors", thanks to which the authorities managed to establish more friendly relations with neighboring countries. The country's activity in international organizations (NATO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Group of Twenty) has intensified. Rapprochement with the "third world" countries, as well as with Russia 3 and China 4, has begun. Ankara began to move away from its long-term orientation towards the West, but did not abandon it: the principle of a multi-vector foreign policy came to the fore. Turkey has begun to make more independent decisions in resolving regional problems. This was most clearly reflected in the Iraq issue. In 2004, the PKK's terrorist activities resumed: Kurdish militant groups resumed armed struggle after the truce announced in 1999. Turkey's leaders reserved the right to pull troops to the Turkish-Iraqi border to attack PKK forces. Moreover, Ankara managed to coordinate actions with Tehran and Damascus in the fight against Kurdish groups in the border areas [The 2007 Turkish Elections..., 2010, p. 10], which subsequently served as a prerequisite for Turkey's rapprochement with Iran and Syria.

Ankara's independence in choosing its allies and partners and regional activism aroused growing concerns among Americans about its "turn to the East" [Larrabee, 2007; Ülgen, 2009]. The US had to make a choice: accept

2 Davutoglu was the head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry from May 2009 to August 2014.

3 Russia is Turkey's main supplier of natural gas (63%) and oil (29%). In 2008, the trade turnover between them reached $ 38 billion [Özbay, 2011, pp. 73-74].

4 From 1999 to 2008, the trade turnover between Turkey and China increased from 1 billion to 17 billion. USD[Türkiye-Çin...]

page 117
with the emergence of a "new" Turkey, or then observe how the secular state gradually falls under the influence of political Islam [Tasrjinar, 2012]. Between 2003 and 2008, the Congressional Research Service alone produced five reports on Turkey. Among the proponents of the conceptual renewal of relations was the former US Ambassador to Turkey, M. Parris, who suggested focusing not on the idea of Western democracy, but on the similarity of national interests of the two states [Hearing..., 2005, p.26]. This formulation has become increasingly common in the rhetoric of the US administration and the AKP since the mid-2000s.

On July 5, 2006, the United States and Turkey published a joint document entitled" Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue for the Progress of the US-Turkish Strategic Partnership " [Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue..., 05.07.2006]. The document is little known in the Russian literature, but it is often mentioned in American and Turkish studies and the press (see, for example, [The Evolution..., 2009]). In terms of content, it was close to the declaration, but its status was not officially specified, and it was not signed by any of the parties. By "shared vision" was meant the intensification of US-Turkish cooperation on a wide range of issues related to US and Turkish foreign policy. It was declared that Turkey and the United States had a "common set of values and ideals" - spreading the principles of democracy, ensuring freedom and prosperity, but the emphasis in the document was placed precisely on common interests. The key directions were the development of economic and trade relations, military-defense cooperation, exchange of scientific knowledge and technologies, and promotion of public diplomacy. According to B. Kayaoglu, an expert of the Organization for International Strategic Studies, the adoption of this document was the first serious attempt by the parties to give a new direction to relations [Kayaoglu, 2006]. Probably, the authors of this document, understanding the importance of strategic partnership, sought to emphasize the absence of contradictions between countries.

To restore Ankara's confidence, the Bush administration was required to resolve the Iraq issue, which was a stumbling block in communication between the two states. According to S. Chagaptay, Director of the Turkey Research Program at the Washington Institute for the Middle East, only the joint reconstruction of Iraq could give "a new impetus to the development of a strategic partnership" [Hearing..., 2005, p. 36]. Since the mid-2000s, Turkey, interested in maintaining stability in the neighboring state, has been involved in the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. The government of R. T. Erdogan even made attempts to establish relations with the leaders of the Kurdistan Regional Government (Cagaptay and Evans, 2012).

However, Ankara's diplomatic, trade, economic and military activization in the territories bordering Iraq took place against the background of the ongoing struggle against the PKK forces. At the same time, the White House took a cautious position and was in no hurry to condemn the PKK's terrorist activities. Washington's lack of involvement in the Kurdish issue, which the Turks themselves regarded as a problem of "internal terrorism", led to the fact that the US popularity rating among the Turkish population fell to 9% by mid-2007 [Confidence in..., 2009]. At the same time, both Washington and Ankara understood that the Kurdish problem could not be resolved without the help of the United States. US Special Envoy to counter the PKK, J. R. R. Tolkien Ralston strongly recommended that the authorities of his country assist Turkey in the fight against the terrorist organization [Hearing..., 2007, p. 19]. In November 2007, the US President issued a statement of readiness to join the fight against Kurdish militant groups. The main area of cooperation was the exchange of information between the intelligence services [President Bush..., 05.11.2007]. It seems that Washington and Ankara have come to an agreement on the issue of the PKK and Iraq, because the continuation of the war in this Muslim country weakened the US position in the region.

page 118
Another aspect of the strategic partnership was Turkey's expected support from the United States for its EU membership. With Ankara obtaining the status of a candidate for the EU, the administration of J. R. R. Tolkien She constantly supported the negotiation process between Ankara and Brussels [President Bush..., 29.06.2004]. Washington's defense of Turkey's interests provoked a negative reaction from a number of EU members. For example, in 2004, French President Jacques Chirac sharply criticized President Bush's actions, suggesting that the latter "should not give any advice to the European Union" [Chirac Chides Bush..., 28.06.2004]. However, in October 2005, another round of negotiations on Turkey's accession to the EU was launched, which did not meet Ankara's expectations. The apparent reluctance of the European Union to integrate a Muslim country into its membership has buried the idea of a" three-way partnership " that the Clinton administration once harbored. At the same time, the failure of negotiations with Europe, which provoked Euroscepticism in Turkish society, contributed to Turkey's rapprochement with a key partner in the transatlantic alliance - the United States.

Cooperation between the White House and Ankara in the military-strategic sphere was developing. In the 2000s, the United States maintained its status as Turkey's leading defense partner: it provided it with military technology and weapons, covering about 80% of its military-industrial complex. The Allies have successfully worked, for example, in the framework of the Partnership for Peace program in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Turkey was the largest recipient of the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) [Tersch, 2009, p.10]. Turkish special Operations forces actively supported the United States in the fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban; in 2003 and 2005, Ankara headed the command of the International Security Assistance Force.

Strategic partnership has also proved effective in solving regional problems. Thus, with the mediation of Turkey, the Ankara Declaration on the Settlement of the Afghan-Pakistani conflict was adopted in April 2007. During the Second Lebanon War, Ankara sent military reinforcements to the UN Interim Force mission in Lebanon and assisted in the evacuation of American citizens, which was necessary due to the frequent clashes between the Israeli Armed Forces and Hezbollah forces [Hearing.., 2007, p.6]. In the spring of 2008, Turkey mediated negotiations between Tel Aviv and Damascus. Her diplomatic work was highly appreciated in Washington. Turkey was increasingly asserting its "third party" status, which for many years remained the prerogative of the United States in its regional strategy in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, Washington became increasingly convinced that the" new " Turkey was becoming increasingly unwilling to disregard national interests and international law. So, during the Georgian-Ossetian conflict between the allies, tensions re-emerged: Ankara allowed US Air Force ships with humanitarian aid to pass into the Black Sea only after all the provisions of the Montreux Convention 5 were observed. Formally, Turkey has fulfilled its obligations to its NATO allies. However, Washington failed to influence the Turkish leadership to speed up the process of passing the courts [Samozhnev, 18.08.2008]. Moreover, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan suggested that Moscow create a "Platform for Stability and Cooperation in the Caucasus" ("Caucasus Alliance") with the participation of Russia and Georgia. This proposal showed that Turkey preferred to improve relations with its economic partners, rather than spoil them.

A characteristic feature of bilateral relations during the presidency of George W. Bush was the strengthening of economic ties. Turkey was on the

5 The United States should have notified the Turkish leadership of the crossing of the Straits at least eight days in advance.

page 119
the third place in the list of countries that received investments from the United States [Giin, 2010, p. 154]. The United States, in turn, ranked fifth among Ankara's partners in terms of trade turnover [Turkey's Evolving.., 2009, p. 99]. In 2000-2008, the balance of foreign trade between the United States and this country developed in an increasing manner: the volume of imports increased from $ 3 billion to $ 4.6 billion, and exports-from $ 3.7 billion to $ 10 billion [U.S. Goods Trade...]. During the period of strategic partnership, steps were taken to bring economic relations to a new level.

As in the 1990s, the implementation of the Eurasian Energy Transport Corridor project remained one of the priorities of the US-Turkish partnership in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which was completed in 2005, gave an impetus to cooperation in this area. Amid the ongoing debate over Iran's nuclear program in 2008, the United States agreed to sign a 15-year agreement with Turkey on the joint development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Thus, the development of bilateral relations not only in two traditional areas (political and military), but also in the third-economic - became a feature of the US-Turkish interaction.

* * *

The notion of a deep political crisis in relations between the two countries after 2003, which has become widespread in American and Turkish political and academic circles, cannot be considered fully justified. In many ways, the strategic partnership was effective. The negative aspects of US-Turkish relations were also exaggerated by experts from Obama's entourage. In my opinion, the Democrats who came to power in the United States in 2009, when they proposed restoring partnership with Turkey, were more likely to use such rhetoric to ease the tension that still persisted in relations, rather than to offer an alternative, qualitatively new program of interaction. In fact, today the partnership that took shape under President George W. Bush remains strong, but with different accents that require separate analysis and reflection.

list of literature

Avatkov V. A., Rebro O. I. USA-Turkey: a New balance of Old Partners, Moscow: IBV RAS, 10.10.2012. http://www.nmes.ru/?р=15767 (accessed on 02.02.2013).

Gadzhiev A. G. Turkey in the US Foreign Policy Strategy in the Middle East. IBV RAS, 06.01.2010 - http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2010/06 - 01 - 10b.htm (accessed: 15.04.2014)

Guryev A. A. Kurd issue and Turkish-American Relations, Moscow: IBV RAS, 06.07.2005. htlp: / / www. iimes. ru/rus/stat/2005/06 - 07 - 05.htm (accessed: 15.04.2014)

Nadein-Rayevsky V. [Turkey's Foreign Policy: Winds of Change]. Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya [World Economy and International Relations]. 2013, N 2.

Nakisbaev D. V. American-Turkish relations in the era of globalization and prospects for their development (political analysis). Diss. Candidate of Political Science, Moscow: Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2008.

Samozhnev A. The Bosporus is closed. Turkey does not allow American warships to enter the Black Sea / / Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 18.08.2008.

Svistunova I. A. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's visit to the United States. IBV RAS, 05.12.2010. http://www.iimеs.ru/rus/stat/2010/05 - 12 - 10a.htm (accessed: 13.03.2013).

Svistunova I. A. Irakskiy krizis 2003 g. i turko-amerikanskie otnosheniya [The Iraqi crisis of 2003 and Turkish-American relations]. 26. 2005.

Suleymanov A.V. [Turkey, Iran, the USA and the Iraqi crisis of 2003]. Izvestiya Saratovskogo universiteta. Ser. History. International Relations, Vol. 13, Issue 4, 2013.

Turkey on the eve and after the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2007, Moscow, IV RAS, IBV, 2008.

Turkey in the conditions of new internal and external realities. Moscow, IV RAS, IBV, 2010.

Turkey during the rule of the Justice and Development Party, Moscow, IBV, 2012.
page 120
Turkey: A New Role in the Modern World, Moscow, CSA RAS, 2012.
722 Anayasamn 92-nci ve 117-nci Maddeleri Uyannca Hükümete izin Verilmesine Dair Karar // Resmî Gazete. 12.10.2001. http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2001/l0/20011012.htm (accessed on 11.02.2013).

763 Türk Silahh Kuvvetlerinin Kuzey Irak'aGönderilmesine... Dair Karar // Resmî Gazete. 21.03.2003. http:// www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/03/20030321.htm (accessed: 04.06.2014).

Alinza Bülent. Turkey and the Global Storm // Turkey Update. 12.10.2001.

Ari Tayyar. Yükselen Güç. Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri ve Ortadoğu. Bursa, 2010.

Boyer S.P., Katulis B. The Neglected Alliance: Restoring U.S.-Turkish Relations to Meet 21st Century Challenges. Washington (D.C.), 2008.

Chirac chides Bush over Turkey // CNN. 28.06.2004.http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/06/28/chirac. bush. turkey/index. html?iref=mpstoryview (accessed: 23.05.2014).

CHP'li Sav'in konuşmasi: "Bu iğrenç savaşin altinda ezilmeyin... // Youtube. 01.03.2003. http://www.youtube. com/wateh?v=U5 - 8GzlkOhQ;http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6xN2K7X0BBw (дата обращения: 25.03.2014).

Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the World // Pew Research Center.http://www.pewglobal. org/2009/07/23/confidence-in-obama-lifts-us-imagc-around-fhe-world/3 /(accessed: 28.06.2013).

Çağaptay S., Evans T. Turkey's Changing Relations with Iraq // Policy Focus. 2012, N 122.

Davutoğlu A. Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararasi Konumu. İstanbul, 2012.

Duman Çağdaş. I. Körfez Savaşi Sunumu // Caspian Weekly. 05.03.2010.http://tr.caspianweekly.org/ana-kategoriler/orta-dou/959-ikoerfez-sava-sunumu. html (accessed on 28.03.2014).

Gün Mustafa. The USA-Turkey Relationship After The 2003 Iraq Crisis // Bilge Strateji. 2010, Bahar. Cilt 1, Sayi 2.

Hadar L. The Bipolarity of U.S. -Turkish Relations // Turkish Coalition of America. http://www.tc-america. org/issues-information/us-turkey-relations/the-bipolarity-of-us-turkish-relations-672.htm (дата обращения: 26.08.2013).

Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats of the Committee on the International Relations House of Representatives. 110th Congress. 2005, May 11. N 109 - 148.

Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives. 110th Congress. 2007, March 15. N 110 - 130.

Joint Press Availability with President Obama and President GUI of Turkey // The White House. 06.04.2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the press office/Joint-Prcss-Availability-With-President-Obama-And-President-Gul-Of-Turkey / (дата обращения: 13.12.2012).

Kayaoğlu Barin. Sharing Vision, Structured Dialogue (At Last): Are Turkish-American Relations Improving? // Turkish Weekly. 13.07.2006. http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/2193/sharing-vision-structuring-dialogue-at-last-are-tur kish-american-relations-improving.html (дата обращения: 15.10.2013).

Larrabee S.F. Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East // Foreign Affairs. 2007. July/August.

Limits of Turkey's "Strategic" Partnership with the USA: Issues of Iraq, Democratization and the EU // Foundation EurActivPoliTech. 16.05.2002. http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/limits-turkey-strategic-partnership-usa-issues-iraq-democr atization-cu/article-118238 (дата обращения: 04.06.2014).

Pollock R.L. The Sick Man of Europe - Again: Islamism and Leftism Add up to Anti-American Madness in Turkey // The Wall Street Journal. 16.02.2005. http://ahiworld.org/media-center/press-releases/2005/623-the-wall-street-journal-piece-highlights -turkeys-promotion-of-anti-american-attitudes.html (дата обращения: 23.06.2013).

President Bush and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan Discuss Global War on Terror // U.S. Department of State Archive - 2001 - 2009. 05.11.2007. http://2001 - 2009.state.gOv/p/cur/rls/rm/94642.htm (дата обращения: 13.07.2013).

President Bush Discusses Democracy, Freedom From Turkey // The White House. 29.06.2004. http:// georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ncws/releases/2004/06/20040629 - 4.html (дата обращения: 15.07.2013).

President Bush, Turkish Prime Minister Discuss War on Terrorism // The White House. 16.01.2002. http:// georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020116 - 5.html (дата обращения: 14.07.2013).

Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Samuel "Sandy" Berger November // The American Presidency Project. 17.11.1999. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47874 (accessed: 08.10.2013).

Özbay Fatih. The Relations between Turkey and Russia in the 2000s // Perceptions. 2011, Autumn. Vol. XVI, N 3.

Remarks at the Department Ceremony for Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel of Turkey // Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H.W. Bush (Book I). 11.02.1992. www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1992-bookl/ html/PPP-1992-bookl-doc-pg225.htm (дата обращения: 06.06.2014).

Remarks by the President and President Demirel of Turkey in Joint Press Availability // The White House. 15.11.1999.http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/WH/New/Europe-9911 /remarks/1999 - 11-15c.html (дата обращения: 06.10.2013).

Remarks by the President and President Demirel of Turkey in State Arrival Ceremony // The White House. 15.11.1999. http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Europe-9911 /remarks/1999 - 11 -15b.html (accessed: 08.10.2013).

Safire W. Turkey's Wrong Turn Undermines a Genuine Friendship // The New York Times. 25.03.2003.

page 121
Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership. 05.07.2006 // Embassy of the United States - Ankara, http://turkey.usembassy.gov/news 06052006a.html (дата обращения: 21.05.2013)

Taşpinar Ömer. Turkey: The New Model? Washington (D.C.), The Woodrow Wilson Center Paper. 2012.

Tersch E. von. Developing a Strategic Partnership with Turkey. U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project. Carlisle, PA. 07.03.2009.

The 2007 Turkish Elections: July 26, 2007. Briefing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 110th Congress. Washington (D.C.), 2010.

The Evolution of US-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle (PA), 2009.

The President's News Conference with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey // The American Presidency Project. 23.03.1991. hltp:/ / www. presidency.ucsb. edu/ws/?pid=19419 (accessed 06.06.2014).

Turkey's Evolving Dynamics: Strategic Choices for U.S. -Turkey Relations. Center for Strategic and International Studies Report. Washington (D.C.), March, 2009.

Türk Silahli Küvvetlerinin Yabanci Ülkelere Gönderilmesine Ve Yabanci Silahli Küvvetlerin 6 Ay Süreyle Türkiye'de Bulunmasina. 25.02.2003// Vikikaynak. http://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/T%C3%BCrk_Silahl%C4%B1_ Küvvetlerinin yabanc%C4%Bl %C3%BClkelere g%C3%B6nderilmesi ve yabanc%C4%Bl silahl%C4%Bl kuvvetlerin T%C3%BCrkiye%27de bulunmas%C4%BI i%C3%A7in H%C3%BCk%C3%BCmct%27e yetki verilmesinelili%C5%9Fkin Ba%C5%9Fbakanl%C4%Blк Tezkeresi (дата обращения: 28.02.2013).

Türkiye-Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Ekonomik İlişkileri // Türkiye-Çin İрек Yolu Ekonomik ve Kültürel İşbirliği Derneği. http://tucider.org/tr/turkiye-cin-halk-cumhuriyeti-ekonomik-iliskileri.html (дата обращения: 03.05.2014).

Türkmen Füsun. Kinlgan İttifakian 'Model Orlakliğa'. Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri. İstanbul, 2012.

U.S. Goods Trade with Turkey // Office of the United Stales Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/ countries-regions/curope-middle-cast/curope/turkey (дата обращения: 23.12.2013).

Ülgen Sinan. In Search of Lost Time: Turkey-U.S. Relations after Bush. US-Europe Analysis Series. Brookings Institution. 2009. Feb., 19.

Yenidönemde Tьrk Diş Politikasi: Uluslararasi IV. Tьrk Diş Politikasi Sempozyumu Tebliğleri // Ankara, 2010.

Yilmaz Nuh. Stratejik Ortakhktan Model Ortakhğa: Tьrkiyc'nin Bağimsiz Diş Politikasinin Etkileri // Tьrk Diş Politikasi Yitoği. Ankara, 2011.

page 122

Постоянный адрес данной публикации: