The end of the 20s-beginning of the 30s of the last century is one of the most dramatic stages of Kazakh history. During these years, violent modernization provoked protest in the form of armed protests ^.1 They covered the entire republic. In 1929-1932, there were 372 performances, which were attended by about 80 thousand people. All actions were suppressed by units of the Red Army, as well as the OGPU troops. Several thousand people were convicted of participating in the movement, and hundreds were shot. Part of the cattle breeders of Western Kazakhstan migrated to the territory of Turkmenistan and, united with local tribes - the Yomud, led the fight against the Soviet government. Some aspects of this struggle are reflected in a number of studies and publications ^.2

In these works, the main focus was on the military defeat of rebel formations in September 1931. In contrast to N. G. Gujiants and AL. G. N. Nepesov, Yul. Polyakov, and A. I. Chugunov made extensive use of archival materials that reflected the results of the activities of the party (Communist Party of Turkmenistan) and military (Border Guards of the USSR) bodies. The documentary base of the topic was radically expanded due to the publication in 1972 of the collection "Border Troops of the USSR. 1929 - 1938", among the compilers of which was A. I. Chugunov ³ . A significant contribution to the development of the topic was made by works devoted to the history of the Turkmen Military District and the Tashkent Higher Military School named after V. I. Lenin4 . They describe in detail the combat actions of cadets of the Tashkent Military School who took an active part in the Karakum expedition of 1931 .The events that took place in Karakum in September 1931 were also reflected in the memoir literature. ⁵ In this article, based on archival materials, the author sought to reveal more fully the role of Kazakhs in the struggle of Turkmens against Soviet power in 1931.

In the course of collectivization, some of the nomadic pastoralists of Western Kazakhstan began to migrate to the territory of neighboring Turkmenistan. The first groups of migrants appeared on the territory of the Turkmen SSR in mid-March 1931. The movement went along the well-rich road along the Kara-Bogaz Bay and was carried out in two directions: one group moved south, to the area of Krasnovodsk ⁶ and Kazandzhik, the other moved east, to the area of Kungrad and Kunya-Urgench.

At the head of the first group that appeared in the sands of Kazandzhik district (600 farms) were bai Omar Mashikli, Kumyshbai and others ⁷ . After the first group, the next one appeared, and by the first days of April in peski, in the north-east of Krasnovodsk and Kazandzhik, there were more than a thousand Kazakh cattle farms, which settled in a huge area near wells in small groups of 5-10 farms.

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According to the GPU of Turkmenistan, these Kazakhs came from 22 village councils of various regions of Kazakhstan - from Kzyl-Orda to Aktobe and were headed by an influential cleric Dosan Akhun ^.8 Among the migrating farms, about half were Baysk farms that had escaped from meat harvesting ^.9 On March 24, employees of the prosecutor's office from Aktobe came to the farms of the Babyk nomads, headed by the Mustafayev brothers, located in the area of the Kenderli well for negotiations. The pastoralists beat them up, declaring their intention to leave for Iran and their readiness to fight with Red Army units ^.10

The presence of Kazakh pastoralists on the territory of Western Turkmenistan, their resolute attitude and willingness to resist significantly worsened the already unstable political situation. In the last days of March 1931, the 85th division of the OGPU troops arrived in Kazandzhik from Ashgabat. Part of the division was left in Kazandzhik, the other part, together with operatives, left for the area of the Kaimat well (150 km north-east of Kazandzhik), where there was a large group of Kazakh cattle farms. Arrests of Kazakh bais and propaganda work among nomads aimed at their return to Kazakhstan began in Kaimat.

The arrest of 50 Kazakh bais further worsened the situation. The news of the arrest of the Kazakh Bais prompted the Turkmen Yomud tribes, who migrated to Pisky because they did not agree with the policy of violent cattle harvesting carried out by the party and Soviet bodies of Turkmenistan, to armed resistance against the Soviet government. Rapprochement of the tribal Yeomud elite with the elders of Kazakh pastoralists began ¹¹ .

The news of the events in Fort Alexandrovsk also prompted the Kazakh nomads to take part in armed actions. Here, on April 10-11, an uprising of Kazakhs broke out, during which the rebels seized a blockade, released 200 bais, disarmed a police detachment and killed a number of local party and Soviet workers. Part of the insurgents, under the onslaught of the OGPU troops of Kazakhstan, retreated to the southeast and launched military operations in Mangyshlak and Ustyurt ^.12 In an effort to free the arrested relatives, Kazakh pastoralists began to prepare an attack on the volunteer detachment under the command of Serezhnikov and the GPU commissioner Dovnarovich. Part of this unit, consisting of Yomud Turkmen, went over to the rebels, killing Serezhnikov, Dovnarovich and two Turkmen policemen. The nearby Behelke nomads did not hesitate to join the rebels ^.13

On April 19, a combined armed group of Kazakhs and Yeomudis suddenly attacked a detachment of the 85th division of the OGPU troops under the command of Tseytlin, numbering 52 Red Army men, near the Kaimat well. For four days, during continuous attacks, the rebels completely defeated the detachment. Most of the Red Army men were killed. 15 people were taken prisoner and shot. Only two of the party escaped. The attackers got four machine guns captured in the battle and all rifles with ammunition ¹⁴ . The arrested Bais, escorted by Red Army soldiers, were released and joined the rebels. As it was later established by the agency of the Prosecutor General's Office of Turkmenistan, Behelkin residents led by Begench Karamanov Tagi Berdyev, Mamed Durdy Divona and Kazakhs led by Bekesh Dermetkhanov took an active part in the joint armed group.

The destruction of the detachment inspired the rebels and caused a broad movement throughout the Krasnovodsk-Kazandzhik region, which took on the "character of an armed uprising against Soviet power" ^.15 On April 22, another group of rebels (Turkmens and Kazakhs) under the command of Kondyrbai Dybysov defeated the village of Khoja-Su on the shore of the Kara-Bogaz Bay. All buildings were burned and warehouses with food and manufactories were looted. On April 27, the rebels defeated the crafts

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the Karabogaz Sulfate Trust. On April 29, a combined group of Kazakhs and Yeomudis led by Khoja Nepes Atajanov captured and looted warehouses near the Soili well near Krasnovodsk ^.16 Hundreds of farms of Turkmen families, such as behelke, ak-atabay, Jafarbay, and Karovi, began to gather in the area of the Kaimat, Tuar, Chagyl, Tashdshen, Kumsebshen, and Dakhly wells. During May and June, one and a half thousand farms of Turkmen and Kazakhs were located in this area, which became a base for armed rebel detachments numbering up to 800 fighters ^.17

The command of the Central Asian Military District (SAVO) immediately after the defeat of the detachment of the 85th division sent a combined detachment of 250 sabres to Peski under the command of the brigade commander of the Separate Turkmen Brigade Melkumov ¹⁸ . One R-3 reconnaissance aircraft, piloted by pilot Shakht, was assigned to help the detachment. On April 24, Melkumov arrived in Kaimat. By that time, the rebels had retreated to the area of the Geoklen Kuyusa and Charyshly wells. On April 29, Melkumov engaged in a battle with a detachment of rebels (150 people) in the mountains. Kaimat-Dag. The insurgents (mostly Kazakhs) stubbornly resisted. The battle continued into the night and ended with "the gang, having detected the movement of our units covering Kaymat-Dag from the north, taking advantage of the onset of darkness, dispersed in small groups and left in different directions, taking with them the wounded and killed." ¹⁹

The next day, Melkumov marched towards the Kurtysh well to defeat a large rebel group consisting of Tekin residents of the Baharden and Geok-Tepinsky districts . ²⁰ On May 3, his detachment engaged in a fierce battle with Tekin residents that lasted all day. At nightfall, Melkumov went to the Igda well to rest ²¹ . A few days later, his detachment was withdrawn from Karakum and concentrated in Kizil-Arvat. SAVO's headquarters gave the order "to act in a short decisive blow, without getting involved in the fighting in peski" ²² . The district command did not want to use troops to perform police functions ²³ .

Meanwhile, combined groups of Kazakh and Turkmen pastoralists have stepped up their operations in the Western Karakum Mountains. Difficulties with food supply dictated the only possible tactic: looting settlements located along the Kara-Bogaz Bay and the railway.

The leadership of the Prosecutor General's Office of Turkmenistan has stepped up measures to combat the insurgency. Detachments of OGPU troops under the command of Kabissky and Gonta were sent to Pisky, as well as Lamanov's landing party. ²⁴ On May 9, a detachment of Gonta (70 horsemen) arrived at the Soili well (50 km east of Krasnovodsk) and began to monitor the Arfa well. On May 11, a 100-strong insurgent group consisting of Turkmens and Kazakhs under the command of Khoja Nepes Atajanov, Begench Karamanov and Durdy Khojayev attacked the Soili well. After a detachment of Kabissky (70 sabres) came to the aid of Gonta's detachment, the rebels, having lost six people killed and ten wounded, withdrew. A detachment of Gonta by car, accompanied by 50 sabres, attempted to overtake the rebels, but without success, as they dispersed in the vicinity of the Soili ²⁵ wells . Part of the rebels stopped at the Gurgi well (40 km east of the Belek railway station), where they waited for the approach of Kabissky's detachment. But the latter went to rest at the Belek station. Another part of the rebels retreated to the Arfa well, then joined the main group of ²⁶ . On May 22, the leadership of the GPU of Turkmenistan sent a detachment of the 63rd division of the OGPU troops, numbering 84 sabres, to eliminate the rebel detachments operating in the area of the Khoja-Sufi spring. Kabissky's detachment was directed towards the Gezeli-Ata well (80 km north-east of Jebel) with subsequent access to the Tuar well.

The combined Kazakh-Yomud armed group (400 horsemen) under the command of Bekesh Dermetkhanov and Tagi Berdyev was located in the Kolod area-

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Gozli-Ata and Oyuklu villages (80 and 100 km north of Bala-Ish railway station) ²⁷ . On May 26, the rebels came into contact with Kabissky's detachment at the Tersakan well (35 km north-west of Gozli-Ata). The fight lasted intermittently for four days - from May 26 to May 29. As a result, Kabissky's detachment, having exhausted ammunition and lost six people killed and seven wounded, retreated in the direction of Krasnovodsk ²⁸ . The rebels, having lost about 50 people, left in a north-easterly direction. On the way, they encountered the 63rd Division's combat guards advancing from the Khoja Sufi spring through the Tuar and Tersakan wells ^.29 The rebels defeated by the division dispersed. One part retreated to the south, towards the Koimat and Gozli Ata wells, while the other part reoccupied the Tersakan well immediately after it was abandoned by Division ³⁰ . At the same time, the landing group under the command of the chief of the Krasnovodsk combat stage Lamanov landed in Khoja-Sufi on the coast of the Kara-Bogaz Bay and began to move in the direction of the Tuar ³¹ well . Lamanov's detachment had no serious clashes with the rebels and returned to Krasnovodsk some time later. Other detachments were also assigned to their permanent locations.

The actions of the OGPU troops did not bring significant results. Under these conditions, the leadership of the OGPU in Central Asia began to persistently demand that the SAVO command send regular Red Army units to eliminate the insurgent movement in Karakum ²³. On June 13, 1931, the SAVO Revolutionary Military Council assigned the task to the Turkmen group of forces "by combined actions of cavalry and infantry from the areas of Kizil-Arvat, Kazandzhik, Jebel, Tashauz and aviation to strike according to the main gang groups located at the wells of Orta-Kuyu, Geoklen-Kuyusy, Koimat, eliminate banditry in the Karakum sands " ³³ . However, on June 19, the operation in Karakum was canceled and postponed to autumn ³⁴ .

During July-August, the Kazakh-Yomud group ousted units of the OGPU troops and volunteer detachments from the northeastern part of the Krasnovodsk district, again destroyed trading posts and cooperatives, attacked Kazandzhik, organized the crash of two mail trains, robbed and burned the Yagman coal mines, and tried to attack the Jebel ³⁵ station . Power in the Karakum sands was almost entirely held by the rebels. Their leadership center was located in the area of the Chagyl well. Its members included Tagi Berdyev, Mamed Durdy Divona, Begench Karamanov, Bekesh Dermetkhanov and others. Eili Akhun became the ideological leader. The functions of political and military leadership were performed by Mammad Durdy Divona ³⁶ .

By the beginning of September, the Kazakh-Yeomud group numbered up to a thousand armed fighters. Of these, 150 people were Kazakhs who were subordinated to Bekesh Dermetkhanov and Umarbay Tleubergenov ³⁷ . More than 200 Kazakh farms could not put up more armed people. As for the remaining 800-1000 farms, they migrated back to Kazakhstan in late May and early June ^.38 The Kazakh armed group was several times less numerous than the Turkmen one. But its high combat capability allowed it to take an active part on an equal footing not only in robberies and raids, but also in combat skirmishes with units of the OGPU and Red Army troops.

After the leadership of the combined Kazakh-Yomud group received information about the military operation being prepared against them, it decided not to migrate, but to resist. In the area of the Tuar and Chagyl wells, the insurgents led by Begench Karamanov, Khoja Nepes Atajanov and Bekesh Dermetkhanov started digging trenches ^.39 The main rebel forces were concentrated in the area of the Tuar, Chagyl and Oglamysh wells.

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According to the plan of the SAVO field headquarters command, a combined motorized mechanized detachment under the command of Lamanov ⁴⁰ was advancing from Krasnovodsk to the Tuar well . Its forces consisted of two rifle platoons (48 people) in cars with six machine guns (cadets and commanding officers of the United Central Asian Military School named after V. I. Lenin), 28 Red Army soldiers of the 85th division of the OGPU troops, a sapper platoon (25 people), a motor company (86 people), a volunteer detachment (42 people), five T-27 tankettes and ⁴¹ armored vehicles .

Lamanov's detachment reached the vicinity of the Tuar well on the morning of September 12. Armored vehicles could not move on sandy roads and were left under the protection of a volunteer detachment at the Soili ⁴² well .

The appearance of the tankettes caused confusion among the rebels, who were in combat guard ⁴³ . But Bekesh Dermetkhanov quickly got his bearings in the situation. On the approach of the motor-mechanic squad, he sent a parliamentarian to meet him with a written statement in Russian and Kazakh about his readiness to surrender. ⁴⁴ Lamanov fell for this ruse, and the party moved without the necessary precautions to the Thouars. At the same time, the command of the detachment broke away from the column and moved in the first car that was fired upon. Lamanov, Trebushnoy (commander of the auto company), Shkurov (commander of the combined company of cadets) and several other people were forced to lie down in the sand and could not command the detachment, which, having heard the shots, stopped a kilometer from the ambush.

The commanders who remained with the detachment (the chief of Staff and others) did not take quick measures to deploy the detachment and rescue the command. As a result, the car with the command of the detachment remained under fire from the rebels for more than five hours ^.45 When the main forces of the motorized infantry detachment, reinforced by the firepower of tankettes, approached, the rebels put up a stubborn and fierce resistance for more than two hours. During the battle, they resorted to various tricks: they disguised themselves in the sand and in the thickets of the Saxaul, imitating surrender, threw out red or white flags and opened sudden fire on approaching ones, distracted the attention of cadets and Red Army soldiers by putting popes on sticks, while firing at them from other positions ^.46 But the fire of tankettes and shelling from the plane predetermined the outcome of the battle, which ended with the defeat of the Tuar hotbed of resistance. 144 insurgents were captured. Among them were the leaders: Bekesh Dermetkhanov, Umarbay Tleubergenov and Zhandyrbay Jumabayev ⁴⁷ . Part of the rebels retreated in the direction of the Chagyl well, located 25 km from Tuar. Due to the lack of gasoline, the motor squad could not pursue them and moved towards the Chagyl well only the next day.

The decisive battle unfolded on September 13 and 14 at the Chagyl well. The number of armed rebels defending the well reached 600 people. The main core consisted of Behelkin, Jafarbai, Ak-Atabai and Kazakhs. Under the rebel command, the Chagyl well area was seriously prepared for defense: trenches were dug along the front (3 km) and in depth (up to 4 km) ⁴⁸ . At seven o'clock in the morning on September 13, the rebels engaged in a battle with the 2nd Turkmen Cavalry Regiment. Their positions were bombed three times from the air. On the first day of the battle, four aircraft participated in the raid, and on the second day - 22 ⁴⁹ . Despite heavy aerial bombardment, there was no panic in the rebel ranks ^.50 Moreover, an organized salvo fire was conducted on the aircraft. As a result, four aircraft were damaged, and one pilot was slightly wounded in the leg ^.51

The defenders of Chagyl fought fiercely. Despite the threat of death under the tracks and from machine-gun fire, some daredevils managed to get very close to the tankettes and open fire on the viewing slots. During the battle, a tankette that fell into a pre-dug and camouflaged pit was burned, and the crew was destroyed. The leadership of the battle by the rebel command, as repeatedly noted in operational documents, was well thought out and tactically graded.-

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motny ⁵² . Since all the main rebel forces were engaged against the units of the 2nd Turkmen Cavalry Regiment, the Chagyl well on the Tuar side was covered only by a small barrier of 40 people ^.53 When approaching Chagyl, the command of the motor-mechanic detachment did not take any active actions, limiting itself to sending one tankette to reconnaissance. This allowed the rebels to transfer some of their forces against the advancing motorized infantry detachment, which was fiercely resisted ^.54 The motorized infantry squad was shackled by the attacking actions of the rebels. Only in the early morning of the next day, thanks to the bombardment of rebel positions from the air, the motorized infantry squad managed to go on the attack and overturn the barrier. A cavalry attack by units of the 2nd Turkmen Regiment broke through the positions of the defenders, and the rebels began to withdraw towards the Dakhly and Kara - Ishan wells ^.55

In the battle for Chagyl, the motorized infantry detachment lost four men killed and two wounded; the 2nd Turkmen Cavalry Regiment lost 8 killed and 11 wounded. Among the dead were the commander of the detachment I. I. Lamanov and the tactics teacher A. P. Sokolov ^.56

Ahead was the last major battle at the Dakhly well. There were no Kazakhs among the participants of this battle. There, the Yeomud Turkmens defended themselves to the last bullet: Behelkin, Ak-Atabai and Karovi ⁵⁷ . ⁵⁸ women and children participated in the battle . The rebels lost 216 dead and 59 prisoners. Cadets of the Lenin School under the command of Malyshev, together with the units of the 1st Turkmen Cavalry Regiment that arrived in time, using artillery, grenade launchers, supported by aviation, broke the resistance and captured the Dakhly well ^.59 The cadets lost 30 men killed and 28 wounded ⁶⁰ .

Kazakh participation in the Turkmen insurgency between March and September 1931 was notable. It was the Kazakhs who migrated from Kazakhstan to the Western Karakum Mountains that pushed the Yomud Turkmens into armed struggle against the Soviet government. Kazakh tribal leaders, having come into contact with the leaders of the Behelkin and Jafarbai, began to play an organizing role in the Turkmen resistance. Kazakh armed detachments took the most direct and active part in military operations. Moreover, it was they who demonstrated their ability to conduct military operations in the first clashes with regular units of the Red Army (April 1931). Being in a foreign land, surrounded by a larger ethnic group, the Kazakhs did not disappear into it, but occupied their own niche, having managed to play an organizing and, to a certain extent, leading role in it at the final stage of the Turkmen insurgency.

Not everything was smooth in the relations between Kazakhs and Yomud Turkmens. Sometimes there were clashes due to lack of water, food, provision of horses, etc. But the interests of the struggle dictated to the Kazakhs the need to make compromises. In clashes with the OGPU and Red Army units, Kazakhs demonstrated examples of heroism, courage, will to win, the ability to flexibly adapt to the situation, and quickly respond to changes in the situation. The experience of the struggle of Turkmen insurgents against Soviet troops, accumulated in the previous period (during the 1920s), was supplemented by the struggle of Kazakh insurgents against units of the OGPU and the Red Army in 1929-1930 on the territory of Western and Central Kazakhstan (Suzak, Turgai, Batpakkara). Far from detracting from the merits of Turkmen tribal leaders in the struggle against Soviet power from March to September 1931, it is necessary to emphasize the role of Kazakh elders who contributed to its organization and implementation. A striking example is Bekesh Dermetkhanov, a former Guryev volost administrator ^.61

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notes

¹ See: Omarbekov T. Zobalan (Anxious years). Almaty, 1994 (in Kazakh); same name. The tragedy of Kazakhstan in the 20s-30s. Almaty, 1997 (in Kazakh); Allaniyazov T. K. "Counterrevolution" in Kazakhstan: the Chimbai version. Almaty. 1999; Allaniyazov T. K., Taukenov A. S. Shetskaya tragediya. From the history of anti-Soviet armed actions in Central Kazakhstan in 1930-1931. Almaty, 2000.

^{Nepesov G. N.} 2 The victory of the Soviet System in northern Turkmenistan (1917-1936). Ashkhabad, 1950; Gurdjieff N. G., Eskov A. A. The Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Turkmenistan - organizer and leader of the defeat of the Basmachian adventure of 1931 // V. I. Lenin and the Historical Destinies of the Turkmen people. Ashkhabad, 1975; Polyakov Yu. A., Chugunov A. I. Konts basmachestvo [The End of Basmachestvo], Moscow, 1976; Zevelev A. I., Polyakov Yu. A., Chugunov A. I. Basmachestvo: vozrozhdenie, sushchnost', krah [Basmachestvo: the emergence, essence, collapse], Moscow, 1981.

³ Border troops of the USSR. 1929-1938. Collection of documents and materials. Comp. Ivanchishin P. A., Chugunov A. I. M., 1972.

⁴ Combat path of the troops of the Turkmen Military District, Moscow, 1959; Tashkent Red Banner and Order of the Red Star Military School named after V. I. Lenin. A brief historical sketch. Tashkent 1958; Tashkent Combined Arms School named after V. I. Lenin (A brief historical essay on the Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command Red Banner Order of the Red Star school named after V. I. Lenin). 2nd ed., ispr. and add. Tashkent, 1978; Tashkent Red Banner: Essays on the history of the Tashkent higher combined-arms command Red Banner Order of the Red Star School named after V. I. Lenin. Tashkent, 1988.

^{Lyashchenko N. G.} 5 Years in overcoats (Commander's Youth). Frunze, 1973; same name. Time has chosen us, Moscow, 1990.

⁶ Now the city of Turkmenbashi.

⁷ Russian State Archive of Socio-political History (hereinafter-RGASPI). f. 62. Op. 2. d. 2549. L. 56.

⁸ Ibid. d. 2544. l. 8.

⁹ Ibid., 2545 p.1.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., 2549 p. 56.

¹² Ibid. d. 2545. Ch. 1. l. 118.

^{Behelke and Jafarbai are} 13 phratries of the Turkmen Yomud tribe.

¹⁴ RGASPI. f. 62. Op. 2. D. 2544. L. 18.

¹⁵ Ibid. d. 2549. l. 48.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid. d. 2544. L. 63-64. 65-66.

¹⁸ Ibid. d. 2549. l. 106.

¹⁹ Ibid., l. 120.

²⁰ Ibid., l. 121.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., l. 159.

²³ Russian State Military Historical Archive (hereinafter - RGVIA). F. 25895. Op. 1. d. 62. L. 12-13.

²⁴ RGASPI. f. 62. Op. 2. D. 2544. L. 64.

²⁵ Ibid. d. 2545. Ch. 2. L. 321.

²⁶ Ibid., l. 352.

²⁷ Ibid. d. 2544. l. 64.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Border troops of the USSR. p. 195.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 194.

³¹ RGASPI. f. 62. Op. 2. d. 2544. L. 64.

³² Ibid. d. 2545. Ch. 2. L. 269.

³³ Border troops of the USSR. p. 195.

³⁴ RGASPI. f. 62. Op. 2. D. 2539. L. 61.

³⁵ Border troops of the USSR, pp. 205-206.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 220.

³⁷ RGVIA. f. 25895. Op. 1. D. 873. L. 59, 60, 74.

³⁸ RGASPI. F. 62. Op. 2. D. 2544. L. 66; D. 2546. Ch. 1. L. 53.

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³⁹ Ibid. d. 2546. Ch. 2. l. 228.

⁴⁰ RGVIA. f. 25895. Op. 1. D. 722. L. 15.

⁴¹ Ibid. d. 719. l. 47.

⁴² Ibid. d. 400. l. 31.

⁴³ Ibid., l. 36; d. 873. l. 10.

⁴⁴ Tashkent Red Banner... P. 121.

⁴⁵ RGVIA. f. 25895. Op. 1. D. 719. L. 324.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 400 p. 31; Tashkent Red Banner... p. 122.

⁴⁷ RGVIA. f. 25895. D. 400. l. 31.

⁴⁸ Ibid. d. 871. l. 87.

⁴⁹ Ibid. d. 400. l. 36; d. 871. L. 87.

⁵⁰ Ibid. d. 719. l. 149.

⁵¹ Ibid. d. 400. l. 36.

⁵² Ibid. d. 719. l. 149.

⁵³ Ibid., l. 324.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid. d. 400. l. 44.

⁵⁶ Ibid., l. 36.

⁵⁷ Ibid., l. 85.

⁵⁸ Ibid. d. 871. l. 111.

⁵⁹ Ibid. d. 400. l. 85.

⁶⁰ Tashkent Red Banner... P. 132.

^{Gurdjieff N. G., Es'kov A. A.} 61 Edict. soch. P. 86.

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