The article is devoted to the efforts of the state leadership of post-Soviet Kazakhstan to overcome the economic crisis due to the collapse of the unified economic complex of the USSR and put it on the track of sustainable growth and modernization. The article reveals the reasons why the path of industrialization and diversification of the economy based on a new technological base turned out to be the only acceptable one for ensuring not only its growth, but also the state integrity of the country. The main objectives of the first two state accelerated development programs are considered: the first five-year plan for 2010-2014, which focused on industrial diversification, and the second - for 2015-2019, in which the main task was the implementation of large infrastructure projects.

Keywords: enclave, diversification, industrialization, innovation, modernization, economic growth, oil industry, transition economy, strategy, transport infrastructure.

Kazakhstan is currently the only country in the CIS where the slogan of forced modernization is placed by its leadership at the forefront of not only long-term (until 2050), but also current economic policy. Although until recently, at the turn of the 1990s-2000s and in the first years of the new century, the very possibility of such a choice was greatly questioned. There were many reasons for this.

By the end of Soviet rule, Kazakhstan occupied an intermediate position in terms of industrialization between Russia and (by the then name) the Central Asian republics, although somewhat closer to them. Large enclaves of mining and metallurgy, oil production and processing, and commercial grain farming were created in it. But the industry was only partially equipped with modern technologies, which by the end of the Soviet state's existence were already very outdated. The entire economy was divided into three sectors, each of which was located in its own circle of administrative distribution system: federal, republican, and local government departments. Accordingly, the planned supply of their material and financial resources and distribution of products were ranked. Kazakhstan occupied important positions in the extraction of some metal ores, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, in the production of grain crops, and was noticeably present in the oil industry. According to S. Zhukov and O. Reznikova [Zhukov and Reznikova, 2001, p. 52], in 1989 the industry of union subordination accounted for two-thirds of fixed assets, half of employment, and about half of output. But these industries were poorly linked to the rest of the republic's economy. Enterprises of lower levels of subordination were in all respects inferior to enterprises of union significance. "The structure of the economic complex of the former Soviet Union, by the way, is largely inherited by us in Kazakhstan," President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev wrote in his speech.

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the book "On the threshold of the XXI century" was extremely distorted and aimed at meeting the needs of the extractive industries and the military-industrial complex. Naturally, it could in no way contribute to increasing the level of competitiveness of the economy" [Nazarbayev, 1996, p.17].

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, only a part of those elements of Kazakhstan's economy that were previously included in vertical ties retained certain chances to restore or find a new demand for their products. Local enterprises were unable to compete with imported goods in the newly opened markets. As a result, almost all branches of production of goods either barely survived (metallurgy, mechanical engineering, food industry, agricultural enterprises), or were on the verge of extinction (primarily light industry).

As a result, three processes are intertwined in Kazakhstan. First: the crisis and the reduction of production due to the breakdown of previous ties. Second: spontaneous rehabilitation, including culling, of all elements of the previously created economy-based on new criteria of rationality that have emerged as a result of market reforms. Third: efforts to restore at least some of the old economic ties and build new ones. Therefore, at first, changes in the economy took on the character of a collapse, which only from the mid-1990s turned into a more or less smooth decline with the appearance of pockets of stabilization and recovery growth. The decisive factor was the formation of the Kazakh-foreign sector of the oil and gas industry, which by the end of the 1990s reached the previous level of production and began to grow rapidly.

FINDING A NEW STRATEGY

However, by the end of the 20th century, the country's gross domestic product had not reached even three-quarters of the Soviet level, even though the oil and gas industry had significantly increased its contribution to it. The structure of gross product has also changed: the production of goods, which is typical of the socialist economy, has lost its dominant position, and the production of services has come to the fore. This trend, which is typical of the modern world, in Kazakhstan was manifested not as a result of the growth of social labor productivity, but as a result of the decline in most sectors of production of goods; the transition from the system of state procurement and administrative distribution to market relations, and the reduction of government spending on the economy.

In such circumstances, the emphasis of the state leadership on the development of the export oil and gas sector began to cause concern among the Kazakh public for the future of the country. There were fears that it was moving along the well-known path of the "oil monarchies" of the Arab East. Moreover, the largest foreign companies were invited to the country. "The example of the prosperity of the Persian Gulf countries," wrote Kazakh analyst S. Smirnov, "painted the steppe expanses of Kazakhstan with the mirage of the inevitable "Kuwaitization". As a result, the picture of an oil rig in the middle of grass steppes or sand and a commercial kiosk attached to it becomes more and more real... Passive expectation of the country's "Kuwaitization" contributes to the disintegration of the non-primary production complex." From this, "he concluded," the "Nigerian" version is no longer the "Kuwaiti" one [Smirnov, 2000]. In our country, the opinion of the above-quoted S. Zhukov and O. Kropotkin was in tune with this prediction. According to Reznikova, Kazakhstan has developed a "special dead-end version of dualism": "Several dozen export and energy enterprises are turning into an enclave", the return on which depends entirely on the global situation, and it uses the local electric power industry and transport infrastructure as donors. However, the authors made a reservation: "The coming years will show whether the existing dual structure will continue to develop according to the dead-end version, in which the enclave character of the country will be different."-

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the ter of the export sector may even increase, or the necessary steps will be taken to improve the situation." Either the state will create a mechanism for efficient use of oil export revenues within the country, or the rest of the economy will be in a state of " depressive stabilization "(Zhukov and Reznikova, 2001, p. 139).

Pessimism about the future of Kazakhstan's economy also corresponded to widespread views on the prospect of its statehood. "Political power," American political analyst Martha Olcott said, " is becoming synonymous with economic power, and Kazakhstan is beginning to resemble other commodity-exporting countries with a small elite." Its political system is "a cross between autocracy and oligarchy" (Olcott, 2003, p.258). Kazakh political scientist N. Masanov drew attention to the" extremely important " role played in Kazakhstan's politics by the rivalry of tribal associations - zhuzs - and within zhuzs among the elite [Masanov, 2003, p.365]. And the toughest estimate looks something like this: Nazarbayev and his entourage deliberately set a course "to build a 'Sultanist' authoritarian regime, only covered by a democratic facade " [Kalishevsky, 16.05.2014].

This article does not mean to analyze the state of Kazakhstan's statehood in essence. Such estimates are given only to show that the subsequent choice of President Nazarbayev in favor of forced modernization was unexpected for many. Even despite the fact that back in 1997 he approved the "Strategy-2030" with the task of raising Kazakhstan to the level of modern "Asian tigers". "Today we are on the threshold of great opportunities," the President said. - Many of you know how some of the poorest countries in Asia have emerged from poverty within 30 years and become prosperous industrial states. < ... > As a result of such success, these countries are known around the world as Asian Tigers. Are there any reasons why Kazakhstan, with all its capabilities, cannot achieve the same? They don't exist. By 2030, I am sure that Kazakhstan will become the Central Asian Leopard and will serve as an example for other developing countries " [Message to the People of Kazakhstan, 12.10.1997]. This was followed by a whole series of strategic programs and plans designed for different periods. But attempts to implement them twice - in 1998 and 2008-were interrupted by the impact of international economic crises on Kazakhstan. Finally, against the background of overcoming the last crisis, a comprehensive State Plan for Accelerated Industrial and Innovative Development (SPFIID) for 2010-2014 was formulated and approved. (State Program for Accelerated Industrial and Innovative Development, 2010), a little later it became an integral part of the "Strategy "Kazakhstan - 2050". What prompted the president to take this path?

His previous experience probably played a role: from the party committee secretary of the largest Karaganda metallurgical Combine to the Pre-Council of Ministers, First secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Republic, and even (in the politically turbulent 1990-1991) a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Moreover, Kazakhstan was one of the most important elements of the economic complex of the USSR, surpassing most of the Union republics in terms of the level of industrial development and the involvement of the population in industrial labor. So much so that even the almost catastrophic recession in the first half of the 1990s did not throw it far back into the pre-industrial economic and social archaism. And the very first successes in the development of the oil and gas complex have provided a new important resource - one that can be most easily mobilized for the stabilization and restructuring of the economy. Especially if the main reserves of growth, which were laid down in the mechanism of the previous economic system, were exhausted.

Further, the results of the efforts of the 1990s, and then the crisis of 2008-2009, showed how limited the country's economic potential for recovery and recovery is.

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the ability of the preserved enclaves of the economy to integrate into the national reproduction system. It would seem that the oil and gas sector can become a powerful engine of growth. By the beginning of the 2008 crisis, oil production had increased almost 3-fold (about 80 million tons), and gas production had increased more than 4-fold. Fuel and energy resources accounted for 70% of exports and more than 20% of GDP. However, the connection of the oil and gas sector with the country's economy was limited only by contributions to the budget and the National Welfare Fund "Samruk-Kazyna"created in 20081. This, however, played an important stabilizing role during the crisis years. But in general, neither the state nor the market were ready to actively work towards the harmonization of the economy. "The policy of diversification," states the FIID program, " has faced the lack of the necessary critical mass for its promotion... In the pre-crisis period, the market economy of Kazakhstan was formed evolutionarily. The movement of the economy was set by the export-raw materials sector and cheap foreign loans." "Business priorities did not coincide with the state's priorities for the development of manufacturing industries that produce products with high added value. Loans from private banks were mainly directed to trade and construction. Of the more than $ 100 billion in foreign direct investment attracted to the economy in the first two decades, 85% was accounted for by raw materials industries "[Gosudarstvennaya programma..., 2010, pp. 7-10].

The crisis highlighted all the weaknesses of the Kazakh economy. A sharp decline in the value of exports led to the devaluation of the tenge. The decline in production affected all industries with the exception of the oil and gas complex. This has affected the standard of living of the population, among which two-thirds are employees. The use of oil and gas revenues for production and consumer imports, as well as replenishment of the National Welfare Fund, turned out to be only a way to maintain simple reproduction and sluggish economic growth based on outdated fixed assets, mostly close to complete physical deterioration. The competitive environment is not yet fully developed. This is hindered by the monopolization of heavy industry markets, the weakness of medium and small enterprises, the pressure of "gray" imports, as well as the" hanging " sector of the economy in the form of state-owned enterprises of railway transport, energy, economic and municipal infrastructure. The essence of the problem of this part of the economy lies in the ambiguous criteria for evaluating its performance. On the one hand, these are economic indicators: investment, return, profit, profitability, on the other - its special significance as an element of economic and social infrastructure.

The uncertainty of the economic outlook has created another danger - the archaization of the social structure of a society that was previously dominated by wage labor. But by the time of the crisis, its size and share in total employment had halved. The manufacturing industry lost more than half of its employees. The situation in construction turned out to be even worse: employment fell by more than three times. In contrast, the self-employed population has increased from less than 5% to almost 45%. Especially at the expense of agriculture, whose share in total employment has increased from the previous quarter to a third, while the contribution to gross product has repeatedly decreased - from 30% to just over 5%. Mainly due to the swelling of the sector of peasant and family farms [Aleksandrov, 2013, pp. 170-173]. Such changes are also fraught with serious socio-cultural consequences. According to N. Masanov , this is due to significant changes in the system of social and cultural preferences, work ethics and public morals. "Traditional social and cultural norms are introduced into the urban industrial environment, but they do not coincide-

1 Samruk - a legendary bird similar to an eagle; kazyna - treasury, in this case a fund.

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people with labor skills and industrial production ethics" [Masanov, 1999, p. 135].

Finally, the economic, geographical, and socio-demographic characteristics of Kazakhstan, as a consequence of Soviet forced industrialization, cannot but prompt serious consideration of the dangers of choosing "Kuwaitization". There are four major economic and geographical regions in the republic:

- Northern Kazakhstan: diversified industry, mechanized agriculture, developed transport infrastructure, predominance of the Russian population;

- Southern Kazakhstan: industry and agriculture are weaker than in the north, Kazakhs predominate in rural areas and Russians in urban areas;

- Western Kazakhstan: hotbed industry, low population density with a predominance of Kazakhs;

- East and South-East Kazakhstan: unevenly distributed industry, agriculture only in the foothill zone, the predominance of Russians in cities, Kazakhs in rural areas.

These four regions are separated by a "weak territorial core array doomed to stagnation and demographic death" (Zatulin, Grozin, Khlyunin, 1998, p.11).

This model also corresponds to the highly uneven territorial distribution of cities, which is also a serious obstacle to the integration of the economic, social and state organism of the republic. S. A. Panarin (IB RAS) characterizes this model as follows: "The urban network in Kazakhstan is very sparse (one urban settlement per 10 thousand square kilometers), while cities and urban - type settlements are very unevenly distributed throughout the country. Medium-sized and large-sized cities are mostly pressed against the borders of Kazakhstan; as a result, we see not so much a network as a horseshoe of cities that is open in the south-west" (Panarin, 2005, p.48). To this was added the disintegration of the population in the form of interethnic division of labor: the predominance of the Russian population in industry, mechanized agriculture, education, science, culture and management [Agro-industrial complex of the USSR, 1990, p. 82-83; Erofeeva, 1999, p. 160-161].

MODERNIZATION: INCENTIVES AND ACTIONS

As a result, regardless of the personal preferences of President Nazarbayev, it can be stated that, no matter how you look at it, the choice in favor of the "Kuwait" path would be disastrous for Kazakhstan's statehood. The economy of the republic, left to its own devices by the will of history after the collapse of the USSR, in the 1990s revealed a dramatic lack of potential for recovery and, most importantly, for building a unified system of social reproduction. Public investment was limited, and the national business was not yet strong. Therefore, the economy's dynamics were mainly supported by the export oil and gas sector and cheap foreign loans. Kazakhstan's industry appeared not as a single industry, but rather as a conglomerate of enterprises or their separate groups, loosely connected by the internal division of labor. They are individually dependent on global market prices, as well as on low domestic demand and opportunities to import equipment, components and materials. The national business, for its part, showed interest only in those areas of activity in which it is possible to count on a quick return on investment: trade, services, housing construction, real estate. And this picture was superimposed on the background of weak ties between enterprises and sectors of the economy, disunity of regions, low efficiency of public administration, which was drawn together into a single state.

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Centre. The reduction of production led to unemployment and a decrease in the standard of living of the population, to the archaization of the social organism, and created a threat to social stability. Separatist tendencies have become more pronounced in the country, especially in the south.

All these problems were colored in even more dramatic tones by the crisis of 2008-2009. Apparently, this prompted President Nazarbayev to strengthen the economic function of the state as early as February 2008. In another "Message to the People", he promised to activate domestic investment resources with an increase in the role of state-owned holdings, development institutions, and social and entrepreneurial corporations. In the oil and gas industry, the sphere of control of the state-owned company KazMunayGas began to expand rapidly. Then in 2010, when the peak of the crisis was over, the president announced the launch of a long-term State program of accelerated industrial and innovative development under the slogan "Economic diversification is the key to success" [Message of January 29, 2010].

This program is based on the objectives of the "Kazakhstan - 2050" Strategy, which President Nazarbayev first spoke about in his annual address in December 2012. Its main goal is "to create a welfare society based on a strong state, a developed economy and opportunities for universal labor, and Kazakhstan's entry into the top thirty most developed countries in the world" [Message of December 17, 2012]. Later, in his January 2014 message, he presented a more complete and divided version of it. Since the "Strategy 2050" actually absorbed all the previous programs, it is advisable to consider its main provisions [Message of January 17, 2014].

Kazakhstan-2050 strategy defines seven long-term priorities:

1. "Comprehensive economic pragmatism".

2. Comprehensive support for entrepreneurship.

3. New principles of social policy: social guarantees and personal responsibility.

4. Knowledge and professional skills are key landmarks of the education system.

5. Strengthening of statehood and development of Kazakhstan's democracy.

6. Promoting national interests and strengthening regional and global security.

7. New Kazakhstan patriotism - "the basis for the success of our multinational and multi-confessional society".

The strategy's indicators are based on the principles and standards of the OECD member States. These include annual GDP growth of at least 4%; an increase in investment from the current 18% to 30% of GDP; the introduction of a knowledge-intensive model of the economy and an increase in the share of non-primary products in the export potential to 70%; an increase in science funding to at least 3% of GDP; a twofold reduction in its energy intensity; and bringing the share of small and medium the share of medium-sized businesses in GDP is not less than 50% from the current 20%; the increase in labor productivity by 5 times - from the current 24.5 thousand to 126 thousand dollars. In the social sphere: 4.5-fold increase in GDP per capita - from $ 13,000 to $ 60,000; transformation of Kazakhstan into a country with a predominance of the middle class; increasing the share of urban residents from 55% to 70% of the population; increasing life expectancy to 80 years and above.

The entire period up to 2050 is divided into eight five - year plans, the first of which is the just-completed program for 2010-2014, the main task of which was "ensuring sustainable and balanced economic growth through diversification and increasing its competitiveness". The National Welfare Fund "Samruk-Kazyna", systemically important companies of the fuel and energy complex and metallurgy, as well as strategic foreign investors were supposed to act as the engines of the projects. Fuel and ENERGY COMPLEX

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and other export industries had to play the role of locomotives of industrialization by developing the production of subsequent repartitions and spreading the multiplier effect to related sectors of the economy. Particular importance was attached to the combination of regional specialization and vertical integration with the formation of territorial clusters and agglomerations, which is extremely important for the country's disintegrated economy.

The National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan is at the head of the state monetary and financial policy institutions as an instrument of the state's macroeconomic policy. Below is the system of institutions for economic stabilization and development through financial support for domestic enterprises and investment projects at all levels. Public financial resources should be channeled through both public and private operators. The latter include second-tier banks, international development institutions, non-state leasing and investment companies, and other financing organizations. The central position in this whole system is occupied by the already mentioned National Welfare Fund "Samruk-Kazyna". At the same time, the state has taken over the financing of systemic and sectoral support measures and infrastructure development, while the private sector, including management holdings, national holdings and companies, has focused on financing specific projects. The total volume of direct investment in planned projects was estimated at 6.5 trillion tenge, or $ 43 billion (at the exchange rate at that time). Investment in the oil and gas sector was central. In 2014, it was necessary to increase oil production to 85.0 million tons (120% by 2008), natural gas to 54 billion cubic meters (164%), oil exports to 75 million tons (119%), and oil refining at Kazakhstan refineries to 15 million tons (122%). It was intended to increase oil production mainly due to the development of the Tengiz 2 field and the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea (Kashagan field and neighboring areas). But at the same time, the products of non-primary sectors of the economy should have reached 40% of the export volume. It was also necessary to ensure the advanced development of energy, transport and infocommunication infrastructure, to achieve a breakthrough in the development of domestic entrepreneurship [State Program..., 2010, p. 2-64].

By the beginning of 2015, the official results of the implementation of the program had not yet been summed up. Therefore, it is possible to appeal only to incomplete periodic government reports, which still lack data for the whole of 2014. Below are their main basic indicators [Indicators of the State Program for Accelerated Industrial and Innovative Development.... N 3, 2014, pp. 5-16]:

- GDP growth in real terms in 2014 - by at least 38.4% compared to 2008: 2008-100.0; 2013-129.9.

- Growth of GVA (gross value added) of the non-primary sector by 2015 -39.5% by 2008:

2008 - 100.0; 2013-130.4 (I-III quarter of 2014 to 1-W quarter of 2008-130.7).

- Growth of GVA of the manufacturing industry by 2015 - 43.6% by 2008: 2008-100.0; 2013-125.8 (I-III quarter of 2014 to I-III quarter of 2008 - 125.6).

- Increase in the share of manufacturing industry in GDP to 12.5% by 2008: 2008-11.8; 2013-10.7 (I-III quarter of 2014 to 1-III quarter of 2008-10.9).

- Increase in labor productivity in the manufacturing industry by at least 1.5 times by 2008.:

Q1-III 2014 to Q1-III 2008 - 135.5.

- Exports of non-primary goods during the five-year period showed strong fluctuations and at the end of the five-year period turned out to be lower (81.2%) than the initial indicator.

2 An oil and gas field in the Atyrau region of Kazakhstan, 350 km south-east of Atyrau. It belongs to the Caspian oil and gas province.

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- Oil production, including gas condensate, thousand tons (2014 plan -85 million tons):

2008 - 70,671. 0; 2009-76,482. 6; 2010-79,684. 8; 2011-80,60.9; 2012-79,224. 5; 2013-81,786.7 (I-III quarter of 2014 to I-III quarter of 2008-113.1%).

- Volume of natural gas production, billion cubic meters (2014 plan - 54 billion cubic meters):

2008 - 32.9; 2009-35.9; 2010-37.4; 2011-39.5; 2012-40.1; 2013 (I-III quarter of 2014 to I-III quarter of 2008-127.8%).

Not only the above data, but also other data from official reports and analysts ' materials do not give the necessary idea of the qualitative changes in the Kazakh economy during this time (see, for example: [Tleuberdieva, 2014]). It is clear that most of the specific goals were not fully achieved, although certain positive changes and overall economic growth (albeit low) still occurred. However, expectations of high oil and gas production rates were not met, primarily due to delays in the development of the key Tengiz and Kashagan fields. Since the end of 2014, the bursting of the global oil price bubble has increasingly complicated the use of export revenues to implement plans for accelerated industrialization.

However, this was not the only problem of the modernization strategy chosen for the first five years of FIID. A negative role was played by significant defects in the very model of the national economy that was in transition from an administrative (socialist) to a market one. First of all, the weakness of national private capital. The fact that the factors that determine the behavior of private business in Kazakhstan do not fully meet the task of forced modernization of the industrial economy was indicated in the program for the first five years. Another problem was also the well-known disintegration of the national economic organism along territorial and reproductive lines-vertical and horizontal. All this prompted the creation of a program implementation system, in which a strong state distribution mechanism was designed to combine large-scale state projects with the involvement of large, medium and small private businesses in the modernization process and the creation of enlarged and internally integrated economic and geographical regions on this basis.

But in the course of implementing the program, significant shortcomings were also revealed in the management system itself, which is based on unidirectional (top-down) teams without feedback (bottom-up) links during project discussion and implementation. That is why the shift of many tasks of the five-year plan to the sphere of regional responsibility turned out to be a serious miscalculation. They often failed to attract foreign and domestic investment, mobilize local resources, and monitor the timely and high-quality implementation of projects. The programs often included enterprises that were not competitive even in the domestic market and were not provided with raw materials. Despite the priorities of industrialization, most of the more than 770 enterprises were in the agricultural sector and construction, and out of more than 30 large-scale projects, only 5 were related to the production of finished products [Today.kz < / en> 29.08. 2014; Ak Zhol, 06.12.2012].

It is not surprising that in his last address to the people (dated November 17, 2014), which ended in the fifth five-year plan, N. Nazarbayev ordered to limit the number of priorities of industrialization in the second five-year plan for 2015-2019. First of all, increase the efficiency of the extractive sectors, finalize oil and gas production scenarios, support the export potential of the oil and gas sector, and increase the development of rare earth metals, taking into account their importance for knowledge-intensive sectors of the economy. And also to enter the global exploration market, attracting investments from foreign engineering companies. Even earlier, in August 2014, the President took new important steps towards further centralization

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public administration of the economy [Kazakhstan: The President reorganized the government, 2014].

The number of ministries was reduced from seventeen to twelve, and nine agencies were transferred to ministries in the form of committees. At the same time, the Ministry of Economy and Budget Planning was transformed into the Ministry of National Economy with the transfer of functions of a number of republican committees to it. Several new ministries have been created:

The Ministry of Investment and Development with the functions of the former Ministries of Industry and New Technologies, Transport and Communications, the Communications and Information Agency, and the National Space Agency. It is also responsible for energy efficiency and geology issues.

The Ministry of Energy ("I believe that now is the time to concentrate the energy sector in one hand," the President said), which has been delegated the powers of the Ministries of Oil and Gas, Industry and New Technologies, Environment and Water Resources.

The Ministry of Health and Social Security, which has been assigned the functions of the Ministries of Health,Labor and Social Protection.

The Ministry of Culture and Sports, which is assigned the functions and powers of the Ministry of Culture, religious Affairs agencies, Sports and Physical Culture. Other measures have also been taken to redistribute functions between ministries and departments in the direction of their centralization. However, measures to strengthen the state vertical of economic management turned out to be aimed not so much at the priorities of the first five - year plan-industrial development, but at other goals. In his next State of the Nation Address in November 2014, President Nazarbayev announced changes to the modernization strategy.

SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN - A STRATEGIC TURNAROUND

It was about the new economic policy of Kazakhstan " Nurly Zhol "("Bright Path") [Presidential Address, 11.11.2014].

In tactical terms (with low world oil prices and the consequences of the global crisis not fully overcome), the state's economic policy is focused on fulfilling social obligations to the population and on prioritizing support for those sectors of the economy that "create the greatest multiplier effect on economic growth and employment." In the strategic plan, an important turn has been made from the accelerated modernization of industry to the development of transport, energy, industrial and social infrastructure, as well as small and medium-sized businesses as a mass base for economic growth and employment. For this purpose, the reserves previously accumulated in the National Fund are mobilized3.

Back in February 2014, it was decided to allocate 500 billion tenge from the Fund as the first tranche of 1 trillion tenge to support economic growth and employment in 2014-2015 in two tranches. Now the second 500 billion tenge ($2,747 million) is to be distributed for the following purposes::

- 100 billion tenge ($549.5 million) - for concessional lending to small and medium-sized businesses and large businesses, for projects in the food and chemical industry, in mechanical engineering, in the service sector, as well as for the recapitalization of the Problem Loan Fund.

- 250 billion tenge ($1,374 million) - to improve the banking sector and buy back " bad " loans.

1 The amount of appropriations in tenge is shown (in parentheses)and in dollar terms. At the beginning of 2015, the exchange rate fluctuated around 182 tenge per 1 US dollar. Kazakhstan's GDP at the end of 2014 was $ 233 billion.

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- 81 billion tenge ($445 million) in 2015 - to complete the construction of the first dry port 4 complex, the infrastructure of the Khorgos-Eastern Gate special economic zones and the National Industrial Petrochemical Technopark in Atyrau and Taraz.

- 40 billion tenge ($219.8 million) in 2015 in addition to 25 billion tenge ($137.4 million) for the continuation of construction of the EXPO-2017 complex.

- 29 billion tenge ($159.3 million) in 2015 for the development of the capital's airport in order to increase its capacity from 3.5 to 7.1 million people in 2017.

N. Nazarbayev stressed that it is the Infrastructure Development Plan designed for the second five-year period that will be the core of the new economic policy. More than 100 foreign companies intend to participate in it, and the total investment portfolio will amount to 6 trillion tenge ($33 billion); the state's share is 15%. Its main projects are:

1. Development of transport and logistics infrastructure within the framework of forming macroregions on the principle of hubs 5. The infrastructure framework will connect the macroregions with Astana and with each other by main roads, railways and airlines on the beam principle. Major road projects: Western China-Western Europe; Astana-Almaty; Astana-Ust-Kamenogorsk; Astana-Aktobe-Atyrau; Almaty-Ust-Kamenogorsk; Karaganda-Zhezkazgan-Kyzylorda; Atyrau-Astrakhan. The creation of a logistics hub in the east and maritime infrastructure in the west of the country will also continue. A ferry service from the port of Kuryk and the Borjakty-Ersai railway line will help increase the export potential in the western direction through ports in the Caspian Sea. It is planned to build or lease terminals in dry and sea ports in China, Iran, Russia and EU countries.

2. Development of industrial infrastructure in existing and emerging special economic zones. A separate area is infrastructure for tourism, where creating one job costs 10 times less than in industry.

3. Development of energy infrastructure. Limited backbone networks cause a shortage of electricity in the southern regions of the country, and natural gas in the central and eastern regions. Efforts should be focused on the construction of high-voltage lines Ekibastuz-Semey-Ust-Kamenogorsk and Semey-Aktogay-Taldykorgan-Almaty. This will allow creating a balanced supply of Kazakhstan's power plants to all regions of the country.

4. Modernization of housing and utilities infrastructure and water and heat supply networks. The total investment requirement is at least 2 trillion tenge ($11 billion), with an annual allocation of at least 200 billion tenge ($1.1 billion) from all sources of financing until 2020. USD). To encourage investment from foreign and domestic sources, up to 100 billion tenge ($550 million) should be allocated annually in addition to the funds already provided in the budget.

5. Strengthening of housing infrastructure. The formation of agglomerations in the course of implementing the development strategy is accompanied by increased mobility of the population and increased pressure on the labor market and urban infrastructure, including housing stock. The state will build social housing for long-term rent to the population with the right to buy without intermediaries and at the lowest possible interest rates for the loan. Therefore, state financing for the construction of rental housing is additionally increased by 180 billion tenge (1 billion tenge). USD) during 2015-2016.

4 Dry port - an internal terminal that is directly connected by road or rail to a seaport. It serves as a center for transshipment of sea cargo on domestic routes.

Hub 5 is a major transfer and reloading transport hub.

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6. Development of social infrastructure. In addition to the three-year budget, 70 billion tenge ($385 million) will be allocated to the school system; 20 billion tenge ($110 million) will be allocated to reduce the shortage of places in preschool organizations over 3 years with the involvement of the private sector. Within the framework of the industrialization program, 10 higher education institutions have been identified, on the basis of which science will be connected with economic sectors and personnel training will be provided. 10 billion tenge ($55 million) will be allocated for the formation of their material and technical base by 2017.

7. Continue supporting small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) and business activities. By the beginning of the second five-year plan, 100 billion tenge from the National Fund was fully disbursed for these purposes. This made it possible to create 4.5 thousand jobs. Unprecedented conditions for lending to businesses at just 6% for 10 years have been created. "We have never had such conditions in our country before," the president stressed. To further support SMEs as a driver of economic growth and increase their share to 50% of GDP by 2050, the government will seek to use credit lines from ADB, EBRD and the World Bank totaling 155 billion tenge ($851 million) in 2015-2017. $ 3 billion each. It will be allocated annually during 2015-2017 from the National Fund. Prerequisite: investments should be accompanied by structural reforms, which requires cooperation with international financial institutions. The World Bank, ADB, EBRD and the Islamic Development Bank are already ready to allocate $ 9 billion for 90 priority projects.

N. Nazarbayev concluded his address on a high note, thus emphasizing the importance of a new strategic turn:

"Roads are life lines for Kazakhstan. In our vast expanses around the roads, life has always arisen and developed. We are obliged to create such a transport network so that highways, railways and air lines diverge from Astana in all directions. Like from the heart to the arteries. As from the sun - rays. New highways that will be built by Kazakhstanis will renew our economy and society. They will firmly connect all corners of our country with the center. Cargo flows will accelerate and increase. Transit volumes through the country will increase. Our citizens will drive on modern and high-quality highways, will be able to safely and quickly get to any region. Social infrastructure will be improved, new and modern schools and hospitals will provide high-quality services. As a result, this will affect the well-being and quality of life of every citizen of Kazakhstan. And most importantly , all this will remain on our land as the wealth of our future generations " [Presidential Address, 11.11.2014].

* * *

Summing up the experience of the first (2010-2014) five-year period of SPFIID, we can conclude that neither the economy of Kazakhstan itself, nor the state administration apparatus is yet ready to solve such a task as a frontal scale and accelerated modernization of the industrial economy. It can be assumed that this was the main reason for N. Nazarbayev's turn to a new strategy-concentration of efforts on projects of national and international significance.

In a similar way, but ten years earlier, the Russian state leadership went this way, putting the implementation of a megaproject - the development and international expansion of the oil and gas sector of the fuel and energy complex-at the forefront of its economic strategy [Alexandrov, 2007].

But if in our country such a strategy actually turned out to be an alternative to modernizing its widely diversified industrial economy, then in Kazakhstan, with all the weaknesses of its socio-economic body and management system already noted, such a decision seems more reasonable. Especially,

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if we take into account that it fits into the general trend of efforts of the main players in the Eurasian economy and politics - the desire to turn this continent into a single economic space - from Western Europe with the Middle East to the Far East and Southeast Asia.

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